56. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: Your letter of May 18, 1955,2 requests the advice of the Department of State on the political effect of the proposed withdrawal of one of three United States Infantry Divisions of the Far East Command prior to the end of FY 1956, resulting in the following deployment of the remaining United States ground forces within the Far East Command:
| Korea | 2 Army Divisions |
| Japan | 1 Army Regimental Combat Team |
| Okinawa | 1 Marine Corps Division (less 1 Regimental Combat Team) |
| 1 Army Regimental Combat Team |
The withdrawal of any further United States divisions from the Far East is in itself, and without regard to the precise place in which forces are stationed, to be regretted from the standpoint of the effective conduct of our foreign policy. I assume, however, that this decision is unavoidable.
If it is a matter of disposing two Army divisions in Korea and one Army Regimental Combat Team in Japan, or one Army division in Korea and one Army division plus one Army Regimental Combat Team in Japan, the Department of State is of the opinion that politically it would be much preferable to maintain the two divisions in Korea.3 The withdrawals of our forces from Korea which have already taken place have been bitterly resisted by the Korean Government, particularly since it has not been feasible for this Government to support a military establishment on the part of the Republic of Korea of the size and character which that Government desires. As this Government recently said to the Commonwealth Governments which desire to reduce their military units in Korea, the efficacy of [Page 108] the Joint Policy Declaration of the United Nations members who fought in Korea is greatly enhanced by the continued and effective military contributions of the nations who stand behind it. Further withdrawals of United States forces from Korea would seriously weaken our efforts to persuade our Allies to maintain even token forces in that country. It could also weaken the confidence of the Koreans in United States support and thus increase the possibility of unilateral action designed to involve us in further hostilities against our will.
Conversely, it is politically desirable that we reduce our forces in Japan as rapidly as military circumstances permit. This is one of the best ways to induce the Japanese to increase their own defense effort, and it tends to reduce the friction which inevitably arises there from the continued presence of large United States forces after the termination of the Occupation.
While it appears on the whole politically desirable to reduce our ground forces in Japan to one Regimental Combat Team by the end of FY 1956, this reduction would be more rapid than was contemplated during the recent negotiations with respect to the contribution to be made for the support of United States forces in Japan. Such a reduction also has serious balance of payments implications for Japan. Accordingly, as soon as a decision with respect to the deployment of our forces is made we should like to discuss with Defense at the staff level the implications of the decision with respect to the current relations between the United States and Japan and Korea.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/5–1855. Top Secret. Drafted in NA on May 23. In a memorandum to the Secretary dated May 24, concurred in by Murphy and Hoover, Robertson recommended signature. (Ibid., 795.00/5–2455)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 795B.5/5–1855)↩
- The JCS were split
on the issue. Radford was in
favor of the first stated alternative, while the Service chiefs
supported the second. A memorandum from the JCS to Secretary Wilson dated May 6, set forth the reasoning of both
the Service chiefs and Radford. (Attachment to memorandum to Hoover from Colonel C.A.
Randall, May 12; ibid.,
795.00/5–1255)
In the letter cited in footnote 2 above, Wilson stated he was prepared to recommend to Eisenhower that two divisions remain in Korea, but that before making this recommendation he wished advice “in regard to the effect on the political situation that such deployment would have in the Far East.”
↩ - Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