Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

374. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 15, 1956—11 a.m.

235. Department will have noted with concern part two of second communiqué August 10 (Embtel 209²) which states without qualification: “Formation of a government of national union with participation of representative PL forces”. First point, supplementary elections, was as per plan; second, however, was sprung on Lao public via communiqué.

1. Far as Embassy able ascertain, situation has all elements of backstaged deal between Prime Minister and PL. Creditable source within Souvanna’s palace guard tells us Prime Minister made concession privately August 8 to Souphanouvong, who begged for it as only peg on which he could sell colleagues and people back home on returning to fold. Souvanna August 9 had greatest difficulty selling cabinet and assembly representatves previous to signing communiqué August 10. (After my call on Souvanna late afternoon August 9, at which incidentally he said nothing to me of communiqué coming out next day, I saw assembly representatives filing in to see him and was told cabinet meeting was to follow them.) Nevertheless, Hanoi broadcast August 9 gave out news it was agreed August 8 there would be (1) partial elections (2) coalition government with PL representatives; attributed this to Radio Vientiane August 8, falsely, as we were later able ascertain (PL have radio to Sam Neua and could have forwarded news August 8 after Souvanna’s backstage agreement).

2. Reference Embtel 212,³ Katay August 10 told me there had been much friction within government on point in question. Asserted PL leaders recognized statement as it stood was commitment which unconstitutional; PL could legally enter government only with approval of National Assembly of the time, and this would probably be only when present government resigned. PL nevertheless insisted, and won point, that communiqué baldly stated there would be govt with PL participation; this they said was imperative for their home consumption.

Comment: At ceremony August 10 signing second communiqué (called joint declaration) Souphanouvong made speech solemnly declaring PL forces would respect and sincerely and integrally apply the agreements assigned. RLG members present took this statement to mean PL bound themselves to abide by legalities in question of entering government, and Souphanouvong’s statement was later incorporated by him in broadcast to people August 11. Embassy however fails see ground for such optimism. On contrary, appears PL have rather bound themselves to enter government, as per agreement.

3. National Assembly group appointed by Prime Minister and headed by Bong Souvannavong, to thrash out elections point after first communiqué, which left “under study” is known to have opposed concession in question as highly irregular, took logical view that composition of a government to be formed after elections could depend only on outcome such elections. Parliamentarians are said to be most unhappy over RLG guarantee; Embassy unaware what means Prime Minister used to talk them (and many cabinet leaders) over. View remains extant, moreover, that in any case only present government is committed to government of national union, and new Prime Minister may not consider himself so bound.

4. It is generally assumed here that any change would take place only after new partial elections, when it understood present government would resign. According Katay this could not be before early 1957, while Finance Minister says March or April, (see timetable Embtel 212) Nevertheless, there is nothing in second communiqué to ensure “coalition” would only follow upon new elections. It is presumably legally possible for some PL ministers to replace present incumbents in cabinet without even a change in government, let alone new elections, always provided this met with Assembly approval. And if Souvanna should decide to resign before new elections (e.g. in September or October) the PL would certainly lose no time in demanding their pound of flesh—whether or not it might be argued that Souvanna’s successor is not bound by point 2 of second communiqué. PL would presumably either enter government or return to dissidence.

5. In marked contrast to emphasis on measures permit PL participate in political life of country has been de-emphasis on measures to permit RLG resume sovereign powers in two provinces. Such measures have not yet even been discussed by two parties who merely set up two commissions to agree upon these “details”. This as significant as it is disturbing that neither in his radio address to nation August 11 nor in his speech at airport before departing for Sam Neua 12 did Souphanouvong make any reference whatever to two provinces, to facilitating reunification there, to restoration of RLG sovereignty or reintegration PL under RLG authority. Even with respect two commissions which are to deal with these problems only few allusions have been expressions of pious hope their work will prosper in application “principles already agreed on.” In our opinion this was deliberate and obvious tactic to divert attention from problem of two provinces and thus minimize risk that pressure might be brought on PL to cooperate there. Souphanouvong’s two speeches under reference are further indication that mixed commissions will probably have rough sledding and that RLG is in for real trouble unless it continues to give and give. Embassy hoped to submit further views on significance last week’s events in next day or so.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1556. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Ottawa, London, Paris, New Delhi, Phnomn Penh, and Saigon.
2. Telegram 209 from Vientiane, August 10, contained a translation of the unofficial French version of the second August 10 communiqué issued by the Pathet Lao and Royal Government delegations. In addition to Pathet Lao participation in the government, the two sides agreed to supplementary elections to augment the National Assembly and implementation of the agreements reached in principle by the joint political and military commissions. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–1056)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–1056)