Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, June 9, 1956—5:15 p.m.

1264. Vientiane’s 1571² and 1581.³

1. The Department fully supports position you have taken reftel with Prime Minister and hopes you can convey US position to Crown Prince, Katay and other leaders. Your account of Prime Minister’s vague reply to ChiCom invitation and his selection of August date is disturbing. Therefore we fully support your effort to get across idea that US Government, while sympathetic to difficulties of Lao position, would consider such hurried visit to Peiping as endangering security and independence of Laos, and creating difficulties for US efforts to support Laos along lines Secretary’s June 8 message to Crown Prince.

2. We also support your efforts to delete any specific time for visit and to make visit contingent upon solution of internal problems. You should point out other countries have received Peiping invitations and have made no immediate reply. Even Cambodian Sihanouk delayed almost one year and Pakistanis still have not gone.

3. It seems incredible to us that Lao leaders would make such quick reply and accept unconditional visit to Peiping prior to: (a) determination from talks with PL as to possibility of satisfactory settlement; (b) further exploration Thai Lao planning and mutual support; (c) other assurances from their friends. However, if Lao ignore these factors and proceed with undue haste to Peiping, US congressional and public opinion which now friendly and sympathetic toward Laos as evidenced aid program might change. Neither Congress nor American people would be willing make continued efforts assist Lao Government maintain independence, security and freedom if that government appeared to be making unnecessary sacrifice its own interests to ChiComs, despite repeated US representations.

4. In addition above points you may also inform Crown Prince and other Lao leaders of apparent Burmese Government experience with Russian and ChiCom penetration. Just before resignation U Nu expressed dissatisfaction with barter deals with Communists. A few days ago letter appeared in one of leading Burmese papers reportedly revealing U Nu’s dissatisfaction with results policy of neutrality which Russians and ChiComs had exploited to penetrate Burma for their own interests to detriment Burmese independence and security. This letter as well as other authentic evidence indicates Burmese leaders dissatisfaction with and fear of activities Russian and ChiCom Embassies during Burmese elections. Many Burmese considered this unwarranted Communist interference in political affairs Burma. Burma’s experience is clear warning to Laos.

5. Department disturbed implications some of Crown Prince’s statements to you that Laos must have considerable US backing in order not be forced accept whole ChiCom package on Peiping visit. Department believes that Lao leaders should fully realize that such support is contingent upon firm Lao leadership. External assurances are no substitute for internal will and determination to remain free. We can supplement but we cannot supplant. SEATO Treaty now protects Laos from Chinese Communist aggression.

6. FYI Department fully aware possibility Lao leaders may be capitalizing ChiCom overtures to obtain from their friends additional commitments and assurances.

7. (FYI: It seems to Department Souvanna is either being dangerously wobbly or is developing scheme of rapprochement with PL and ChiCom which he has not revealed either to us or to his RLG colleagues. We are concerned latter possibility in view his lack of frankness concerning current relations with Souphanouvong, and Burchett’s visit as well as recurrent reports of clandestine RG contacts with Phetsarath. End FYI).

8. FYI In addition to personal letter from Secretary, which already carried out we have been examining following additional steps designed strengthen Lao determination: (a) intensification Thai-Lao military planning; (b) development of Thai-Lao agreements and possible US or other support, or possible link with SEATO; (c) establishment of SEATO watchdog committee on Laos or periodic joint visits to Laos by representative of some SEATO powers (i.e. Thailand, Philippines, Australia) to discuss problems of Lao security; (d) in cooperation with ICA, formulation not financing of aid projects on 2, 3 or 4 year basis to convince Lao of our intention to continue support; and (e) some appropriate form of expression of congressional interest in Laos.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-956. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Young and Corcoran and approved by Robertson. Repeated priority to Bangkok.
2. In telegram 1571, June 7, Blancké reported that he had learned from Souvanna Phouma that the Royal Government was considering suggesting August 1956 as a convenient time for the proposed visit of Lao leaders to Peking. Blancké argued that timing for the visit must be contingent upon settlement of the internal problem of the Pathet Lao. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-756)
3. In telegram 1581, June 9, Blancké reported that Souvanna Phouma had shown him that day a copy of his reply to Chou En-lai, in which the date of the visit was left to Chou’s convenience with the suggestion that August would be suitable. The Royal Government merely expressed the hope that the internal problem would be settled by then. (Ibid., 751J.00/6-756)