244. Letter From the Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson1
Phnom
Penh, August 1,
1956.
Dear Walter: During his overnight visit to Phnom Penh, I
had long and interesting conversations with Admiral Radford. In fact, certain developments
in the Admiral’s thinking were so far-reaching that when he kindly
offered to take me along with him on his flight to Vientiane and Bangkok
I judged it useful to continue our consultation in the air. Herewith, in
substance, is the Admiral’s thinking:
Admiral Radford had a very
definite view that Congress and American public opinion, particularly in
the South and West, are getting completely fed up with providing aid to
leaders who extol the virtues of the Communist bloc or who make snide
remarks about the
[Page 536]
U.S. while
at the same time taking our aid as a matter of course. In the Admiral’s
opinion, U.S. assistance to Cambodia will probably cease because
Congress will not put up with Sihanouk any longer.
If Admiral Radford’s evaluation
of the home situation is correct, it would be of vital importance to us
here to know where we stand. Thus far, we have been going on the
assumption that we would be vouchsafed a reasonable amount of aid to
Cambodia as our principal tool in countering Communist aid programs and
in assisting Cambodia to remain independent and thus a barrier to
further Communist encroachment in Southeast Asia.
On the question of Communist aid programs, Admiral Radford was inclined to take a fairly
sanguine view. He said when it came to sending technical assistance
missions, the Communist dictatorships are going to find themselves in
difficulties. He assumes that a number of technicians sent abroad will
take this opportunity to defect. The Admiral feels that if we could
encourage such a development generally, the Communist governments would
start to pull back for fear lest the habit of defection could spread
more widely. I think there is some basis for this speculation and we
shall be alert to encourage defection wherever possible. However, I have
not received any information indicating whether Communist defection in
other countries where there are aid missions, such as Burma and India,
has in fact assumed any significant proportions.
On the wider scene, Admiral Radford felt very strongly that if our series of
defensive collective security pacts are to be effective the enemy must
have no doubt whatever as to our readiness to fight at any time one of
these pacts confronts a case of Communist aggression. In the Admiral’s
view (and I am sure he must have discussed this with you and Herb Hoover many times), it is the
certainty of U.S. armed action which is the greatest deterrent force in
international affairs at the present time. A corollary of this thesis is
that uncertainty as to U.S. action (and here he cited SEATO and the Baghdad Pact) encourages
the Communist bloc to continue its position of attrition and of
subversion.
No doubt these views of Admiral Radford are not altogether new, but I thought it my duty
to report to you the thinking of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. So far as our own little bailiwick is concerned, I do not agree
that we should terminate our aid; …. In such a … country as Cambodia, it
might even be
[Page 537]
possible to get
the Prince himself to realize the dangers he is courting.
Cheers,
Rob
P.S. I found Max Bishop in Bangkok
very anxious to arrange a sort of regional confab with his other
colleagues on the mainland of SEA. I had already planned
with Jeff Parsons for him and
Freddie Reinhardt to get
together with me, possibly at Angkor Wat, for a run-down on affairs in
Indochina as it would be helpful for Freddie and me to get JEFF’s latest
word from Washington, and perhaps useful for JEFF to learn from us what
judgments we have been able to work out on the basis of our experience.
If, as Max Bishop suggested, we
widen the field, I can see no harm in that, although in such a case I
think the meeting could not be very well held in Cambodia in view of
Max’s identification in Southeast Asian minds as one of our principal
spokesmen for SEATO.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum From the Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)2
Phnom Penh, July 27, 1956.
I much appreciate the well thought-out questions outlined by
General Erskine in his
memorandum to you of 19 July on points to be developed in discussion
with me concerning our relations with Cambodia.
Taking up the first group of questions which relate to French
influence in Cambodia, I should say in general there seems to be an
over-emphasis on the amount of this influence and its bias against
the U.S. The French, as you and I have agreed, desire at all cost to
maintain that increasingly shabby and ephemeral thing they call “la
présence française,” but they fundamentally lack the wherewithal
either in military strength or in economic resources to accomplish
this objective. The main asset of the French in Cambodia and
elsewhere in Indochina is the fact that they have a monopoly on the
language, educational system and administrative training of the
people we deal with.
[Page 538]
As indicated in our telegram no. 173
which was sent at the request of the Departments of Defense and
State, we believe ultimately that a government which pays and equips
a foreign army should likewise have responsibility for training that
army. At present, however, … it is not possible for the U.S. to
undertake this responsibility. This is, I trust, a short-term factor
since as recently as early 1955 I had secured a secret agreement of
the then King Sihanouk for the
phasing out of the French Military Mission and the assumption of
this training responsibility by MAAG. However, for the time being, since the Cambodians
would not entrust the training function to us and we would probably
in any event be unable to assume it immediately because of the
language factor, I feel that perhaps our efforts should be directed
toward a more effective effort on the part of the French staff
advisory training mission.
