Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

89. Informal Notes of a Meeting of the National Security Council Planning Board, Washington, December 21, 1955, 10 a.m.–12:30 p.m.¹

Washington, December 21, 1955, 10 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

INITIAL PRESENTATION

Governor Stassen opened his presentation with a statement of the need for the U.S. to keep the initiative it has attained on the question of disarmament. He remarked that the support won in the General Assembly and in the world could not be maintained by standing pat on present policy. He said the impossibility of banning nuclear weapons is generally accepted, the importance of preventing surprise is recognized, and the President’s proposal is generally considered to be a sound beginning. The question which the Soviets and others are pressing is what comes next. He further said that it would be adverse to U.S. security to have many “fourth countries” attain a nuclear weapons capability. Such a development would multiply the chances of nations acting recklessly. Mr. Stassen said that the U.S. must now spell out further steps on the other side of the gateway. At this point he said that he did not agree with the JCS that the gateway must be in effect before negotiating other measures. He did not agree, however, with State that the President’s proposal was something to be taken or left. He believed that the President’s proposal was not a prerequisite step, but was rather an integral part of the whole.

Turning to Volume V,² the Governor stated that he had never proposed and would never propose broad language as a cover for freewheeling action. The detailed implementation of the policy would have to be agreed upon by the Departments concerned. His aim was to move U.S. policy enough to get and retain a sound initiative. He then said that what was badly needed was a determination on the part of the Departments to help move policy rather than trying to delay or stop that movement. Mr. Stassen thereupon turned to the language in the paper³ and went through most of the items, pointing out changes and significant language.

On Item 5 he repeated his remark that the President’s proposal was an integral step and not purely a prerequisite. He called special attention to Item 7 as a big policy issue. He argued that very small reductions would have a considerable world impact, and that such reductions could take effect during the first year of experience in the implementation of the President’s proposal. He also emphasized Item 8 as a very important question, stressing the need to minimize the possibility of nuclear weapons being held in the so-called “fourth countries”. Within a comprehensive inspection system it would be, he argued, in U.S. interest for neither the U.S. nor the USSR to devote future nuclear material production for additional nuclear weapons. He granted that Item 8 (like the whole policy) might never be carried out, but called it an essential part of our posture in the world. (Note: Either here or at a later time the Governor indicated that this proposal could be started when the President’s plan went into effect.)

Item 10⁴ was another important issue, but one which could not be solved in this brief time. Mr. Stassen did not foresee any inspection system to deal with the ICBM after it had been produced and deployed. He aimed at a policy of openness which could prevent massive production of weapons, and concluded that though postponed now, the issue must be met within six months to a year.

Item 20⁵ on nuclear weapons tests was likewise to be postponed, but Mr. Stassen reported that the scientists were divided considerably on this matter, some believing cessation would be to the U.S. advantage.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Reid⁶ (Budget) asked about bringing Communist China into the system. Mr. Stassen replied that this was not politically possible now, and explained that China did not need to be tied in for about five years. He agreed that it could not stay outside the fold forever.

General Bonesteel (Defense) asked how long it would take to work out the many details indicated, and further whether decisions on principle would be communicated to other governments. Mr. Stassen said that this would not be done in the form presented in the paper, but that he would expect to begin talking with the countries most concerned, particularly with respect to moving together on the problem of “fourth countries” and the relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Additionally, Mr. Stassen replied that if Item 7 were adopted he would seek agreement with our friends before February that the U.S. in its initial proposal would favor small reductions as a part of the tie-in to the President’s proposal. (At this point there was a side argument with Bowie and Amory as to whether it was feasible or not to account for nuclear contributions to an international stockpile.)

General Farrell (JCS) queried the value of Item 7, and said the Services could not really consider this matter at this time based as it was on the first full year under the President’s proposal. Mr. Stassen replied that it was necessary now to start talking about this subject and negotiate future steps. He asked the JCS to reconsider what price they would pay to achieve the great improvement in U.S. security which the President’s proposal would bring. One price is some reduction in the U.S. armed posture. He urged the JCS to move with him on this problem. General Bonesteel interjected that the conventional reduction problem was intimately related to the ability of the U.S. to meet creeping Communist expansion. Reductions, he feared, might help the Communists advance piecemeal in the peripheral areas, referring to Korea, China, Vietnam, etc. Mr. Stassen noted that there was a question of the best possible U.S. security under the assumption that the President’s proposal had been implemented, and repeated his question of how much that opening up was worth. This question was batted back and forth for a while. General Farrell resumed with a recommendation that Item 16 be deleted. Mr. Stassen, saying that the problem could not [be] deleted, wished that the JCS would supply their version of the right language for the issue of overseas bases.

Mr. Amory (CIA) opened up the question of Mr. Stassen’s view on the possibility that free world armed forces would be reduced in the next period in any event. The Governor answered that on balance they would not, when German and Japanese additions were counted. Mr. Bowie (State) retorted with his opinion that there would be a decline in the forces we were now counting on. Mr. Amory turned to the question of the size of the inspection force, which he hoped would not be excessive. He argued the need for a breakdown of the system, and further information on the work of the task forces. He went on to state his view that we might have to pay the price of throwing China in to get the desired end result. Mr. Stassen countered that it was not worthwhile to recognize China now for this reason, and that China could not build its own air force, missiles or nuclear weapons for the next five to ten years at least. Amory countered that with respect to conventional forces, we had to count in China, Vietnam and North Korea. (At this juncture Bowie stated that he had never seen any specific studies on the effect of major mutual reductions of forces, and called for such a study. There was a bit of side argument about this point.)

