105. Letter From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the First Secretary of Embassy in New Zealand (Fraleigh)1
Dear Mr. Fraleigh: I have received and read with interest your Despatch No. 494 of May 242 regarding the implementation of the Karachi decisions on SEATO. Since I was the Officer in the Department who called in the Australian and New Zealand Representatives about the importance we attached to moving ahead in implementing the Karachi decisions regarding the organizational machinery of SEATO, I felt I might drop you this brief note. In Karachi, as you know, we agreed to establish a Permanent Working Group as part of the Council Representatives mechanism and also to establish a small International Secretariat. Our concern here, based on reports from [Page 218] our representative in Bangkok, was that a number of the SEATO countries did not have their members of the Permanent Working Group in place at Bangkok nor had some of them nominated the individuals to fill the slots which they had agreed to fill on the International Secretariat.
From the very birth of the idea of SEATO we have, in keeping with not only the letter but the spirit of the ANZUS Treaty, been particularly careful to deal with the New Zealand and Australian Representatives here in Washington on a basis of much greater intimacy than with regard to some of the other members of the SEATO organization. In other words, we have let our hair down with them completely and sought their advice, counsel, and suggestions since we are the first to admit that we have no monopoly on imaginative ideas. In keeping with this practice, with which George Laking is fully familiar, I called in the Australian and New Zealand Representatives and explained the problem, noting that until we all had our personnel in place in Bangkok, SEATO really could not go forward and make progress. I certainly did not mean to imply any criticism of either the Australian or New Zealand Governments, but simply flagged their attention to the importance which we all attach, from the Secretary on down, to getting the SEATO machinery, which we had agreed to at Karachi, operative. This was fully understood here, I think.
With respect to our nominating a second secretary as our member of the Working Group,3 we picked, after careful consideration, the best man who in our judgment was the best Foreign Officer for this job. He is John Hill of our Embassy in Bangkok, who played a leading role in the preparations for the Karachi meeting and at Karachi made a deep impression on all of us, including the Secretary. In fact, he prepared a number of the Secretary’s talking papers in Karachi and is one of the finest young officers I have ever seen in the Service, both vocally articulate and also articulate on paper.
The purpose of this little note is simply to acquaint you with the background and to suggest that you let George Laking and any other people in the New Zealand Government who were concerned about what we did know how sorry I am that it created heartburn at Wellington. Certainly that was not my intention, which, on the contrary, was simply to flag them on this point on a basis of frankness and intimacy which we have always had in our relations with their representatives here who have been so helpful to us in all SEATO matters. [Page 219] I mentioned to Lloyd White, the New Zealand Counselor here, that I had received personal word that some people in the New Zealand Foreign Office seemed upset about our talk with them about this problem and asked him also to let George Laking know on a personal basis that we certainly meant no criticism whatsoever of the New Zealand Government which has strongly supported SEATO and which has made, through Foss Shanahan, such a fine contribution to the work in Bangkok.4
Sincerely,
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/6–2156. Confidential. Attached to FRALEIGH’s reply dated June 21, quoted in footnote 4 below.
In a memorandum to the Secretary dated June 15, MacArthur stated that on May 15 and 16 he had called in representatives of Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, and France and stressed to them the importance of filling their positions on the new SEATO International Secretariat and SEATO Permanent Working Group “at the earliest moment.” (Ibid., 790.5/6–1555)
↩- In despatch 494, FRALEIGH stated there had been a “rather caustic” reaction in the Department of External Affairs to MacArthur’s action because, according to an informant, New Zealand felt it had not been responsible for any delays. FRALEIGH also reported being told by this official that “manning committees and functions was all right, but more important was the generating of ideas on how to fight Communism in Southeast Asia, and the United States, on which New Zealand depended heavily for such ideas, had apparently produced little so far.” (Ibid., 790.5/5–2456)↩
- In despatch 494, FRALEIGH quoted his source as saying both Australia and New Zealand had been “shocked” to hear that the United States had appointed someone of this rank. “The United States did not seem to indicate by this appointment that it attached very great importance to the Working Group, our source remarked.”↩
- In his reply cited in footnote 1 above, FRALEIGH stated in part: “Before your letter arrived, I heard appreciative remarks in External Affairs about the comments you made about this matter to Lloyd White. After discussing the matter further yesterday, I feel that there is now no residue of the feeling that previously existed.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/6–2156)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