Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, February 3, 1956—10 a.m.

967. Department pass Defense and CINCPAC. Joint Embassy–USOM–USARMA message. Reference: CINCPAC DTG 270405Z January.² Defense Minister yesterday urged in strongest terms, first to USOM Director and PEO Chief and later to myself, that US decision re ANL force level and 1956 calendar year budget be communicated to him. He said it is impossible to make any plans or proceed with necessary reorganization until these basic facts are known. I assured him that matter is being given our urgent attention but he was clearly deeply dissatisfied.

We believe time has definitely arrived when we should make up our mind on force level and communicate our decision to RG. This has most important bearing both on steadfastness of Royal Government and on effectiveness of ANL. As far as we are aware, no objection has been raised to 25,000 figure and we hope CINCPAC recommendation (see reference telegram) will be promptly approved.

Re Icato 490,³ we feel strongly that it is neither wise nor practicable to withhold from RG tentative total US aid figure. Result would be to create so much uncertainty, not to mention ill-will, as to hamstring both ANL activities and reforms which we consider of highest importance. We believe therefore that we should at this time communicate to RG tentative total, with two reservations. First would be that stated amount would be available if further examination of budget and of more economical procedures makes it clear this amount will be required to support approved force level. Second would be that, if serious emergency unprovided for in budget should arise, we would give sympathetic and urgent consideration to request for supplementary aid. As to tentative total to be communicated, we suggest $37.5 million, approximately equal to anticipated total expenditures under CY 1955 budget. Just as we feel it would have seriously deleterious effect on Lao morale to insist they reduce forces below present level at this time, so consider it would be equally harmful, while they continue to be engaged in active military operations against Communist Forces, to inform them of reduction in their military aid, unless and until we can demonstrate present amount is not required to maintain approved force level.

Study of ANL budget by very limited PEO staff presently in Vientiane is proceeding as rapidly as possible and further preliminary comments will be submitted within day or two. It will be weeks or months, however, before we know definitely whether savings can be effected over 1955 expenditures, and if so how much. For both military aid, political reasons we believe therefore we should without further delay, inform Lao Government along lines proposed preceding paragraph.

We also consider we should continue to keep in mind that, if hostilities in north should increase in scope and intensity, considerably larger aid to ANL budget might be required.

I very strongly endorse this country team message and hope interested Washington agencies may be able communicate to us in nearest future decisions along lines our recommendations.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/2–356. Top Secret; Priority.
2. Not found.
3. In Icato 490, January 6, ICA informed the USOM in Vientiane that the Director had approved a 1956 Defense Support program for Laos of $30 million, but suggested that the figure not be revealed to the Government of Laos. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 57 A 248, Box 112, Vientiane)