299. Letter From the Minister in Laos (Yost) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)1
Dear Ken: In the belief you might like to have an informal summing up of where we stand in Laos, I am sending along the following notes.
I… Though feeling the public pulse in Laos involves angles of which Gallup never dreamed, present forecasts are reasonably favorable in that the authorities in each province, while often shaking their heads over other parts of the country, assure us their own province is safe.2 We are far from relying, however, on these comforting assurances.
As we judge the situation, the three most important elements in affecting public opinion before the elections will be economic relief, propaganda and security. The first is primarily a question of rice and, as you know, we are raising heaven and earth to get substantial quantities where they are needed most during the next three months. The second involves stimulating and assisting the politicos to conduct vigorous campaigns—with the framework of a National Front which is still nebulous but fairly promising. USIS is already doing yeoman service, but would like replies to Legtels 6573 and 6694 to [Page 659] sanction the active collaboration we believe necessary. Finally, the bolstering of security requires our continuous support of the Army, without being for the moment too dogmatic about “force levels”, and rapid improvement of the police and gendarmérie along lines we have recommended. If we are able to go full steam ahead on all these lines, I venture to predict that August elections would turn out well. I am chary of making predictions as far ahead as December but am reasonably optimistic.
Our relations with the Government continue to be good, though there is not the degree of intimacy and mutual confidence with Katay to which I have been accustomed in Greece and Austria. I believe this arises from acute cases of nationalism and self-esteem on his part and from an extreme sensitivity to foreign “domination” (which however doesn’t extend to receipt of foreign aid). While this is an unsatisfactory situation, I see no viable alternative to Katay before the elections and believe that with him we shall gain more by patience and calm than by blowing off steam. The latter would, I believe, only fan the embers of neutralism. We always have the Crown Prince and Phoui as restraining influences, through their effectiveness in this respect has definite limits.
I had a long and cordial conversation with Dufour the other day about Franco-American relations in Laos. We agreed that the mutual suspicion and recriminations which have complicated our relations in Saigon had not raised their ugly heads here and that we would see to it they did not do so. I trust Guibaut, who is expected shortly, will be as cooperative.
The situation in the North shows no significant progress. Negotiations with the Pathets are momentarily at a standstill but, in view of Katay’s known faiblesse for this sort of exercise and of the Indians’ passionate sponsorship thereof, may be revived and lifted to exalted and ominous levels at any time. The Indians continue to block effective ICC action while they chase the negotiations will-o-the-wisp. Meanwhile, though the Lao military shows increasing impatience and from time to time mutters “coup d’etat”, the aversion of the Government to take responsibility, coupled with the recent full-scale onset of the rainy season, will probably prevent any major operations, popular, guerilla or military, in the two provinces. A certain amount of sporadic and desultory shooting, sufficient to keep everyone in bad humor but insufficient to settle anything, will probably take place.
I continue to believe that, in the absence of military action, the only chance of getting the problem of the two provinces satisfactorily settled, and I fear it is a slim one, is for Nehru to persuade Chou En-Lai, or US–UK–France to persuade the Russians, that two Lao provinces are not worth a sour note in the honeymoon. Is this too [Page 660] small an issue to inject into the series of high-level diplomatic negotiations which appear to be impending?
II. Thanks to the interest of all you pioneers who have visited us, our staffing and housekeeping problems are decidedly looking up. The arrival of Wendell and Max Finger has made a world of difference and even FOA is beginning to get a few more hands though far too few. As of the moment our housing is just as overcrowded and indecent as when you were here—perhaps more so because there are more of us—but now at least we have the prospect of some relief when the compound begins to open up next month, and of real elbowroom when the projected prefabs materialize in three or four months (?). I regret myself there need be so many Americans here—a tight little team of twelve all told would be my preference—but we keep discovering new fields in which the Lao are incompetent, fields moreover in which some competence is essential if the cold winds from the north are to be kept off. If all the sweet talk being bandied about the world these days should produce a real detente, we could demobilize some of our cohorts here in a year or so. This year, however, is the time when each man and each ton of rice is worth ten later on.
Morale among the Americans is holding up fairly well, but it has worn quite a bit thinner than when you were here and can be expected to wear thinner still before the housing problem is licked. I feel more positive than ever that one year should be the limit of assignment here, at least of all our first contingent who bore the heat of the day.
By the way, what has happened to the Lao proposal to raise our respective Legations to Embassies? It is too bad the prolonged debate about the role of the Souvannouvong family in Lao diplomatic life caused us to be approached last, but I should hope we on our side would not delay too long.5
Do drop me a line when your alarums and excursions leave you time enough to do so.
With all the best to you and yours,
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, PSA Files: Lot 58 D 207, SEA, Lao Correspondence (1955). Secret; Personal.↩
- According to telegram 767 from Vientiane, June 10, the Lao Congress (National Assembly and Royal Council in joint session) passed a constitutional law on June 9 setting the date for elections in Laos on December 25, 1955. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/6–1055)↩
- In telegram 657, May 12, the Legation requested Department of State, USIA, and USOM approval of a plan to support non-Communist parties in the anticipated National Assembly elections in Laos with mobile campaign units (generator, loud speaker, projector, etc.), transportation, films, and posters. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–1155)↩
- In telegram 669, May 13, the Legation noted that the equipment proposed in telegram 657 was already contemplated in existing USIS programs, so all that was required was concurrence for use in the Lao election campaign. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–1355)↩
- See the memorandum, Supra.↩