420. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

946. Joint State–ICA–Defense–USIA message. Vientiane 1067.2 We believe there great merit in proposed civic action program but need additional information with respect concrete aspects project.

Our understanding program, drawn from various sources, as follows: RLG program self-help, to be used initially in 10 provinces now under its control designed stimulate village communities draw upon own resources make basic improvements health education public works agriculture. In order use available manpower and skill most effectively program will be joint civilian-Army undertaking.

Two 11-man civilian mobile teams per province (i.e. ultimately 24 teams) composed technicians drawn from among existing personnel Government agencies and Ministries will put self-help program into motion each area. Most recruits already trained their specialties but all will require further training as “civic action” team. Six-to-eight-week training program already prepared and will be executed following Washington approval civic action project. Assume salaries mobile teams will continue be paid by respective Ministries.

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Teams will give minor medical treatment, train village volunteers in use village medical kits, give basic sanitation instruction, start sanitation projects; assist villagers in local construction projects such as bridges draining systems roads, train them carry on after departure team; establish basic school for children and adults to teach three R’s and train volunteers continue program; take census, issue identity cards, perform liaison with local auto-defense; propagandize villages about RLG, train volunteers as information agents for village, organize social veterans youth groups. Teams will spend approximately two weeks each village.

Following mobile teams into particular area but overlapping with them to extent necessary will be ANL commando-type units of 100 men each to supervise continuation programs, permitting mobile teams move on. Since 56 commando units required for 56 districts in which civic action could presently operate approximately 6,000 Army troops including headquarters staff will support some 250 to 300 civilians in mobile teams. Army through logistics and communications capabilities will thus provide basic framework for program. Commando units assure local security, support and supervise local auto-defense units, and assist civic action project. ANL now furnishing required four-month special training to cadre from each commando unit who will then give on-the-job training to remainder commando personnel. Since creation commando units represents reorganization ANL within 25,000 force level, these troops will continue be supported out of already-approved ANL military budget.

Commissioner for Civic Action reports to Chief SIDASP who in turn reports directly to Prime Minister. Commissioner will be ANL man presumably selected by Colonel Ouan. Assume National Council for Civic Action is advisory council and will have no administrative responsibility since multi-member administrative organ would probably render program ineffective.

ICA to finance all costs borne by U.S. including $300,000 emergency period requirement.

Request confirmation and amplification foregoing summary our understanding project. In addition request comments or answers following points:

1.
What are objects of $300,000 expenditure by dollar and local currency cost?
2.
3.
Can you identify U.S. area surplus stocks to be drawn upon?
4.
What is your best estimate annual cost program?
5.
Does candidate for Commissioner Civic Action have proper qualifications, imagination and initiative?
6.
Since it obviously impossible accomplish all mobile team tasks enumerated above in two weeks, assume activities undertaken will depend on priority needs and interests villagers. Will mobile teams return periodically?
7.
We note Minister Public Health and Urbanism to be represented National Council for Civic Action and that Urbanism one of Cabinet posts possibly to be given PL if coalition approved. Request you make clear to RLG we would have strong reservations about supporting important anti-subversion instrument if instigators subversion have voice in program’s coordinating committee.
8.
With respect priority targets, while teams could now go into pockets Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces presently controlled by RLG, appears to us major effort two northern provinces predicated upon settlement following which PL would permit entry RLG. In this case assume Army would precede civilian mobile teams. But if as highly possible PL obstruct effective RLG take-over two provinces what would be civic action role if at same time PL permitted operate as legal political party throughout country? If current negotiations break down and situation remains substantially as at present, is civic action program still of priority importance?
9.
Request your views most advantageous use Army. Can Army participate civic action in numbers envisaged and still receive required conventional military training?

In view these many questions ICA reluctant commit funds until at least preliminary replies thereto available. Nevertheless if you satisfied sufficient basis action exists and immediate initiation civic action essential you authorized proceed, using funds within $12 million FY 1957 non-military DS program (Icato 5733). Owing heavy expense Hungarian Refugee program and possibly augmented Middle East program, FY 1957 funding situation currently very tight and ICA not able allocate additional funds Laos this time. Which DS projects will you eliminate or reduce in order release funds for civic action?4 Upon receipt your decision move ahead with civic action ICA will allot $300,000 within current program NFCR. For long-range period project should be regularized by submission PPA.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–857. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne and cleared by SEA, ICA, and USIA and Defense in substance. Repeated to CINCPAC, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and USUN for Young.
  2. Document 412.
  3. Dated January 18, not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403, Box 60, Vientiane)
  4. In telegram 1288 from Vientiane, the Embassy stated that it was its recommendation and understanding that the $300,000 required for the emergency period would come from a special authorization by the OCB or “other pertinent agency” and not from already allocated ICA funds. … (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–857)