247. Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Cambodia (Loeden)1
Honolulu, August 21,
1956—1:35 p.m.
220035Z. Exclusive for Brigadier General Loeden. Phnom Penh telegram 208.2 Regret Ambassador chose to feel CINCPAC views and country teams are opposed. Comments in addition to those in my 212328Z3 may be of assistance to you in discussion with Ambassador McClintock.
- 1.
- I have concurred as long range goal in United States training mission in Cambodia including United States advisory responsibility with respect FARK planning. Sympathetic with the Ambassadors regrets at United States having missed the opportunity last year, I have always held hopes and concur in biding our time until situation is such that positive steps can be taken for formal United States assumption of training responsibilities. Regional aspects, as in all points made by Ambassador in reference message have a bearing on this problem/Critical developments over status of French training missions in Vietnam and critical question of French Missions and bases in Laos are only some of current problems in areas adjacent to Cambodia that have a direct bearing on United States policy regarding relationships and delineations of advisory responsibilities between United States and French in Cambodia. I see no wide variance between Ambassador’s and my position on this point, although I point out my responsibility in this, as in all matters involving aid in this area, extends to careful evaluation from a regional or area viewpoint as well as that of a single country. Therefore, I do not believe that in light of the situation in the area as a whole that extraordinary diplomatic representations to obtain French cooperation in Cambodia will be productive or even feasible and have not recommended this specific action at this time.
- 2.
- Matter of planning is for practical purposes integral with training problem. Many of the same comments apply. Progress will undoubtedly be slow, but I believe Cambodians will eventually turn to United States assistance although for different reasons than those advanced by country team. I believe that when Cambodians become fully aware of fact that, under MDA criteria, equipment will not be furnished unless capacity exists to utilize and maintain, they will gradually accept fact that satisfactory state of unit effectiveness and [Page 546] logistic support must be reached that United States training assistance is required to reach it.
- 3.
- No confusion exists here as to surface defense units. I have maintained in every country that military forces will continue to be ineffective and indeed may become dangerous unless controlled by Minister of Defense. My 212328Z expands on this idea. I therefore propose that United States assistance for any of these forces be contingent upon their being placed under Minister of Defense and field commanders and not under Minister of Interior or provincial governor.
- 4.
- I see no difference in Ambassador’s opinion and mine concerning priority of military aid. However, impact on our SEATO Allies is probably more apparent at this than country team level, especially the impact of Thailand and the Philippines. For this reason this point is stressed in my recommendations.
- 5.
- I have been awaiting your recommendations on source level for sometime. The MDA objectives for Cambodia still include support for both internal security and limited defense against external aggression. However, since their approachment [rapprochement] with Communism, requirement to meet the second objective has lost some substance. Although force objectives now being considered are on order of 30,000, as you may remember the force objectives were once recommended as high as 42,000 largely on the basis of limited defense. Thus for programming purposes this is less basis for limited defense requirements, and in that sense this is a shift of emphasis which must be taken into account.
- 6.
- As yet no formal MDAP end item program for Cambodia exists. Only approved program is fiscal year 1956 DFS in support of which military departments have provided considerable expedited supply action. Giving due consideration to this lack of approved end item program, distances involved, other time factors, even high priority cases and priorities of supply world wide, support extended by DOD Agencies to Cambodia, although not all we want it to be from end product viewpoint, has been very good in comparison to other SEA countries. I know of no case where military departments have refused to do everything legally and reasonably possible to provide an item or service properly presented and justified by you and approved by this Headquarters. The scope of such support which varies from medical supplies to musical instruments is unusually all inclusive and the priority assigned has been so high as to [be?] constantly under scrutiny by high headquarters in view other more urgent requests throughout world for limited funds available for military assistance. Continued criticism of military departments and their supply agencies will, in my opinion, only result in less sympathetic [Page 547] approach to future problems and cause closer scrutiny of priority being accorded Cambodia in relation to world wide priority system.
- 7.
- I know that you and Ambassador have cooperated and coordinated most fully. I appreciate difficulties of undermanning under which USOM has operated. As you point out, many of the difficulties of communication and inter team liaison smooth out as the organization matures. I desire to stress, however, that coordination between your program and ICA program must be achieved at your level since nowhere else does the opportunity exist to same degree. This is a problem common to all our MAAGs and requires unremitting effort to produce success in our aid programs. This fact is pointed out to all Ambassadors and country teams in President’s directive on coordination by all United States aid programs at country team level. OASD (ISA) 242027Z Cite DEF901745 refers.4
- 8.
- I am particularly concerned over last paragraph reference message. Firm requirements for military aid recommended by you have received prompt and complete review by me and my staff and, whenever requirements are supportable, that [they?] have been recommended to higher headquarters for approval and appropriate supply action. In cases of extreme emergency, such as early request for antibiotics and hypodermic needles, CINCPAC has taken follow through action until expedited delivery has been assured or the requirement is disapproved by higher headquarters. In every case, your headquarters is informed of CINCPAC action. Such support can hardly be characterized as being limited to “on paper” approval. If there is any example Ambassador McClintock or you can point out wherein such support and follow through have not been accorded your recommendation, I would appreciate you reporting it to me.