Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

403. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 11, 1956—7 p.m.

921. Reference Embtel 915.² Following telegram attempts appraisal current situation and suggests US course of action in event re-evaluation its policy becomes necessary per November 13 letter (Embtel 773³).

1. Comparison Souvanna’s present proposal for solution PL problem (see reference telegram) with proposal made to me November 19 (Embtel 802⁴) shows some progress. For first time it is provided PL movement would be formally dissolved and Souphanouvong himself would also publicly disavow all relationship to Communists, past, present or future. Current information indicates Souphanouvong plus possibly one other PL, would be brought into Cabinet whereas earlier, PL had requested four members in Cabinet and Souvanna proposed two or three to me. Nevertheless, broad outline of program much the same.

2. There is some possibility obtaining further modification as result foreign and domestic pressures… . On tenth National Assembly, after speech by Phoui Sananikone, voted 18 to 1 (Bong Souvannavong) plus two abstentions, against Bong proposal to seek PL views on situation in endeavor expedite agreement. Phoui had insisted negotiations should be left to government and that National Assembly not qualified take cognizance problem now. Secondly our impression is that if government asks for inclusion Souphanouvong alone, Assembly would go along whereas issue less favorable if two PL proposed. Thus, Assembly attitude, while apparently favorable to deal, is exerting some slight pressure on PL and Souvanna further to modify PL demands. Third possibility for obtaining modification will come when I next see Souvanna, probably several days hence. I am however delaying my call until receipt letter reaffirming agreement with USOM on import licensing procedure (Embtel 916⁵). This letter will not be delivered to me for one or two days, allegedly because Souvanna wishes sift allegations of graft about which he has heard orally. Letter now expected be brief polite reaffirmation of agreement on import procedure plus expression willingness examine question of three licenses, this in anticipation release December ANL funds.

3. When Souvanna’s letter arrives, it is essential release these funds promptly. December 8 letter provided salutary shock in that no one now takes US aid for granted. Shock was at considerable cost to our relations because even some of our friends have said we are penalizing army for an unrelated matter, namely import procedures (we maintain grant dollars involved both matters). It has further been alleged we are using aid for political objectives. Further, one effect of December 8 letter was to cause Souvanna sound out French on possibility replacing US aid if latter cut off. Local French negative on this but reporting Paris. Another reason for terminating aid suspension is because Sen, Indian Commissioner, has learned about December 8 letter which means Hanoi radio may soon be in act. On basis many talks with various contacts last 24 hours, there is good deal reason to believe that if Laos has to choose between US aid and settlement PL problem along lines that are emerging, government and deputies may choose settlement and risk consequences. Generally agreed sentiment for union and fear of divided country very high.

4. I still do not understand basis for Crown Prince’s confidence (Embtel 901⁶) that Souvanna would fall this week. It does seem to be general view that Savang does not have influence with many deputies who consider him too arbitrary. I do not wish to risk any action which might in any way impair effectiveness his activity but so far as I can see, he is out of picture in Luang Prabang whereas actual situation is that both government and assembly likely accept Souvanna’s modified proposals. Decision still few days off because it now appears Souvanna wants Katay back in hopes preventing unfavorable vote him and followers. In meanwhile, rumors are circulating that Katay saw Vice President in Washington and subsequently sent telegram here which his opponents using to claim he is American puppet.

5. At time August communiqués, Embassy reported that henceforth particular emphasis required on internal security measures in preparation for expected intensified overt and covert policy [garble] reinspired by communists. We have made progress on this front through effort of various agencies, Junior Chamber of Commerce, Operation Brotherhood, liaison with police, including Somsanith’s visit to US. New and important developments are Souvanna’s approval in principle of comprehensive civic action program (decree anticipated shortly and will be reported separately) and his approval of ANL plan to station one commando company in each of 56 districts to strengthen internal security and be instrumental in undertaking rehabilitation each area; also approved reorganization areas. Accompanying this has been increase general awareness danger which reached provincial and district levels with Nhouy Abhay’s briefing at time regional officials here for That Luang festival. Degree of preparedness against subversion and infiltration is factor which should be taken under consideration in connection with our future attitude towards Laos.

