Office of the Historian

418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, January 23, 1957—6:06 p.m.

899. Vientiane 1154 repeated London 239 Paris 271 Bangkok Saigon Phnom Penh Unnumbered.2 We concur we might as well take advantage opportunity once again express officially U.S. view Souvanna’s coalition plan. You therefore authorized transmit note on instructions your Government along following lines subject modifications you believe local situation dictates:3

U.S. Government has honor acknowledge receipt telegraphic summary RLG memorandum January 164 outlining its policy and objectives with respect PL. U.S. cannot agree solution envisaged safeguards Lao national interests.

U.S. inability support RLG plan based on fundamental difference in U.S. and RLG appreciation nature PL movement. U.S. believes PL leaders either Communist or Communist-controlled. U.S. therefore concerned at prospect their representation Cabinet since past experience shows Communist pattern is to seek privileged positions within Cabinet, Army, civil service in order facilitate subversion and penetration effort.

U.S. desires see political settlement in Laos consonant with terms Geneva Agreement July 1954 and ICC resolution January 7, 1956, [Page 886] that is, in manner guaranteeing independence and sovereignty Laos. PL were to lay down arms and be reintegrated into national community as loyal citizens. Like Laos, U.S. is disturbed that 2–1/2 years after Geneva Conference such settlement still not achieved and PL continue in military control two northern provinces. Remedy this situation is not, however, to grant PL even greater concessions when they have clearly not fulfilled commitments made years ago.

U.S. policy toward Laos already well-known to RLG: RLG can count upon U.S. moral, material, political support so long as that support goes to government vigorously seeking maintain its independence. American ability support Laos consequently depends upon clear evidence RLG continues defend its own vital interests. In present situation U.S. will scrutinize impending RLG decisions most carefully in order ascertain whether RLG indeed defending its interests. If this scrutiny reveals RLG–PL settlement impairs Lao ability follow independent course, Congressional attitude will be adversely affected and U.S. may be obliged reassess its policy toward Laos.

FYI: Ourot leaving for Vientiane January 23. His farewell conversation with Robertson January 18 summarized Department’s 894 to Vientiane.5 End FYI.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1957. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne, cleared by Kocher and Sebald, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Paris, London, and USUN for Young.↩
  2. Document 416.↩
  3. The note outlined was transmitted to Souvanna Phouma as follows:

    “Letter to Prime Minister dated January 25 hand-carried by Embassy officer 26th. Excepting for amplification of references in introduction, only change was addition of following at beginning second sentence, second operative paragraph, reference telegram [899 to Vientiane]:

    “‘In view of the intransigeance of the PL leaders toward all solutions offered—whether national or international—since 1954’. (Then goes on ‘US believes PL leaders either Communist or Communist-controlled,’ etc.)

    “This, of course, did not imply foregoing was only reason we believe PL are Communists.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2657)

    Texts of the letter in English and French are in despatch 137 from Vientiane, January 28, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–2857)

    ↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 416.↩
  5. Supra.↩