204. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
1228. Full text of Prince Sihanouk’s open letter to Cambodian Government is at considerable variance with summary prepared from radio monitor service as reported Embtel 1221.2 Complete translation is embodied in my next telegram.3
[Page 454]This morning I called upon Royal High Councillors Sam Sary and Khim Tit, knowing that former was undoubtedly author of Sihanouk’s open letter. I said since US was co-signatory of agreement May 16 we of course wished to know what Prince Sihanouk had in mind in discussing this accord in his open letter and in demanding that International Control Commission make a finding upon it as being within purview of Geneva agreement or a violation of that pact.
Sam Sary and Khim Tit said real purpose of Sihanouk’s statement was to under cut political opposition in country which had been using stick of our MDA agreement to beat horse of forthcoming elections. They said opposition had even gone to extreme of seeking to subvert troops by claiming that Royal Government had “sold” Cambodia to Americans. Unless some dramatic measure were taken to end this issue, Sihanouk felt MDA agreement would become a major dispute in elections. He likewise felt International Commission should be made to fish or cut bait.
Sam Sary, who had undoubtedly masterminded this operation, said key paragraph of Sihanouk’s open letter is embodied in following challenge:
“If International Commission judges that Royal Government exceeds these limits (of Geneva Accord) it should officially notify this to Royal Government. If Royal Government refuses to follow recommendations of International Commission, duty of latter is to react officially against such refusal in one way or another.”
According to involute reasoning of Sam Sary this challenge to commission cannot be met by ICC because Cambodians are confident Canadian member will not vote for a finding that our agreement of May 16 violates Geneva Accord. Since he says by Geneva undertaking ICC must reach decision on all “important” matters by unanimity, Sam Sary reasons that commission will not be able to make a finding against Cambodian Government but will be limited to reporting its own disagreement back to Geneva powers.
Comment: Sam Sary has outsmarted himself on this point. Article XXI of Geneva agreement4 is specific on cases which require a unanimous decision by ICC and these do not cover present issue. Article XX would seem to govern commission’s voting procedure and Canadian Commissioner has already indicated to us that he fears being outvoted by Poles and Indians.
I told Crown Councillors I had no intention of seeing members of ICC at this juncture and had instructed all members of my official family to refrain from contact with Commission as we wished to be [Page 455] sedulous not to influence decisions of Commission. However, I was fairly sure from my previous knowledge of reasoning of Commission Chairman Parthasarathi that he would not at first seek a unanimous decision that our MDA agreement violated Geneva, but would seek a unanimous decision to query Cambodian, and possibly US Governments, on certain moot points. This type of unanimous vote, I thought, Indian chairman might in fact achieve, and in consequence it behooved Cambodian Government to be prepared to defend agreement of May 16 as not being a violation of Geneva.
Councillors concurred in this reasoning and said I could assure my government there was no thought on part of Cambodian Government to go back on agreement of May 16. They said they had debated that issue in their own minds before signing MDA accord and were firmly determined to live up to provisions of May 16 exchange of notes. As for refutation of possible charges by ICC, they had already prepared extensive brief in reply to an “informal” letter from Nehru to Prince Sihanouk in which Indian Prime Minister expressed his doubts as to propriety of Cambodian Government having signed agreement of May 16. I asked Councillors for copy of text of Sihanouk’s reply, but they said they would have to submit this question to their master as it was a personal letter transmitted to Nehru through Indian Minister in Phnom Penh. They thought, however, Sihanouk would not object to their giving me a summary of his reply. Furthermore, they said that if commission should demand a statement from RKG, they would wish to consult with me in advance of making a response.
Khim Tit and Sam Sary said if in ultimate result May 16 accord were called into question by ICC and a finding were made that it violated Geneva agreement, they would most certainly present issue to Cambodian people, apparently by some sort of plebiscite or referendum, the result of which would be an overwhelming popular demand that Cambodia receive US aid according to terms of agreement of May 16. In that event, said Sam Sary, “the will of the people will be overriding”.
As indicated above, I intended to leave members of commission severely alone for time being. However, since commissioners are not free agents but are acting in accordance with government instructions, Department may wish at their respective capitals to indicate US attitude.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/6–1755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to New Delhi, Ottawa, London, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok.↩
- Dated June 16, not printed. (Ibid., 751H.00/6–1655)↩
- Telegram 1229 from Phnom Penh, June 17, not printed. (Ibid., 751H.00/6–1755)↩
- For text of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, July 20, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XVI, p. 1531.↩