Office of the Historian

297. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, May 31, 1955—3 p.m.

730. Reference: Legtels 6912 and 705 to Department.3 Phoui, acting Minister Defense, informs me he is proceeding with preparations for assisting popular movement in two northern provinces, commencing with Phong Saly. Before initiating action however he is awaiting (1) determination accuracy report Viet units have recently arrived in Phong Saly, (2) deliveries rice to royal forces in two provinces for distribution to population. He emphasized movement, if it took place, would be relatively small-scale guerilla operation.

To his inquiry my opinion, I replied operation, if well managed and not involving Royal forces, seemed to me useful in harassing Pathets militarily and embarrassing them politically. To his inquiry what assistance United States would offer, I pointed out military [Page 657] budget now under discussion sufficiently generous to cover necessary expenditures. He confirmed my understanding adequate arms available. He did not mention aircraft or communications equipment, but I presume these requests will be brought up again.

During visit to Xieng Ghouang over week-end, governor and Touby, MEO leader, informed me their partisans in Sam Neua willing participate in guerilla action but careful preparation and clear instructions from government would be required.

We are still far from certain any significant action will result from all this backing and filling.

Yost
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.001/5–3155, Top Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.↩
  2. Telegram 691, May 19, reported that Souvanna Phouma informed Yost that preparations for anti-Pathet Lao guerrilla action in the two northern provinces were underway and that Royal Lao commandos were covertly reinforcing the local guerrillas. (Ibid., 751J00/5–1955)↩
  3. In telegram 705, May 25, Yost reported his discussion with Crown Prince Savang on the prospects for the Lao Government’s “popular uprising” in the north. The Prince asked Yost what the United States would do if the Viet Minh intervened to put down the revolt. Yost replied, “it would produce strong diplomatic reaction. Whether it would provoke military reaction would depend on decision Manila Pact powers”, which Yost could not predict. (Ibid., 751J00/3–2555)↩