Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

463. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 7, 1957—6 p.m.

208. Reference Deptel 126.² Before Katay spoiled Souvanna’s try sixth by insisting at eleventh hour on Vice Premiership which threw Bong into opposition, I regarded situation as worse than year ago, in fact almost desperate. In circumstances I had decided tell both Katay and Phoui in effect that it their responsibility defeat Souvanna before investiture or his policy thereafter.…

With this further sudden reversal, I modified somewhat approach to Phoui and in direct contact with Katay reported Embtels 198³ and 199.⁴ So long as 6-man government reported Embtel is in prospect, I do not think we should reconsider our acceptance fact we prepared live with Souvanna. It doubtful we could persuade Katay and Phoui alter course radically even if we had one which gave reasonable promise assembly approval. At this stage, I feel we must rely pretty much on their judgment and I do have good deal of confidence in soundness their views on PL problem as well as in genuineness their concern for continued US aid to Laos.

Whether or not investiture speech made substantially as drafted, I also think Katay Phoui will keep close rein on Souvanna; in fact Katay told Embassy officer yesterday he would never let PL into government before actual restoration of two provinces and reintegration accomplished. Even if he could not form government he has fair measure of control which is reinforced by tie with Phoui. Actually, regardless what said at investiture, it seems to be understood by Nationalists and Independents that revision of constitution, not PL problem, is first order of business. When Crown Prince gives me audience I will try encourage this trend.

Re aid aspects investiture speech, I will not avail myself Department’s authorization to make points outlined Embtel 183⁵ at least until after vote on investiture. I would prefer make decision in light events and after further reflection on French attitudes here which continue cause us concern. Appreciate and concur with cautions expressed final paragraph reftel.

We had close call yesterday and basis experience to date, we may have some more anytime. Nevertheless, way out of crisis now seems to be in sight though far from certain of accomplishment. At any rate, more solid elements are again in a little better position. If Katay–Phoui plans work out, constitution may be revised in one or two months and sounder, more stable situation result. In meantime, investiture debate may be rough with particularly sharp attacks on Katay from left.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/8–757. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and London.
2. Supra.
3. In telegram 198, August 6, the Embassy reported that Parsons told Phoui Sananikone that Souvanna Phouma’s remarks to Holliday caused the Embassy serious anxiety regarding future U.S.-Laos collaboration, but that Parsons was sure that Phoui and Katay would prevent Souvanna Phouma from bringing his Pathet Lao policy to fruition. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–657)
4. In telegram 199, August 6, Parsons reported that he was unable to see Katay to give him the same advice he gave Phoui, but that he believed the message had gotten through to Katay. (Ibid.)
5. See footnote 3, supra.