Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

472. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, September 3, 1957—10 a.m.

332. I had talk with Crown Prince 31st just before his return Luang Prabang. My intention was to review situation in broad terms pointing out that certain dangers of past year had been overcome (by staving off coalition, formation stronger government, depriving leftist opposition of parliamentary power) but that in year ahead we foresaw two major problems (growing penetration and subversion in ten loyal provinces and improper diversion of US dollars which might threaten our ability continue aid). Savang let me finish point one and then replied at length.

He said it was true Pathet Lao had suffered a severe defeat but it would be mistake for US to conclude situation better in any fundamental sense. He did not know whether he had got across his point in Washington last year to Mr. Robertson, Secretary and the President that fight would go on indefinitely, that Communists recoiled only to try again with new tactics. More political, economic support of US necessary if Laos which geographically so exposed was to survive. No doubt there would be reverses but he and others here would not give up any more than PL would. Their leaders now certainly being reprimanded in Hanoi for failure and some might even disappear but while one could not foresee what Communist tactics would be they would surely return to attack. (It was interesting that during this part of talk Savang frankly identified himself with “free world” despite RLG’s official policy of neutrality.)

I told Savang I was sure his point had got across in Washington because our government had long been acutely aware struggle against Communists was long term one and our policies took into account this fundamental assumption. It was precisely because we desired continue our support for Laos that I was concerned at two dangers which I saw ahead and which might make task somewhat different from that of my first year here. One of these dangers pointed up by Bong’s paper which had charged Katay and associates with irregular issuance of import licenses worth five million dollars. Bong was wrong about this as correct figure was nearer twelve or thirteen million. It was my responsibility try prevent waste of funds as such waste could jeopardize continuance our support of Laos. Therefore if he heard of us taking severe action it would be not because we had changed our policy toward Laos but because we judge actions necessary if we were to be enabled continue our policy.

Crown Prince replied obliquely that Katay not approved by people, nor Souvanna nor even Phoui. People had no feeling for assembly either. There were, however, those whom people would follow (he did not clarify this) and what present political leaders had done was therefore of only passing comment. Same true of constitutional amendment which he therefore did not oppose. I said that I hoped action we took could be quiet and informal but problem was important. Savang agreed it was better handle matter quietly and then said that already those responsible were apprehensive and concerned as to their future. During this part of talk I alluded to need for ANL to be paid regularly as means emphasizing relation diversion of dollars to survival of Laos and Savang replied army morale was not good at present as result non-arrival various supplies. He laid blame for this on Souvanna.

Turning to other and more difficult danger ahead I said we had much information indicating stepped up PL penetration and subversion efforts in ten loyal provinces. Savang at first countered by describing deterioration of PL morale in two provinces, dissatisfaction of populace there and need for Viet Minh to reorganize PL troops in Sam Neua. … He then discussed situation elsewhere complaining civic action too far behind schedule and stressing need for dynamic action by auto-defense units. Fact PL attacks of late all against auto-defense proved these units bothered Communists.

Savang who focuses primarily on north said there were two ways RLG might now deal with PL problem. One which he favored was vigorous harassment PL wherever they were found in order eliminate them or make their positions untenable. While this going on he implied that negotiations would make no progress. Other method was Katay’s scheme (Embtels 227,² 271³) to lure PL into commitments for restoration RLG authority and for reintegration PL into national community in return for coalition which would never come off. Then RLG would deal with PL as internal problem. Savang said he did not think much of this as PL were as intelligent as anyone else. I said if I were representative of co-chairman I might have comments on this too quite apart from those Savang had made. Latter went on say enigmatically that during remainder rainy season it essential clean up pockets of subversion and we would probably see developments in various places in north, also in Attopeu. Despite his comments, however, I felt by no means sure that he regards possible disaffection of populace in many areas, particularly in tribal areas, as problem of immediate and critical importance.

As I got up to leave I told Savang we had been disturbed to learn of lengths to which previous government had committed itself to receive Polish and Russian diplomatic missions here. New government had I thought been well received in US but if one of its first acts was to accept Communist bloc representatives there would no doubt be disillusionment. Savang said he was annoyed about this particularly as Souvanna had told Polish commissioner delay was due to Savang and Commissioner had then confronted him directly. He urged me speak to Phoui again on this subject and said he would too later on. I said I expected to do so after I had had benefit of seeing our Under Secretary, Mr. Herter, in Saigon September 9,⁴ occasion which would also give me chance to report orally on talk with Crown Prince today.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–357. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. See footnote 4, supra.
3. Supra.
4. From August 23 to September 22, Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and Special Ambassador James P. Richards, former Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, traveled to East Asia with the primary purpose of attending the independence celebrations of the Federation of Malaya, August 29–31. Before arriving in Kuala Lumpur, Herter, Richards, and their party visited Manila and Saigon. After the independence celebrations, they traveled to Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon (September 8-10), Hong Kong, Taipei, Okinawa, Seoul, and Tokyo. Extensive documentation on this trip is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 899–905A.

   A report of the discussion between Herter and Parsons is in telegram 420 from Hong Kong, September 11. (Ibid., 110.12–HE/9–1157)