Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

177. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, January 6, 1955—8 p.m.

2859. Pass copy FOA. Re Deptel 2390.² Embassy’s comments reference telegram follow:

Although Embassy has not yet received separate summary recent telegrams³ (last paragraph reference telegram) on basis those available to us and our own observation French scene we agree basis exists for Franco-American conflict in question training Cambodian military forces. This and other possible areas of disagreement may be intensified unless appreciation given to distinction drawn by French between Vietnam on one hand and Cambodia and Laos on other.

In general, French recognition reduction their military and political influence Vietnam has made them more than ever determined maintain and if possible increase it in Cambodia and Laos. They are unwilling concede to US in Cambodia and Laos to same extent as in South Vietnam. Although many French believe South Vietnam will ultimately fall under Viet Minh control and only hope rests in Sainteny approach on economic and cultural plane, they do not apply same reasoning to Cambodia and Laos. Embassy telegram 2448 December 9⁴ reported Embassy’s view that French decision accelerate withdrawal FEC Vietnam, together with those French and Vietnamese civilians who would wish follow, would not affect appreciably French intention maintain its role and influence in other two countries. Since then there have been increasing confirmations this fact, most important of which following:

(A) During tripartite Ministerial discussions on IC December 18, Mendes stated French had 500-officer training mission Cambodia and intended keep it there and that French considered presence this mission Cambodia in keeping French defense policy (Embtel 2601 December 19⁵).

(B) During Assembly’s IC debate revolving around 1955 civil budget Ministry Associated States (approved December 20) it was made amply evident that majority deputies did not think there much hope of saving South Vietnam from eventual Viet Minh control and hence were concerned over extending any new French economic assistance to that area, but at same time were agreed that France should make every effort maintain its influence in Cambodia and Laos, particularly on economic and cultural plane. Pertinent extracts debate follow:

(1) Massot (RADSOC), reporter finance committee which had rejected budget, stated that economic aid for three IC States for 1955 would be only 7 billion francs; 3.9 billion for Cambodia, 1 billion for Laos, and 2 billion for Vietnam. Indicated committee concern over budget largely addressed to projected new investment South Vietnam and that was reason why committee favored blocking funds for Vietnam although approving those for Cambodia and Laos. Emphasized importance Cambodia this context saying: “Principal effort ought be brought bear on Cambodia. This country has remained faithful to us. We have found there (Massot was member recent Parliamentary Mission IC) remarkable sympathy for France and desire cooperate with French Union. Cambodia has need of [garble] indispensable that Port of Ream give this country direct access to sea, and that communications lines tie this port to other parts of country. Construction bridge Tonle-Sap contemplated as well development Phnom Penh aerodrome.”

(2) With regard economic and technical assistance IC States Prime Minister LaChambre stated “essential part French financial effort is destined for Cambodia and Laos because we have considered it possible carry out in these two states some long-term programs, while only some expenditures of immediate return could be envisaged for Vietnam.” He said since Cambodia and Laos depended on Port Saigon for outlet, some people thought that a Viet Minh electoral victory in 1956 would drag these two countries shortly thereafter into Communist orbit. “This why in program submitted, works we intend carry out to assist these two states have principal objective dispensing with Port Saigon.” LaChambre added that studies showed Port Ream technically feasible and that total 3.3 billion francs earmarked this project for 1955–1956 which included connecting road between Ream and Phnom Penh. In emphasizing cultural approach, LaChambre stated that “of all manifestations of our presence in IC, our teaching effort is without doubt the one which, in present conjecture, offers us maximum chance enduring.” He referred, as did Massot, to heavy demand for entry into Lycee Albert Sarraut Hanoi, a demand which exceeded facilities. In emphasizing significance IC protocol Manila Pact, LaChambre said it of greater importance to Cambodia and Laos than South Vietnam. LaChambre also underlined French intend safeguard French interests wherever located IC including North Vietnam.

(3) ARS deputy Frederic-Dupont (who also member Parliamentary Mission IC) reiterated his July charge that Geneva Accord represented phased abandonment Vietnam but underlined “great French policy SEA still possible since Cambodia and Laos remain faithful French culture and hence French economic and financial cooperation should be assured them.”

(4) Social Republican Jean-Paul Palewski (also member Parliamentary Mission IC), in criticizing US policy towards IC, said “is it necessary cite action of businessmen and representatives of US in Cambodia who prevent or wish prevent maintenance French influence there?”

(5) Mendes-France, in urging Assembly get on with task considering Ministry Associated States budget during debate, said problem Vietnam had been evoked “but it is necessary to think also of Laos and Cambodia where we carrying out constructive policy regarding which, I am happy say, no criticism evoked.” He said major part of credits requested were destined for Laos and Cambodia, and that unfavorable Assembly vote would “raise doubts among people and authorities those countries who impatiently await our decision.”

(6) Letourneau (MRP) took exception Mendes by saying despite praiseworthy project Ream Port, did he, Mendes really think France could effectively help Cambodia and Laos after France leaves Saigon? Letourneau also asked LaChambre whether he, Letourneau, should conclude that South Vietnam will be forgotten as far economic aid concerned since LaChambre had said economic aid would almost exclusively be directed to Cambodia and Laos.

(7) Mendes responded saying while major part sum requested by government destined for Cambodia and Laos, South Vietnam had not been forgotten and that why Government taking exception finance committee position favoring blocking funds for Vietnam while approving those destined Cambodia and Laos. In emphasizing French cultural approach IC, Mendes also stated in course debate: “if on political plane our action is now limited, on other hand and to extent our assistance is requested, we have fine mission to accomplish on cultural plane and in field technical assistance. I have conviction that maintenance French educational establishments as well as the sending of French professors and technicians to IC countries represents one of best chances for France in future in this region.”

Comment: Inescapable conclusion is that policy of Mendes Government is to maintain, if not increase, French role in Cambodia and Laos on military, economic and cultural plane. In this policy, Government is supported by majority non-Communist members both Houses. Mendes is far too astute a politician to espouse any other policy for Government is already under heavy pressure from MRP, Gaullists and others for having “abandoned” France’s role in Indochina and, incidentally, for having abandoned it not to three countries in keeping with their new independence but rather to US who, in view of many non-Communist parliamentarians, is rapidly proceeding to replace France as dominating influential power in three countries. Cambodia is most sensitive area this regard and therefore understandable that Mendes Government, in striving to choose country to which it is able to point in refuting charge, should choose Cambodia.

We have no doubt that Mendes by so using subject of maintenance of the French military mission in Cambodia during recent tripartite ministerial talks wished to give us notice French intentions this regard. Budget of Associated States, already passed by Assembly and soon to go to Council of Republic, provides for economic and cultural aid to Cambodia and Laos including projects which are apparently now under consideration by FOA.⁶

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/1–655. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane.
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. Supra.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 2336, footnote 1.
5. For text, see ibid., p. 2400.
6. A note on the source text indicates there was an omission at the end of this last sentence.