Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

312. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in Burma¹

Vientiane, October 7, 1955—5 p.m.

7. Reference: Our telegram 403 to Department repeated Rangoon 6.² Following is background Royal Government–Pathet Lao negotiations scheduled Rangoon October 9.

Points at issue are:

1. Re-establishment Royal administration in two northern provinces. ICC on June 15 declared right of RG to administration two provinces may be deduced from recognition by Geneva powers of unity of Laos and sovereignty of RG over entire country but stated that, in view conditions prevailing two provinces, RG could not establish administration there effectively without political settlement with Pathets envisaged in Article 14 of Geneva Agreement.

Pathet Lao have paid lip service to RG sovereignty over two provinces, which constitute re-groupment one of PL fighting units, but have made mockery of it by demanding RG name all present incumbents (PL) to administrative positions. RG understandably rejected this but has offered some posts to PL.

ICC will probably propose RG name two provincial governors and half of other officials two provinces, including all such as may be necessary to carrying out RG tasks effectively. We would consider this satisfactory minimum acceptable to RG provided other terms this settlement satisfactory.

2. Elections. PL have demanded sweeping changes in electoral law, including women suffrage and modification eligibility rules for candidates. RG has replied it is too late to change electoral law before elections but PMS offered modify eligibility rules for candidates. Most significant concession was offer accept PL statement in lieu of primary school certificate as condition of reliability. ICC will probably accept RG position on this, though perhaps suggesting certain administrative procedures for promoting fairness in elections, which we believe RG would accept. Probably ICC will also recommend RG have sole responsibility for conduct elections.

3. Integration of PL’s forces. Canadians and Indians originally considered proposal to integrate PL troops (perhaps 3,000 of estimated 6,000 strength) into Lao National Army. We most strongly opposed this and as result discussions here and in Ottawa believe Canadians and Indians have accepted idea of integration into national community and not National Army. We consider this crucial.

We believe little chance negotiations will succeed. Main purpose of RG is convince Indians of good faith and desire reach peaceful settlement without being driven to such serious concessions as would make country easy prey to PL takeover (e.g., integration of large number PL troops into army).

We doubt negotiations will last more than two days, but if they do, would appreciate telegraphic reports from Embassy Rangoon. …

For additional background see Lao Government White Book of May, 1955. We sent French text to Embassy Rangoon in July and believe British Embassy Rangoon has English translation thereof.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 409, which is the source text.
2. In telegram 403, October 5, the Embassy reported that Katay and Souphanouvong had agreed to meet in Rangoon on December 9 in an attempt to reach a political settlement. The ICC planned to sit in on the negotiations and present its revised “outline settlement” either before or after the meeting. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–555)