42. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, April 7, 19551
The Secretary opened the conversation by referring to the changes in the British Government. Sir Roger Makins said that “the new team” placed an accent on youth and would work very well together. Sir Roger was delighted that Macmillan was Foreign Minister since he was an old and good friend and had had considerable experience in the field of foreign affairs. Macmillan, Butler, and Salisbury would, he said, make a strong group around Eden. Sir Roger was also pleased that the Earl of Home had been named Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, and believed that Selwyn Lloyd, whom he described as an excellent administrator, would make a very good Minister of Defense.
Sir Roger said he was leaving for a brief trip to London a week from tomorrow. This would afford him an opportunity to have a good talk with Foreign Secretary Macmillan, and he said he would like very much to see the Secretary some time next week before his departure to explore his latest thinking so that he, Sir Roger, could pass it on to Macmillan. The Secretary agreed and said he would be very glad to see Sir Roger.
The Secretary then said he had asked Sir Roger to come in to talk to him primarily about the Bandung Conference. The Secretary [Page 80] felt that the Bandung Conference could exercise a real influence for peace with respect to the Formosa situation if something constructive came out of it. On the other hand, the Secretary had received a recent indication, from Burma he believed, that at Bandung it was probable that a resolution might be adopted which neither the US nor the UK would like. If any resolution or statement came out of Bandung which seemed to give a green light to the Chinese Communists to take Formosa, the possibility of hostilities which could not be confined to the offshore islands and Formosa was greatly enhanced. If, on the other hand, some resolution or statement could come out of Bandung calling for a cease-fire and calling on both parties not to resort to force, the chances of maintaining peace in that area would be very considerably enhanced. In other words, the question of war or peace in the Far East could be significantly affected by what happens at Bandung.
In strictest confidence, the Secretary said he could tell Sir Roger that if assurances could be obtained through the Bandung Conference that the Chinese Communists would agree to a cease-fire regarding Formosa which would leave the islands to be fought for, this would in itself be a considerable contribution, although it would obviously be nowhere new as good as an over-all cease-fire such as envisaged in the draft New Zealand Resolution prepared for presentation to the UN. The Secretary said he had decided to urge certain friendly countries which would be represented at Bandung to propose a cease-fire if the subject of peace or the subject of Formosa came up at the Conference.
Sir Roger asked if the Secretary would suggest a general ceasefire or indicate that even a cease-fire for Formosa leaving aside the question of the offshore islands would be helpful. The Secretary replied that he did not contemplate suggesting that the friendly countries propose a cease-fire for Formosa and the Pescadores only, rather a general cease-fire.
The Secretary then said he had been considerably depressed last evening in thinking over the general situation in Asia. He felt that there were signs that Asian solidarity in an anti-Western sense might be hardening. He did not like Nehru’s speech2 at all. He had attacked the Manila Pact as an organization which increased tension and might lead to hostilities; he had attacked NATO, claiming it gave Portugal Western support in Asia with respect to Goa; he had attacked the Union of South Africa; he had attacked the West for “meddling” in the Middle East. Nehru’s speech had in spirit, though not in content, reminded him of a speech made by a Czech, Hromadka, during the 1948 World Council of Churches at Amsterdam. [Page 81] Hromadka had taken the general line that Western civilization had failed and that some new type of civilization was necessary to replace it. Nehru’s speech had the same general ring. With respect to Asia, the Secretary felt we were up against a bigger and more long-term problem than the details or incidents which make daily headlines in the press. In effect, he felt that there were Asian elements that were pushing for a pan-Asian movement which would be by its very nature and concept anti-Western. He hoped that the British might, prior to Bandung, also use their very considerable influence with certain friendly Asian countries so that both the Formosa situation and the over-all problem of pan-Asianism might not become more aggravated.
Sir Roger said he would report this conversation to his Government, and he personally felt that they would wish also to take a similar line. He asked to what countries the Secretary contemplated sending messages with respect to a cease-fire between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. The Secretary replied that he had not decided as yet, but had in mind Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, possibly Iraq, and Lebanon in the event that Malik represented that country at Bandung. If Malik went to Bandung, the Secretary would urge him to take a position as indicated above. Sir Roger said that if the Secretary could let him know the sense of the instructions we sent out, and the countries to which they were sent, it would be most helpful. The Secretary replied that he would hope to be able to pass this word on to him tomorrow, giving a list of the countries and the tenor of our instructions.3
The Secretary reiterated his grave concern regarding the Formosa situation and his belief that the action of the Chinese Communists will be influenced to a very considerable extent on what backing or approval they believe they will get from other Asian powers. He then mentioned and described in some detail the Chinese Communist activity in building up and improving their air fields along the coast and in the interior area opposite and just to the north and south of Formosa.
Sir Roger then said the situation in Burma was disturbing. The Burmese were running out of money and felt they must sell or barter their rice. They had recently made a deal with the Chinese Communists which involved swapping rice for machinery and other products and which involved Chinese technical experts “with all that goes with it” coming to Burma. The British Ambassador to Burma, GoreBooth, “had had a go at the Burmese about this but was not at all successful”. The Secretary mentioned that when he recently visited [Page 82] Rangoon, the Burmese had expressed their great concern over the problem of rice surpluses and had been inclined to blame the US for its policy with respect to disposing of surplus agricultural products. The Secretary said we were only sending rice to Japan and that we had done this on the basis of Japanese assurances that they would continue to purchase their regular amounts in their normal markets such as Burma.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4–755. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant. A marginal notation in an unidentified hand indicates the Secretary approved this memorandum in draft.↩
- Apparent reference to the remarks made by Nehru in Parliament on March 31.↩
- The Secretary’s decision in the matter is set forth in telegram 1295 to Ankara, April 8, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4–855)↩