If the French are doing almost no unit training, that is principally
due to the fact that the Cambodians won’t allow them to go out to
the units. (Actually, the few units that the French have trained,
largely the Navy and the parachute battalion, look good.) But where
they are active, in the fields of officer training and staff
planning, they are doing a very poor job. We have a right to see to
it that as long as we cannot discharge these functions ourselves, at
least the French should do a more decent job, with our
assistance.
Meanwhile, there are other things we can do to redress this
situation. We have gratifying results from MAAG’s program of English-language training, and I was
informed today by Chief of Staff Colonel Lon Nol that the students selected for this course
had been picked with a view to their eventually being sent to the
U.S. for military training. Time is thus working to overcome one
principal handicap. What I visualize—provided that the policies of
the Cambodian Government become modified to the point where U.S.
training will be permitted—is a gradual phasing up of U.S. training
of Cambodian military students and a gradual phasing down of the
French military mission. However, I do not think, under the present
auspices, that this transition could be accomplished in less than
two years.
There is no particular “French political action program in Cambodia”
other than the one dedicated to maintaining “la présence française”
and to securing the long-existing French economic vested interests
in this country. Although at one time there was a French campaign
against U.S. interests, the French have drawn notably closer into
line with us in Cambodia since the advent of dangerous competitive
forces in the form of Communist Chinese aid and trade programs. At
the top, in the person of High Commissioner Pierre Gorce, there is full
cooperation. At lower echelons, while in the past
[Page 539]
the French staff advisory training
mission has given us no cooperation at all, this situation is now
improving. There has been much progress in U.S.-French military
cooperation in Cambodia during the last month.
Indian influence on the attitudes and actions of the Cambodian
Government has been powerful and generally against the interests of
the U.S. This influence has been exerted in recent months largely by
a psychotic young Chargé d’Affaires, warmly seconded in Delhi by the
equally psychotic Krishna
Menon. In the two talks I had with Nehru about Cambodia, I found the
Indian Prime Minister himself generally reflective and comprehensive
in his views and in agreement that it would be to the security
interest of India that the new states of Indochina should remain
outside the Communist Chinese sphere of influence. I have never
varied in the opinion that a diplomatic goal of the U.S. should be
to elicit greater Indian interest in maintaining, together with the
U.S. and other free nations, a defense perimeter against China since
Chinese penetration into the Lower Mekong Basin would have the
greatest consequences also for Indian security.
As to the number of U.S. personnel in Cambodia, I believe that it is
at its maximum in quantity, but far from its maximum in quality in
respect of ICA endeavors. Perhaps
pardonably, I feel that our State Department staff, although
restricted in numbers, are doing an excellent job. USIS is on the point of bulging at the
middle and more filled with energy than with ideas, but if their
numbers are not increased, their personnel may not get too much in
each other’s way.
MAAG Cambodia is an outstanding
group of officers and enlisted men and they have accomplished
wonders given the difficulty of their position, the covert and
active opposition of the French military mission and the propaganda
efforts reared against them by the Communists in Asia with the
abetting of the Indian element in Cambodia. USOM, however, is overstaffed—not in proportion to the
job to be done but in proportion to the job accomplished. There is
room here for some top-notch experts and if they are really
first-class I would not object to the economic mission even being
slightly increased, but quite frankly its present personnel includes
too much deadwood. My guess is that with proper selection and a
desire to use our aid programs as a political weapon rather than a
Santa Claus project, we could accomplish twice as much with the same
personnel.
I now come to the last and perhaps most important group of questions.
Few steps can be taken to reduce Prince Sihanouk’s prestige with the public. He is by far
the most popular figure in Cambodia and has almost universal support
from the mass of the population. However, this mass support would
probably go to any figure
[Page 540]
endowed with monarchical authority and a capacity for
leadership….
I still, despite the present problems and difficulties, believe that
our basic policy objective in Cambodia is sound and that it is
attainable. It is simply to keep this little but strategic country
independent. Moreover, … Prince Sihanouk and his entourage have the same basic
objective. Although they have given aid and comfort to the
Communists of late, they are not consciously pro-Communist. As a
matter of fact, they fear the Communists. … I believe that with
diplomacy and the judicious use of aid we can not only counter the
threatening influence of the Communists here but beat them at their
own game. The present situation in Cambodia presents a challenge to
American diplomacy. If we keep our tempers and play our cards right
we can accomplish exactly what we have set out to do: deny the Lower
Mekong Basin to the Communists by keeping this little country truly
independent.
