181. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1

490. Department pass Defense. Saigon: Eyes only Collins and O’Daniel. Cambodian Defense Minister2 sent for me this morning. He said King and his Ministers had agreed to acceptable US military mission and to ultimate phase-out of French from Cambodian Armed Forces.

Colonel Ngo Hou said he wished urgently to negotiate MAAG bilateral with me and that Cambodian Government was ready to turn over training installations almost at once to US, but would have greater difficulty in arranging for rapid phase-out French military mission. Ngo Hou showed me text of memorandum agreement between Deputy Minister of Defense Ouk Chhoun and General Gazeanaud dated December 15, 1954 which provides that members of French military mission will be made available “as a credit in personnel” to Cambodian Armed Forces only upon demand of Cambodian Government, and that as personnel of French military mission depart from Cambodia, they will not automatically be replaced unless at specific request of Cambodian Government. This accord is effective from January 1 to July 1, 1955 and contemplates a maximum total of French officers and NCOs of 727.

I told Minister of Defense I thought it essential if US were to agree to MAAG bilateral and eventually to assumption of training responsibilities that we should have secret exchange of letters indicating firm intention of Cambodian Government to phase-out French. Minister of Defense agreed to such an exchange of letters.

We concurred there was no need and in fact it would be harmful for any abrupt withdrawal of French before US instructors and MAAG personnel were in position to backstop Khmer Armed Forces.

For example, no MAAG which we could supply could on 24 hours notice suddenly replace French element in Khmer Army and, in my judgment, it would be disastrous for us to attempt such abrupt [Page 416] transfer of responsibility. However, there is no doubt at all that from King on down Cambodian Government has accepted decision for phase-out and orderly withdrawal of French from Khmer Armed Forces.

I feel this negotiation has fully met conditions established by our defense authorities and that this opportunity should be seized at once.

I accordingly request immediate authority to initiate negotiation of a MAAG bilateral and to conclude exchange of letters Re phase-out of French.3

I asked Ngo Hou his view on informing French authorities here of negotiation of MAAG bilateral, saying I had long since placed High Commissioner Gorce on notice of my intention eventually to negotiate such agreement. Minister of Defense made a wry smile and said Prime Minister Penn Nouth had decided it would be best to negotiate agreement and then politely tell French it had been signed. Ngo Hou said this was likewise view of King. In my opinion, we have so consistently informed local French officials of intention eventually to negotiate for American military mission that there is no further requirement for consultation on this point. Furthermore, as my tiny team of military experts goes over Cambodian Plan DE Campagne and budget for 1955, we shall make no secret to French that we are undertaking necessary technical duties upon which to base our estimate of US direct military assistance for 1955. I think, in consequence, we can honestly say we have met Dulles–Mendes-France agreement for prior consultation before taking action in Indochina.

I have fixed appointment with Minister of Defense for an initial conference on January 20 between Cambodian and US military technicians to discuss 1955 Plan DE Campagne and military budget. Ngo Hou said so far as possible, Cambodians would be represented strictly by Cambodians and if by chance French technicians had to be called in to clear up certain points, they would be limited to testimony of those points only and negotiation would be entirely Cambodian-American.

I said I should be glad to attend first meeting of technicians but that this would be purely preliminary technical study of Cambodian military requirements and means of screening them.

[Page 417]

Minister of Defense made urgent appeal that bilateral accord be signed this month and that first installment US budgetary aid be made available February 1.

McClintock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/–1555. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Saigon.
  2. Ngo Hou was Minister of Defense until January 25, 1955.
  3. The Department responded in telegram 294 to Phnom Penh, January 19:

    “No objection your beginning talks 20th. Specific point for you bear in mind is that you not authorized negotiate MAAG bilateral until we have received Defense concurrence bilateral and have notified you.

    “Therefore in meetings beginning 20th you requested limit your talks to exploratory field plus advice on force structure and other related military matters.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/1–1855)