6. My own belief now is that chances of settlement with PL along lines currently indicated are now such that we should be considering what we would do in that contingency. We do not yet need make decisions, particularly until we see whether Katay can generate opposition, but believe it timely consider seriously what to do if present tendencies should result in settlement. Settlement would include at least one of unfavorable developments (entry of PL in government) which would cause us re-evaluate our policy (letter of November 13 to Souvanna). Depending on integration terms, second unfavorable development may be involved. Nevertheless, I do not believe we should forthwith cut off aid or take any other irrevocable step. We cannot escape from fact that our aid is not marginal or replaceable except by Chinese Communists and Soviet bloc. Quickest and most complete victory Communists could win here would be by driving wedge severing Laos from US. We therefore, in my view, would have to seek course of action which would (1) continue demonstrate seriousness of matter, (2) be genuine re-evaluation, and (3) avoid any final commitment until we see if RLG–PL agreement implemented in good faith. If not so implemented, we should be in strong position here in future. Period between now and supplementary elections three or four months hence would presumably be time needed to appraise outcome.

7. Having gone so far to impress Lao that re-evaluation necessary in certain circumstances, I would think some clearly marked action to that end should be taken if we are to avoid conclusion that US was in last analysis bluffing and hence diminution our weight here in future problems. It might not be enough for me merely to inform RLG officially that situation being reviewed and Washington decision forthcoming in due course. It would have much more impact if I were recalled for consultation on re-evaluation policy. End result such consultation would, I should hope, be decision continue aid at present levels for interim period of few months while caretaker coalition government is in charge pending elections or until such time as success or failure RLG–PL agreement could be determined. Such interim extension aid would have collateral advantage avoiding negotiation on ANL and military support at this time when 1957 military budget consideration not far advanced.

8. In suggesting foregoing line of thought, I am banking on belief that Souvanna’s goal is solution PL problem and that he does not intend consciously or willingly deliver country to Communists. He may have collateral and subsidiary family ambitions which are unpalatable and perhaps inimical to our relations in long run, but main course and extent his ambition is to settle PL problem. However, not only he but any other Lao leader will need assurance of US support such as was reportedly given Katay. Western cause in Laos has been weakened by example of Hungary and, more than before, Lao wonder if we would really come to their aid.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1156. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Ottawa, Saigon, New Delhi, and Phnom Penh and passed to Young at USUN.
2. In telegram 915, December 10, the Embassy reported it had received a report of a proposal which Souvanna Phouma laid before the Lao Cabinet on the morning of December 10. The proposal called for formation of a coalition government by the addition of two Pathet Lao Cabinet ministers (one of whom would be Souphanouvong). At the same time, the Pathet Lao would make a formal written declaration to restore to the Royal Government authority in the two northern provinces and to integrate the Pathet Lao military into the Lao National Army. For all practical purposes the Pathet Lao movement would be dissolved. Formation of the coalition would be simultaneous with completion of these promises by the Pathet Lao. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–1056)
3. See footnote 7, Document 394.
4. Document 395.

5. In telegram 916, December 10, the Embassy reported that the Lao Cabinet accepted the U.S. complaint in a letter of December 8 that three import licenses for equipment were granted without USOM assent. This action by the Lao Government was in contravention of an agreement which committed Laos to expend dollars derived from U.S. aid only after consultation and agreement with USOM. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1056)

   To back up its complaint about Lao failure to consult with USOM, the Embassy suggested and received Department of State approval to postpone temporarily the transfer of $3.9 million for the Lao National Army on December 10. (Telegrams 896 from Vientiane and 695 to Vientiane, both December 7; Ibid., 751J.5–MSP/12–756 and 751J.00/12–756, respectively)

6. Dated December 7, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–756)