Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

133. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for SEATO Affairs (Abbott) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)¹

Washington, February 28, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Expected Pakistani Proposals at Canberra SEATO Meeting

Mr. White, Counselor of the New Zealand Embassy, has requested our views on the points raised in the attached paraphrase of a telegram from the New Zealand Foreign Office.² It is suggested that he be informed as follows:

1. The United States would not be prepared to agree to any statement, declaration or resolution at Canberra which would go beyond our obligations under paragraph IV.1. of the SEATO Treaty or our “Understanding” appended to the Treaty. As a corollary to this, we would be equally opposed to any proposal to modify the text of paragraph IV.1 or to withdraw our “Understanding.” Either of the latter would mean a re-negotiation of the Treaty and require resubmission to the Senate.

2. As regards the anticipated insistence of the Pakistanis to include a paragraph on Kashmir in the final communiqué at Canberra, we do not feel that any mention of Kashmir should be included this year because of the extremely delicate situation which will probably prevail just at the time of the Canberra conference. The fact that the Kashmir problem is actively before the UN is another important reason. However, it may not be possible to adopt a completely negative attitude towards the Pakistani demands. In such case our position would be to attempt to reach as innocuous a compromise as possible.

3. We have not yet decided whether it would be wise to approach the Pakistanis prior to Canberra and attempt to discourage them from taking any of the various steps foreseen in the attached telegram and in reported statements by Prime Minister Suhrawardy and Foreign Minister Noon. However, we will be glad to keep New Zealand informed of any approaches which we might decide to make and hope that they will reciprocate.

4. In case of open conflict between Pakistan and India, Pakistan could properly demand consultation within SEATO. We would assume that the United Nations would be the appropriate forum to take prompt action to bring about a resolution of such conflict. Any consultation within the SEATO framework would therefore necessarily be parallel to UN action.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–157. Secret.
2. Not printed. In it the New Zealand Government expressed its desire to learn the attitude of other SEATO powers toward a potential effort by Pakistan, at the Canberra meeting, to align other SEATO powers with its position on the Kashmir question.
3. In a memorandum of a conversation held on March 1, Abbott noted that he had informed White of the U.S. position along the lines set forth in this memorandum. He noted also White’s statement that if open conflict occurred between Pakistan and India, New Zealand would consult through Commonwealth as well as U.N. channels. “Thus, from their point of view the role of SEATO would be even less important than we saw it.” (Ibid.)