389. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
662. Department pass ICA, Defense, CINCPAC. Reference: Toica 462.2 I attach greatest importance to Prime Minister’s threat to resign if what he considers our failure to meet military budget commitment not remedied. (Toica 462, paragraph 5) Regret sudden emergency this crisis but immediate action is required to take care of situation in which US objectives in Laos could suffer seriously.
Am increasingly aware record of past two years shows repeated instances delay in meeting military funding requirements. These delays in no way help to induce economies and are increasing source of irritation. In addition Prime Minister’s unprecedented and, for him, violent reaction, I have received official written complaint from Ministry Defense which sets forth clearly and logically problem created.
Director USOM has explained to me various aspects of procedural difficulties which have prevented ICA/W from responding quickly to requests for funds. Such factors cannot be advanced to assuage Lao authorities who face continuing problem of day-to-day management. Unique situation exists in Laos where neither ANL, Lao Treasury, or USOM counterpart fund has any reserves to fall back on.
While I am fully sympathetic to objectives of reducing military budget, exacting a Lao Government contribution, and effecting economies in military spending, the policy of hand- to-mouth releases is not creating cooperative atmosphere in which such problems can be thrashed out. Instead it is making US support of Lao Army, which is indispensable to independence, a major issue between us. Policy also inevitably appears as warning of US intent to disengage from Laos at any moment and as pressure crudely applied without, at same time, indicating clearly what we expect achieve thereby.
In view seriousness of matter I called on Prime Minister to tell him DePaul had reported to me remarks made to him, that I regretted situation and that I had requested immediate action by PEO and USOM as well as Embassy to inform Washington and obtain remedial [Page 830] action.3 Souvanna, I think, believed my protestations that this was procedural not policy matter and that no embarrassment was intended. However, he said rumors start easily in Vientiane not only among leaders but among soldiers, whose morale, and loyalty too, were involved. There were already rumors we were penalizing him for his neutrality policy. What he needed to know was whether he was going to be able to pay army with funds which we had budgeted and in time. If he could not maintain the army he would simply get out and leave situation to others as he could do nothing more.
I recognize that problem described above confronts Washington with necessity for immediate action in situation which has various unsatisfactory aspects from our point of view. Problem of how to remedy these can wait for moment (provision of adequate controller staff for PEO months ago would have helped) but what is required now in view Prime Minister’s personal reaction is provision through ICA channels of amount recommended by PEO. At moment we seem to be in position of holding back on military aid while professing that it is our policy to continue aid so long as it is to government which vigorously seeks maintain its independence. Somehow we must prevent technical and procedural obstacles from continuing a situation in which operations are not supporting policy. This is essential whether or not Prime Minister’s threat to resign is wholly sincere or not.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/10–2656. Secret; Priority.↩
- Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403, Box 33, Vientiane)↩
- In Icato 373, October 27, the Embassy and USOM in Vientiane received authorization for a cash grant to the Lao Government of $3.5 million for military budget support. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/10–2756)↩