Dr. Elliott⁷ (ODM) stressed the importance to the U.S. of having intercontinental missiles in place by 1960. He feared that any steps along the lines proposed in Item 10 might be very dangerous. The Governor answered that these missiles could not be developed without considerable testing, which could be discovered by an inspection system. However, he noted that this major point was postponed for further study. He granted that the proposal would be no good if the U.S. Government continued to disagree on the matter for another five or six years. He called for maximum effort now to solve this problem in the national interest, and welcomed suggestions on it from any Planning Board member. Bowie then argued that the report did not meet this problem sufficiently, and Dr. Elliott renewed his argument that it might be very dangerous for the U.S. to stop its own developments in this field.

Commander Nelson (AEC) referred to Item 8, and asked what the timing would be on advancing the proposal therein. Mr. Stassen replied that the timing would be up to the President to decide, once approved, but that the proposal assumed it would be started before “fourth countries” obtained nuclear weapons. General Bonesteel suggested that this development might be a net gain for the U.S., but Mr. Stassen disagreed and repeated his belief that it would provide greater chance for miscalculation, spreading small wars into large ones, and more illogical, if not mad, actions.

Mr. Bowie (State) expressed State’s view that the “period of grace” was now over and that Volume V was inadequate. He asserted that the Volume called for a large inspection force and no significant reduction in armament. He characterized the inspection system as essentially a warning system only. He called attention to the UN resolution which gave an equal priority to “measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament”.⁸ Mr. Bowie believed that the State difference was in fact a basic dissent or divergence from Volume V. State, he continued, thought there had not been adequate studies on the matter of reductions—in particular, the prospects five to ten years ahead had not been fully taken into account. Bowie feared that partial proposals such as these might, if rejected by the Soviets, have a bad effect on the free world. He cautioned that the world as a whole was not as sanguine as we seemed to be about the results of an atomic stalemate, and would like to reduce both the costs and the risks of that situation. He again argued that Volume V did not meet this situation, and asserted that the token reductions called for would not convince anyone. He foresaw a very bad future situation if the U.S. could not do any better in this field. Bowie concluded that the clear serious differences in the government agencies on this question could not be compromised nor could decisions be reached by their agreement. He felt the basic differences must be posed more squarely and then resolved by the President’s decision. Mr. Stassen commented that Bowie’s remarks reflected the basic differences that existed within the Government. He himself was not seeking to compromise these differences, but to fit together a sound policy. He continued to reject the State position on major reductions at this time in the absence of the settlement of key political issues. He insisted that the U.S. act from a position of agreed mutual strength and not go down to a position of weakness, Mr. Stassen continuing to believe that his proposals would keep the U.S. initiative and leadership. Furthermore, he thought that if the U.S. would begin to talk about a lower level of forces it would then be even more difficult to keep up free world strength in the absence of an agreement. However, Mr. Stassen equally rejected the Defense position, which did not provide enough substance for U.S. leadership. He thought the U.S. could start a downward trend in armaments and proposed that all future nuclear material be used for peaceful purposes. The U.S., he said, should “wage peace” by maximum effort to get agreement. A start on this problem would help resolve other political issues, which in turn might make greater disarmament possible. There was some further Stassen-Bowie argument on these points.

Mr. Dillon Anderson summed up with his view that the discussion had posed a number of questions which required further study. He personally had been much impressed with the “fourth country” problem and its dangers. He felt there was much disagreement on policy within the Departments—more than he had previously understood to be the case, and felt that the President must establish a U.S. position. He suggested a later meeting, perhaps sometime in January, at which decisions might be taken. Bowie called for a fuller report on the details of inspection, to which Mr. Stassen responded with a review of task force planning and his own expectation that the combined inspection system be reviewed in the Departments and actually “gamed” thereafter. Bowie continued to argue the importance of a fuller description of the proposed system which was not available to the NSC at this time.

The meeting was concluded with some remarks by Dr. Elliott to the effect of not placing too high a price upon favorable allied and neutral opinion as against the priority U.S. objectives.

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Meetings of the Planning Board. Top Secret. Drafted by Lippmann. No list of participants appears on the source text.
2. Document 82.
3. Reference is to a report prepared by Stassen containing a detailed breakdown of Volume V and summarizing the comments of interested departments and agencies on specific provisions. The report was circulated to members of the NSC by Executive Secretary Lay under cover of a memorandum, December 16, for consideration at the Council meeting of December 22. The report recommended that the NSC approve most of the provisions of Volume V, some in revised form in light of comments received. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)
4. Item 10 is the same as Part VI B 6 of Volume V.
5. Item 20 is the same as Part VI F 3 of Volume V.
6. Ralph W.E. Reid, Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
7. William Y. Elliott, Consultant on National Security Council Affairs, Office of Defense Mobilization.
8. See the editorial note, supra.