459. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
Vientiane, July 17,
1957—5 p.m.
105. Reference: Embtel 94.2
- 1.
- Believe time has come when we must prepare for fact that barring miracle, Katay failing despite best efforts Lao and foreign supporters. Our own efforts which have been intensive behind scenes have received good support from local British and Vietnamese reps but they as well as Thai, French and all other contacts have about concluded Katay has lost. Our hope of splitting Democrats has foundered on their purported conviction that Katay at instigation General Phao were [was?] responsible for Kou Voravong assassination 1954. This plus other grudges held against Katay make it impossible sway sufficient number individuals to drop their opposition.
- 2.
- Reasonable assume Souvanna Phouma will next receive nod from Crown Prince. As Katay probably will give up without presenting government to National Assembly, Savang logically expected allow Nationalists continue their effort under another leader. Furthermore, it widely believed Souvanna can probably gain investiture unless he faces in reverse same threat party disunity which plagued Katay. Difference is Souvanna expected have National Union (Bong) and Democratic support unless Phoui Sananikone given top portfolio such as Defense.
- 3.
- While foregoing is general expectation, there is outside chance for independents be asked to try. Phoui himself says he does not [Page 952] want it but Ngon is possible compromise candidate. Voravongs might well accept him but not Phoui. However, Ngon lacks experience and stature and doubt he could lead strong government. Leuam (unaffiliated) is only other dark horse on horizon and this not at present serious possibility. Investiture either Ngon or Leuam would be highly uncertain.
- 4.
- There may be remote chance of one other solution, namely, emergency government under Crown Prince with or without dissolution of Assembly. It is remote because with King’s life expectancy ebbing, Savang would in our view be unlikely consider this possibility as he must be concerned with “crisis of succession”. Dissolution would be dangerous expedient at this time not only because of opportunities offered PL and Bong to improve their representation but because one more element of confusion and uncertainty would enter into situation which has less assurance of stability than some weeks ago.
- 5.
- Crown Prince still in Luang Prabang but should be here for Independence Day ceremonies 19. I have sent word I should like see him as soon as feasible. Hope Department’s reaction this message can arrive before audience.
- 6.
- Of various courses of action open to us, I believe we should now consider most seriously those based on assumption Souvanna Phouma will seek investiture. We can seek either (a) defeat him, or (b) promote maximum strength in Cabinet which means essentially participation Phoui and Katay in key portfolios and getting them commit Souvanna to Katay–Phoui policy as price of their participation. If, of course, opposition to Souvanna should snowball, we would not intervene. On other hand, disadvantages to US in prolonged crisis becoming more pronounced and there is always spectre of ultimate recourse to Petsarath in default of any other solution.
- 7.
- Should Souvanna form government, I do not think we should despair. Compared with January of this year when most Lao leaders were disposed to swift Pathet Lao settlement without guarantees, we now find most leaders aware true nature Pathet Lao movement and are convinced guarantees essential. Even Souvanna has apprehensions and may be more hesitant regarding integrating Pathet Lao regardless of price paid. In sense we have achieved interim goal of making Lao aware of dangers they run and they are now more disposed to listen to us than when they thought Pathet Lao were good Lao. Souvanna would have to take account of this changed attitude towards Pathet Lao among Assembly and leaders if only because he has had lesson of May 29 defeat. If he comes back we would naturally make concerted drive to press for “reconstruction” through civic action, impact of aid program etc. etc.
- 8.
- For present, we are of course continuing support of Katay and endeavoring see to it that he does not give up before Crown Prince arrives. If Katay hangs on that long, it will afford better basis both for Savang and for us decide what tactics should be pursued.
Parsons