Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

314. Memorandum From Patricia M. Byrne of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs to the Director of the Office (Young)¹

Washington, October 14, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Current Status of the Lao Government–Pathet Lao Dispute

1. According to press reports, the conversations in Rangoon between Lao Prime Minister Katay and Pathet Lao chief Prince Souphannouvong, undertaken at the behest of the ICC, have broken off, to be resumed in Vientiane. We have had nothing official, either from Rangoon or Vientiane, on this.

2. The only result of the Rangoon talks, so far as we are aware, was a cease-fire declaration.² This, generally speaking, contained nothing new, since the two sides had already reached an agreement on cessation of hostilities on March 9 and, of course, the principal achievement of the Geneva Conference was supposedly just that. There is, however, one new element in that the Royal Government has for the first time agreed not to reinforce its garrisons in the two provinces. Although this seems unfortunate from our point of view, the Royal Government’s representatives have stated that there had been no intention to reinforce in any case. It should be noted that the cease-fire agreement is contingent upon agreement on the other major issues (administration of the two provinces, elections, integration).

3. Last official reports before adjournment of the talks indicated that the Pathet Lao remained intransigent on the first and all-important question of restoration of the Royal Government’s administration.³

United States Views:

4. We have consistently opposed any settlement proposal which would not effectively restore the Government’s administration and permit it to conduct free elections throughout the country, including Phong Saly and Sam Neua. We have also opposed any integration of Pathet Lao troops except for a token number after the Government was firmly in the saddle in the two provinces and could minimize the subversive capability of the very few hundred soldiers who might be taken into the National Army after rigid screening for professional qualifications.

5. We have no details on the latest Indian draft settlement presented to the two sides in Rangoon, but … proposals on reestablishment of the Government’s administration and conduct of elections are favorable to the Government, and it appears that any integration of Pathet Lao troops into the Army is to take place after elections.

Outlook:

6. Communist sweetness and light plus the statement of a middle-ranking Pathet Lao defector that the Pathet Lao were prepared to make “any concessions” to participate in the elections may possibly mean the Communists will accept the latest Indian draft proposal, continuing their subversive activity through ostensibly legal means.

7. Nevertheless, the past performance of the Pathet Lao, their reported fierce opposition to the Government’s administration proposals in Rangoon, and our assessment that they will do nothing to diminish their control over a classic Communist forward base seem to augur either interminable negotiations in Vientiane or outright rupture of the talks.

8. It appears that the Indian “take it or leave it” concept, i.e., rejection of their proposed settlement would result in a referral of the problem to the Geneva co-Chairmen, has died a quiet, unpublicized death. Thus, indefinite negotiation in Vientiane without a real break might not lead to a referral to the Geneva co-Chairmen. It seems fairly certain, however, that an open and clear break would.

9. While the U.S. is hostile to a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, it recognizes that a referral of the problem to the co-Chairmen may be a necessary step in the “exhaustion of local remedies for redress of grievances,” after which other means of settling the dispute over the de facto partition of Laos, perhaps under the aegis of the Manila Pact, might be sought.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1455. Secret.
2. Text of the cease-fire declaration was transmitted in telegram 413 from Rangoon, October 11. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–1155) By the terms of the agreement, the cease-fire would come into effect within 10 days of October 11, the date of signature of the agreement, and, to expedite the arrangement, a neutral zone would be created; sending of reinforcements into the two provinces would be prohibited; and a joint military committee of both sides would be set up to implement the cease-fire.
3. Reports on the stalemate at the talks are in telegrams 420 and 429 from Rangoon, October 13 and 14. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–1355 and 751J.00/10–1455)