168. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson1
SUBJECT
- Meeting State–Defense September 5, 1957
Attached at Tab A2 is the agenda of a State-Defense meeting in Secretary Quarles’ office, attended by Secretary Dulles and at which I represented FE. I believe a summary of some of the points discussed under agenda items 1 and 2 will be of particular interest to you.
Agenda Item I:
Top Secret plans of the military were presented in a briefing by General Randall. Secretary Quarles emphasized that these were being held very closely for obvious reasons and that only one-half dozen people in the Pentagon knew about them. The Defense Department is planning on the basis of $38 billion in defense expenditures and a military aid ceiling of $2.2 billion. At the present time the number of Defense personnel, as of 30 June 1957, was 2,794,000 of whom 900,000 were stationed overseas. These two figures, he pointed out, had been made public since the latter figure had been authorized by the President but further figures were top secret for planning purposes only. These plans call for further reductions as follows:
Defense Personnel
- By June 30, 1958—2,600,000
- By June 30, 1959—2,500,000
- By June 30, 1960—2,300,000
- By June 30, 1961—2,200,000
In terms of Army Divisions, this would mean a gradual reduction on the following basis.
Army Divisions
- By June 30, 1957—18 divisions
- By June 30, 1958—15 divisions
- By June 30, 1959—14 divisions
- By June 30, 1960—13 divisions
- By June 30, 1961—11 divisions
Secretary Quarles observed that this meant by June 30, 1961, on the basis of present calculations which were tentative, there would be no divisions left in the Far East, four divisions would be left in NATO and one in Hawaii.
The Secretary picked this one up fast and said that he hoped that Defense would not take forces out of Korea without checking with State. He observed dryly that if they did, they might have to send more back in than they took out. Secretary Quarles emphasized [Page 377] that they would, of course, keep in close contact with State. He said that Defense did not have in mind taking all our forces out of Korea. He put it this way to the Secretary: “You are stating a problem that is clearly recognized here but unresolved.”
The Secretary then inquired as to their plans for Japan, and Quarles responded that they would leave some Air in Japan, that there was no plan for a complete withdrawal from Japan, but that there would be a 40% (or 39,500) reduction in U.S. military personnel by the end of fiscal year 1958. All ground forces would be withdrawn from Japan by the end of this year.
In connection with a discussion of the Air Force, which will get the largest slice of the Defense appropriation pie, it was pointed out that over a period of years tactical air would be cut to half, i.e., from 40 to 20 wings, as the strategic air and missile programs developed. One-half of these tactical air units are overseas now and Secretary Quarles observed that the proportion overseas would necessarily increase.
The Secretary took occasion to observe that one thing which makes it very difficult for State to cope with the international implications of this kind of program is advance stories in the press—both leaks and statements by officials which have not been cleared with State and which place us frequently in an impossible position. He referred to the recent leak which Ambassador MacArthur and Admiral Stump had protested. Attached at Tab B3 are telegrams and stories. The Secretary made clear that he was not blaming Defense for this leak. He recognized that a skillful newspaper man would gather bits and pieces from various sources and make a pattern out of it, but this very fact underlined the need for caution in what our people say to the press. For example, in connection with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan, it makes a lot of difference whether a friendly Japanese government gets the credit for these withdrawals and consequently is in a favorable position to take the initiative in developing its own forces, or whether the impression is conveyed inside Japan that the government is simply responding to U.S. pressure. In the first instance, we utilize an asset we have; in the second, we throw it away, he pointed out.
The Secretary raised the question of better coordination between Defense and State in connection with military planning. Secretary Quarles suggested a meeting such as the one held today should be held often. He hoped that once a month the top people in Defense and State might get together. The Secretary indicated that this would be very useful but pursued the matter further by wondering whether it might be possible for State to have contact with the planning [Page 378] group within Defense before the plans had jelled and been presented to the JCS. Secretary Quarles said that he would be glad to work out anything Secretary Dulles thought would be useful. In this connection, Bob Murphy observed that a State–JCS meeting at which he represented State was held weekly.
There was considerable discussion of the NATO program during which Secretary Quarles noted that by the end of calendar 1958 Defense would be able to meet its NATO commitments. It was clear, however, that as time went on, Defense faced the problem under its current program of robbing NATO to meet FE requirements or vice versa.
[Here follows discussion of agenda item II, on Korea, scheduled for publication in volume XXIII.]