251. Letter From the Ambassador in Cambodia (Strom) to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)1
Phnom
Penh, January 10,
1957.
Dear Bill: The Vietnamese
representative to Cambodia, Mr. Ngo trong-Hieu, is
a very unusual man. He treated Martin
Herz to such an extraordinary discussion recently that I
asked Martin to make a record of
it in great detail in order that his ideas might be considered by
yourself and by Fred Reinhardt. I
am enclosing a copy of the record and am sending copies of the letter
and memo to Fred.
Hieu is quite right in his assessment of the situation in the Vietnamese
minority here. Anti-Diem
elements, ranging from vaguely fellow-traveling to outright
pro-Communist, are increasingly active in it. The pro-Communist trend
seems to be accelerating. Naturally, Hieu is casting about for means to
redress the situation. The positive aspects of his contemplated program
were summarized in our telegram to the Department No. 727, repeated to
Saigon as No. 185.2
If any such action were taken, we think the first result would be that
the Cambodians would send Mr. Ngo trong-Hieu
packing, and this would perhaps not be a bad thing though we are the
first to admit he is a very vigorous and active individual,—maybe too
much so. … He is already being suspiciously watched by the Cambodian
police. Only the other day, a high police official (Dap Chhuon’s trusted
assistant, Loeung Nal) confirmed to us that one of Hieu’s agents had
been picked up by the “neutralist” Chief of the National Police with
letters of instructions signed by the Vietnamese representative. Loeung
Nal also told Godley that a report had been received to the effect that
Hieu had had several big cases delivered to his residence at 2 o’clock
in the morning. Had he had them delivered at high noon, Loeung Nal
remarked, there would have been no suspicion of anything untoward.
Godley mentioned this to Hieu who denied it vehemently, but in any event
our friend Hieu is not very
[Page 553]
subtle and the “neutralist” element of the National Police are already
after him.
Ngo trong-Hieu’s positive program for improving Vietnamese-Cambodian
relations is, I believe, as good as any we could draw up. I hope he goes
ahead with it. If it meets with only moderate success he, himself, will
probably not wish to carry out the extreme measures he spoke about to
Martin. In any event, I do
not propose that anyone at the Embassy should express any approval of
Hieu’s ideas, nor, in fact, revert to them at any time. I should,
however, appreciate receiving any comments you may wish to make on the
matter.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Vietnamese Representative
(Ngo Trong Hieu) and the Second Secretary of the Embassy in Cambodia
(Herz), Phnom Penh,
January 2, 19573
Ngo Trong Hieu said he needed my advice. He felt South Vietnam is
losing ground rapidly among the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. The
Communists are becoming bolder all the time, and the Cambodian
Government either does not care or deliberately favors them. There
are now three pro-Communist Vietnamese papers—the third, Trung-Lap, edited by Tran-van-Bao, has just
appeared. Hieu confirmed the report we had that the pro-Diem newspaper, Hon Viet, is doing very badly: Hon
Viet sells about 300 copies, whereas Song
Chung, the leading Vietnamese-language pro-Communist paper,
sells 2,000.
I said I didn’t for a moment believe that the ratio of Hon Viet-Song Chung sales represents the true
ratio of pro-and anti-Diem
sentiments in the colony here. Hieu gratefully agreed. I said that
the sales of a newspaper often have more to do with the journalistic
capabilities of its editors than with its editorial line. I had
heard that Hon Viet is just a dull sheet
while its rivals are crusading, well-written and interesting. Hieu
again agreed and said that a team of good journalists from Saigon
will be coming up to Phnom Penh in about a month. But he was not
really principally concerned with the newspaper situation. He wanted
to discuss the bigger picture. He needed advice. What
[Page 554]
could he do to reverse the
unfavorable general trend? The newspaper picture is, after all, only
a reflection of the situation in which flirtation or cooperation
with the Communists is becoming “the thing to do” in the minority in
Cambodia because the Government tolerates or even encourages it.
Hieu professed to be exasperated. He had racked his brains what to
do, he felt that something must be done to reverse the trend
spectacularly. Did I think libel suits against the pro-Communist
papers would produce such an effect? After all, Prince Sihanouk is ordering such suits
against papers that are supposed to have slandered him and the
Sangkum. There is a police instruction to the effect that papers
published in Cambodia must not attack the heads of governments with
which Cambodia maintains friendly relations. Did I think that Hieu
might use this to dramatize the fact that South Vietnam, a friendly
country, is being grievously wronged by papers published in
Cambodia? I expressed skepticism about this idea. Hieu agreed. There
was a pause. I said nothing because I had the distinct impression
that Hieu wanted to develop another idea.
Hieu said he had given much thought to just that angle. What did I
think of the following gambit: He was planning in any event to see
Sihanouk in the near
future, to discuss with him the procedural aspects of implementation
of the Paris accords. (See separate memo.4) On that occasion, he might do two things:
First, he would hand Sihanouk
a list of Viet Minh agents in
Cambodia, to make him aware of the danger to Cambodia. Second, he
would tell the Prince that he had heard that attempts would be made
upon the leading men on that list. He was telling Sihanouk about those reports, he
would say, in order that the Cambodian Government might take
precautions and protect those people. On the other hand, he would
add in talking with Sihanouk,
he didn’t see that their presence was at all helpful and was
wondering whether a better solution (than protecting them) wouldn’t
be to order them out of Cambodia. …
[Page 555]
Having opened his heart on this subject, Hieu proceeded to outline
the rest of his positive action program, which appears eminently
constructive and which is detailed in a separate memorandum.5
In the sphere of covert operations, Hieu surprised me by asking my
advice as to what he should do in the case of an agent of his who is
in trouble with the Cambodian National Police. Did I think that the
American Embassy could offer any assistance? The agent in question
is the first of Hieu’s men who was arrested, and Hieu fears that if
he is unable to get him released his whole “réseau” in the rubber
plantations would collapse. The man had been working at the Krek
plantation. He had been responsible for keeping the paper Song Chung out of there, and someone
belonging to the Communist network had apparently denounced him to
the Cambodian police which sent some men up to Krek to arrest him,
allegedly on the grounds of concealed weapons. Hieu claimed that the
man had no weapons in his possession. I asked him why he was then
concerned. He said he didn’t know how much else the Cambodian
authorities knew of the man’s activities. I said I didn’t think we
could help him at all in this instance.
A little later, Hieu asked me whether I thought Laspeyres
(Pierre-Jean Laspeyres, anti-Communist
editor of the Saigon-financed French-language paper “La Liberté“)
could be trusted. He had recently been often seen in the company of
members of the Soviet Embassy. I related to Hièu a number of
personal observations of Laspeyres that made me think him somewhat
quixotic but basically decent. Among the incidents I mentioned was
Laspeyres’ recent visit to my office to seek American financial
assistance for “Liberté”. Surprisingly enough, Hieu commented that
we should not think of giving any assistance because he is already
giving very substantial support. … (Later on the same day, Hieu
offered Laspeyres a small car. He had apparently wanted to check my
opinion of him before making that gift)
Concluding the overall portion of the interview, Hieu remarked that
he would not and could not stand by indefinitely, with his pants
conveniently let down to his ankles, while the Cambodians and the
Communists were bestowing kicks on his posterior. The time would
come when he would have to fight back. Perhaps the time is not yet.
Perhaps he should in any event carry through his positive action
program first. But he would not indefinitely remain on the receiving
end. Some day he would get tough.
[Page 556]
And although I hadn’t given him any advice, he thanked me profusely
for this opportunity of “consulting” on these matters with me.
