Office of the Historian

54. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 24, 19551

Washington, May 24, 1955

SUBJECT

  • The Bandung Conference

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • General Carlos P. Romulo
  • Mr. Niles Bond, UNP
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., PSA

General Romulo was asked to come in to see the Secretary about the Bandung Conference today. The Secretary congratulated the General on his fine work at Bandung and expressed gratification over the final communiqué. In spite of one or two things in it that were not altogether favorable, the Secretary said that the communiqué contained all of the things the United States and the Philippines stood for.

Romulo, in turn, congratulated the Secretary for his successful efforts in Paris and Vienna.2 Romulo told the Secretary that his radio and television broadcast last week3 had been a wonderful and inspiring thing for Asia. As a result of the Bandung Conference, the agreements in Paris, and developments in Vienna, Romulo thought things were shaping up well.

He particularly praised the Secretary’s policy on Viet-Nam. The Secretary replied that there were very great difficulties with the French who do not realize that the only salvation for Viet-Nam is to support, completely and genuinely, a really independent government there. The Secretary was glad to note Philippine interest in Viet-Nam.

As for Bandung, Romulo made the following points:

1.
Unlike many others, he did not believe Bandung represented a great personal victory for Chou En-lai. While acknowledging Chou’s vaunted cleverness and charm, Romulo expressed his very strong personal conviction that Chou had made so many promises to everybody that he was not only disbelieved but ridiculed. Romulo said that every morning at breakfast various delegations compared notes on what promises Chou En-lai had made the previous evenings. He cited this to illustrate his point that Chou En-lai did not win over many delegates.
2.
The anti-neutralist delegations worked together closely and with great effect. The Turkish delegate was particularly able. Romulo hoped the United States would take into account the successful efforts of these delegates.
3.
Romulo was greatly disturbed over Chou’s effect on Prince Wan. Romulo claimed Wan had been completely “beguiled”. He said that in the political committee Prince Wan would not even subscribe to the condemnation of colonialism and that even when Romulo put the question directly to Prince Wan, the latter made an ambiguous reply. Romulo said that Prince Wan took an increasingly soft attitude toward Chinese Communism and apparently believed all their promises to him.
4.
Nehru did not like the conference and was disappointed in its results. Romulo was sure Nehru had promised Chou En-lai that the conference would have favorable results from their mutual point of view. However, it did just the opposite. Romulo said Nehru’s principal preoccupation was to pave the way for Chou En-lai with all the delegations at Bandung, and do everything he could to create a favorable impression for the Chinese Communists. As for U Nu, Romulo felt that he was completely dominated by Nehru.
5.
The Department’s first statement4 on Chou En-lai’s offer to negotiate was very badly received in Bandung, particularly by friends of the United States. According to Romulo, several delegates came to him in consternation over what they felt was a slamming of the door which put them in a very bad position vis-à-vis Chou En-lai after their strong attacks on Communism.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/5–2455. Confidential. Drafted by Young. The source text bears the notation “OK for dist” in an unidentified hand.↩
  2. Secretary Dulles visited Vienna for the signature of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15. For documentation on conclusion of this treaty, see vol. V, pp. 1 ff.↩
  3. “An Historic Week,” broadcast from the White House on May 17. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1955, p. 871.↩
  4. See footnote 5, Document 51.↩