294. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1
700. Reference: Legtel 677, repeated Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh unnumbered.2 Despite Defense Minister’s agreement in principle to reduction Lao force levels to 23,650 plus 1,500 gendarmérie, he has so far evaded being pinned down to exact phrasing and this has seriously handicapped precise budgeting for CY 1955. Having in mind his departure for Paris today, I sought yesterday clear understanding with him on this matter.
He points out that National Guard being liquidated during month of June, though substantial proportion will be transferred to Regular Army or Commandos to fill gaps in latter’s TOs. This will result in reduction from 30,000 to 27,450 July 1. (This is clearly in part paper reduction but it does nevertheless represent substantial Lao concession since their original plan had been to build up this year to 31,000.)
Souvanna was most reluctant to proceed with immediate further reduction below 27,450. He argued: (a) In view of probable action in north, to which Pathet, and possibly Vietnamese, reaction could be expected, it would be unwise militarily and psychologically to reduce further at this moment; (b) both to ensure order and to give population feeling of security at time of elections, it will be necessary, in addition to commitments in north, to distribute units of armed forces throughout entire country during next few months.
I presented at length reasons set forth Deptel 4803 and elsewhere why we consider force in excess of 25,000 (including gendarmérie) unjustified. Souvanna finally proposed reduction from 27,450 to 25,000 take place during last four months of year in equal monthly installments. (He was assuming elections will be held at end of August.) After considerable discussion I said I had no authority to accept this proposal but would submit it to my government for its consideration.
Country team recommendation, with which I concur, is that this proposal be accepted. While we may consider efficiency rather than [Page 651] numbers is what Lao army requires to deal effectively with two problems referred to by Souvanna, both he and Prime Minister feel very strongly numbers are momentarily important. We doubt that savings which might be effected by commencing before September reduction below 27,450 would be worth, at this critical juncture, political and psychological hazards of forcing this reduction down Lao leaders’ throat. Our primary immediate objectives in Laos are to facilitate (a) recovery of northern provinces and (b) sweeping electoral victory. We certainly should not do anything to shake firm attitude of Lao leaders which is absolutely indispensable to achievement these ends.
As to financial savings we believe more fruitful field in any case lies in more economical purchasing and use of supplies. We shall explore this field thoroughly but to do so adequately we need earliest arrival at least some of personnel listed Legtel 598.4 …
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/5–2355. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩
- In telegram 677, May 15, the Legation reported that Souvanna had agreed in principle to a Lao force level of 23,650 plus 1,500 to be merged with police. In all, the Legation noted, Defense support for Laos for calendar year 1955 would total $35–40 million and it argued that to “ensure that Communist gains are limited, at most, to territories in two northern provinces they presently control” support of such magnitude was required. (Ibid., 751J.5/5–1455)↩
- Supra.↩
- Dated April 28, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/4–2855) In telegram 502 to Vientiane, May 25, the Department instructed the Legation to make it clear to Lao officials that the members of the U.S. supervisory group would be “civilians” with military background in keeping with the Geneva Agreement on Laos; or “it may later haunt us.” The Department also asked for clarification on Souvanna Phouma’s prediction of Lao Government action in the north. (Ibid., 751J.5/5–2355)↩