467. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
252. Department pass CINCPAC POLAD. Initial call on new Foreign Minister, Phoui Sananikone, morning 15th proved to be one of [most?] encouraging I have had with any top Lao official in 13 months here. Apart from miscellaneous subjects reported elsewhere, conversation divided into (a) procedure on conduct of business with new government and (b) key RLG policies. Following were highlights:
On procedure, Phoui volunteered he wished frequent contact both officially in office and privately at my house as before his investiture. Said at initial Cabinet meeting, he had told Ministers he desired be informed of any difficulties which might arise in aid or other matters so he could be spokesman for ironing out such difficulties with Americans. This followed by remark that as relations between grantor of aid and beneficiary were more delicate than relations between countries not in such relationship, I hoped he would alert me on upcoming problems so that we could prevent them from becoming big problems. As regards other official contacts, he agreed United States agencies should carry on as before. Various ex-Ministers and ex-Secretaries of State would for most part not continue to function as “chef des services” (Somsanith as Director of Police is an exception) but would usually be available at home to advise the various top civil servants. Thus, as he was too busy devote much time to public works portfolio, he would count on Tiao Souk’s interest and [Page 965] advice. I also received Phoui’s approval to contact Souvanna as Prime Minister directly and will do so initially to make comments foreshadowed Embassy telegram 1832 on aid aspects his investiture speech. I told Phoui fact comments limited to this aspect did not indicate we approved other aspects as for instance, Souvanna’s program for PL settlement on which he already knew my views.
On PL problem, Phoui again assured me that Souvanna understood his program would not be carried out. In first place investiture speech has been written for Souvanna (by French adviser) and there was much difference of opinion as to correct interpretation. Souvanna’s had been flatly rejected in favor Katay’s which was quite similar to Phoui’s own. He did not on this occasion elaborate what official interpretation now is but merely assured me that Souvanna has agreed that when talks with PL resumed, he will follow Cabinet interpretation and direction. PL, he said, would first have to make good on commitments before they could be brought in.
Phoui also cleared up question mark left by Crown Prince’s assertion (Embassy telegram 2313) that constitution will not be revised at this time. Cabinet decided yesterday to go full speed ahead revision in hopes completion before nine Deputies take off for IPU meeting in London. Nationalist-Independent meeting 14th has already decided that revision will provide for investiture by simple majority but with Ministers-designate not voting as present. This will produce about same results as proposal which was rejected for retention two-thirds rule but with restoration Ministers-designate right to vote. As comment it occurs to me that if in eventual supplementary elections PL and Bong should go well, provision for majority vote will be more favorable to Conservatives than two-thirds vote of 60-man Assembly.
One promising revelation by Phoui was that National Assembly committees have already been revised as if result of pretext provided by Phoui’s resignation from chairmanship of Economic Committee. Bong was head of Juridical Committee, and his follower, Quinim, as head of National Defense Committee, have both lost out and neither now holds any important parliamentary position. Similarly, unless reaction of Bong and Democrats to constitutional revision and loss of committee jobs should be such that prudent reconsideration required, Conservative bloc has decided not to bring Bong or Democrats into enlarged government which will be formed as soon as possible when present quasi emergency situation is terminated by revision constitution. [Page 966] Decision whether to form new government at that time or to enlarge this one is, however, to wait on events.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/8–1557. Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, Paris, London, Phnom Penh, Ottawa, and New Delhi.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 462.↩
- Dated August 10, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/8–1057)↩