131. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 26, 19571
SUBJECT
- SEATO
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Firoz Khan Noon, Pakistan Foreign Minister
- Mr. Mohammed Ali, Pakistan Ambassador
- Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III—SOA
Mr. Noon expressed to the Secretary his appreciation for the cooperation received from U.S. officials during the recent Security Council consideration of the Kashmir case. He said that Ambassador [Page 286] Lodge, Mr. Barco2 and Mr. Jones had been “towers of strength” during the time the case had been before the Council.
Turning to SEATO, the Foreign Minister said that he would like to see the Treaty changed to provide that an attack on one member would be an attack on all. He understood, however, that a revision along these lines might cause difficulties with the U.S. Congress. He asked if the U.S. would object if the Asian members of SEATO agreed among themselves that attack upon any Asian member would be considered an attack upon other Asian members of the Organization.
In response to the Secretary’s question, Mr. Noon said that by Asian members he referred to the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. Perhaps Australia and New Zealand would also be interested in his proposal.
The Secretary replied that the formulation of Article IV of the Treaty followed that in our treaties with China, the ANZUS countries and the Philippines. It would be difficult to revise this formulation and, besides, the difference between the present formulation and that desired by the Pakistanis was not great. The Senate preferred the present formulation to that suggested by Foreign Minister Noon, which was similar to the NATO formulation. The present formulation appeared in the Monroe Doctrine. If the Asians wanted a stronger formulation to apply among themselves, however, the United States would have no objection.
Mr. Noon asked for the Secretary’s views on the advisability of bringing Japan into SEATO. The Secretary replied that we would like to see Japan drawn into the organization. The security situation in Asia was a patchwork. The United States had separate security treaties with Korea, Japan, the Philippines and the ANZUS countries. At some time in the future it would be desirable to combine these separate agreements. The obstacles to such a combination were not in Washington but in the capitals of the countries concerned.
The Foreign Minister thought that if the U.S. agreed to a combination of the various security arrangements in the Pacific the other parties would go along. The Secretary responded negatively, but agreed with the Foreign Minister that the Philippines probably would be willing for a more inclusive Pacific area defense agreement. As one example of the difficulty in establishing such an agreement, the Secretary referred to the differences between Japan and Korea. We were attempting to allay these differences but had not as yet been successful.
Mr. Noon asked for the Secretary’s views on the possible desirability of linking SEATO, or at least the Asian members of SEATO, [Page 287] in some way with the Baghdad Pact. If this could be achieved, a far-reaching and powerful security grouping would result.
The Secretary said that this was a new idea in so far as he was concerned and the Foreign Minister would understand that he could not make an impromptu comment on it, although his preliminary attitude toward the idea was sympathetic. Further study might bring forth valid objections and he would also need to consult his advisers.