465. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
218. Since inception government crisis, Gassouin has spoken to me in terms which favor Souvanna, Petsarath and their general policies. He has also contrasted Petsarath and Crown Prince to latter’s disfavor and voiced thesis that there is doubt as to Savang’s succession; it is difficult know how far he has pushed this preference for Petsarath. Gassouin has spoken in similar vein to others on these subjects and I have no doubt French have worked behind scenes in hopes Souvanna at least could come to power. French advisers wrote [Page 961] Souvanna’s draft investiture speech albeit under his direction and there are of course daily opportunities for Parizot and Mathieu who work in Souvanna’s office to influence situation. … quite certain as am I that quite a few rumors disadvantageous to United States have been planted by French.
Although both Holliday and I have made various efforts try and preserve not only facade but some reality to tripartite unity here, fact is French have operated largely on their own and have made no effort reconcile our respective differing ideas or even respond to gestures US (as well as British) have made. French could perhaps equally well reproach United States-United Kingdom with showing marked preference for candidates other than Souvanna but they cannot reproach us with unwillingness to try and patch up our differences. At same time it should be conceded that at times French advisers have been valuable sources of information to this Embassy.
It seems to me French here more preoccupied with considerations prestige, French Union concept and above all maintenance position inside RLG through adviser mechanism than they are in concerted defense Lao position in free world. Many local French (notably Parizot) proceed from assumption that United States determined supplant French here; in fact attitude almost psychopathic in some instances. Parizot has even insisted (in presence Holliday) that United States has in recent years systematically sought diminish French prestige everywhere. Such psychological consequences of France’s reverses apparently make it most difficult for French to work with US on basic problem of keeping Laos free in which we perforce have major role. Gassouin maintained in one talk with me (Embassy telegram 642) that France’s interest now limited to her cultural and moral position and that there is no material interest such as ours (he omitted to state that one practical objective of French policy was to assure pro-French vote by Laos in United Nations). While he did not deny French also concerned to keep Laos free, he was apparently ready to take much greater chances than we if thereby France’s favorites and their advisers could hold key spots. Maybe French are gambling that no matter what happens, United States will not when chips are down actually pull out of Laos because of effects on Southeast Asia and beyond. Thus they go on behind shield of United States defense of Laos and concentrate on maintenance French influence for its own sake.
Viewed from here local French actions shortsighted for following reasons:
- 1.
- Activities certain French advisers albeit discreet likely engender adverse reactions particularly on part Katay and associates.
- 2.
- If Souvanna investiture program carried out, Western (and hence French) influence would at least be diluted and that of neutralists and Bloc enhanced.
- 3.
- If situation becomes untenable to point where United States considered continuance aid would favor Commie more than free world in Laos, France too would be through although some equivalent to Sainteny Mission3 might remain.
… Normally given Quai d’Orsay’s protestations to Embassy Paris of tripartite unity, it should be up to us in field to work out our differences. Unfortunately this does not seem to be possible during Gassouin regime and so another effort elsewhere is only apparent alternative to continued acceptance present undesirable situation.
I feel most strongly that unless France is prepared substitute its resources for ours, it has no right snipe at United States effort in order to promote policies which cannot succeed in long run unless we succeed. I therefore hope Department will consider seriously further informal talks Paris after first concerting views with United Kingdom which is once more firmly seconding our current efforts. Such talks should have positive aspect so that conclusion will not be drawn that we are merely trying to force Gassouin and French advisers out. On contrary French should be convinced we value French presence and assets here and are seeking promote their use in furtherance common aims and our basic interest in preservation Laos independence.
We in this context sincerely point to admiration with which Lao elite continue regard French culture as asset for West and hence United States. Without this window on West, communication Occidental viewpoints would be far more difficult and local tendency toward neutralism would probably be more pronounced. We ought to be able convince French that United States does not mean to sever language and cultural links between France and Laos particularly if we can give evidence of intent help preserve them. In return, French must realize that links of our own which are being built benefit them too.
I believe proposed talks if held should be timed as soon as possible after Souvanna receives investiture. If he fails both timing and talks themselves less important.