99. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 15, 1957, 4:02 p.m.1


  • The Questions of Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba


  • Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
  • Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, IO
  • Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
  • Mr. Herman Phleger,L
  • Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

Ambassador Eban called on the Secretary this afternoon further to discuss the questions of Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba. He referred to the attached Aide-Mémoire which had been delivered to the Secretary earlier in the afternoon and said that it represented a constructive response to the American initiative of February 11 and he hoped that it would break what appeared to be a deadlock. He described the Israeli [Page 159] Aide-Mémoire as a supplementary document to the American Aide-Mémoire of February 113 and as envisaging swift action.

Ambassador Eban referred to the American proposal on the Straits of Aqaba and observed that the area of doubt was small, that there was a broad ground of agreement and that within a matter of days questions of control of the Straits and freedom of navigation could be resolved. Ambassador Eban mentioned two points: 1) necessity for a legal definition and interpretation of the Gulf of Aqaba. He thought that Israeli and American representatives could get together over the weekend and work out a definition of the international character of the waterway; 2) necessity for a definition of the functions of the UNEF in the Straits of Aqaba. He thought it would be an axiom beyond controversy that unless UNEF were placed there Egyptian guns would quickly appear and would stop Israeli ships. Previously pessimistic predictions on his part had usually been correct. Egyptian statements had already indicated what they may do. Ambassador Eban thought that the stability of tenure of the UNEF should be defined in the Straits of Aqaba area. He recalled that on January 28 and again on February 24 Ambassador Lodge had indicated in the UNGA that it would be essential that the UNEF be there, which would permit freedom of navigation. Ambassador Eban suggested that Ambassador Lodge’s views be embodied in the terms of reference of UNEF. If there were a legal definition of the waters of the Gulf and if the UNEF’s tenure at the Straits was defined, uncertainties regarding future blockade would be removed.

Ambassador Eban continued that, with respect to Gaza, two points were essential: 1) it would be disastrous and pose a grave threat to Israel if Egypt reoccupied the area; the possibility of an Egyptian return was a major Israeli preoccupation, and 2) if Egypt did not return to the Gaza territory it would be an area not at war with Israel. If Egypt returned, the Gaza area would be at war. To avoid the latter possible development, Israel could accept and would commit itself to settlement of Arab refugees. For the first time, Israel was willing to plunge into new and icy waters in this respect. Ambassador Eban recalled that the Secretary in August 1955 had suggested that there should be a repatriation where feasible or resettlement and compensation where repatriation not feasible. Israel agreed and planned to pursue a similar approach. Israel had concluded that we here have a new opportunity.

[Page 160]

Ambassador Eban said that if the lines of thought which had been expressed in the Israeli Aide-Mémoire were adopted, the following developments could occur:


Declaration by the US and others regarding international waters of the Gulf of Aqaba and freedom of passage through the Straits.
Israeli withdrawal of military forces.
Entry by UNEF with agreement on terms of reference, including stability of tenure.


Israeli withdrawal of military forces.
Arrival of mission to study civil administration and subsequently to report to the UNGA.

Ambassador Eban added that to return to the previous status in the Gaza area would be so drastic that Israel would wish to explain its views to a mission before such action was taken.

The Secretary said he had read the Israeli Aide-Mémoire with deep disappointment. It seemed to misapprehend the nature of the declaration which we had there proposed. The Israeli Aide-Mémoire was not really responsive. It had been indicated in the American Aide-Mémoire that there was in these matters an order of events and an order of urgency which had been fixed by the UN; first, the UNGA had called upon Israel to withdraw to the Armistice lines. We had felt that Israel’s willingness to do so might be increased and that its ability to satisfy its public opinion and its Parliament would be assisted if we had set forth the American attitude. Ambassador Eban’s suggestion with respect to negotiations was a misconception of our attitude. The US as a member of the UN and as a maritime power would be willing to use its influence in the directions indicated but we did not suggest that we would set ourselves up as a rival to the UN to negotiate in its stead, nor to take the place of Secretary General Hammarskjold. We had no mandate from the UN, nor would we be willing to act in that capacity. We were, on the other hand, prepared to make our views known in an authoritative way and, in fact, have already done so. We had thought that such action might make it easier for Israel to comply with the UNGA Resolutions. These suggestions were a far cry from negotiations as suggested by Ambassador Eban. It seemed to be his thesis that negotiations between Israel and the US should precede other action. Furthermore, we would be dealing with matters which were of concern to such other littoral states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The Secretary continued that some of these observations also applied to the Gaza area where there was a general Armistice Agreement involving Israel and Egypt. The Israeli Aide-Mémoire seemed to [Page 161] contemplate that there should be an effort to impose Israeli-United States views on the United Nations. The Secretary expressed amazement that Ambassador Eban had thought this suggestion would prove to be an acceptable procedure. Such action would leave a confused and dangerous situation in the Gaza area if, in fact, it were the only basis for Israeli withdrawal.

Ambassador Eban said Israel’s formal position seemed to be misunderstood. Israel feared that withdrawal would be followed by renewed blockade, for which reason Israel could not comply with the United Nations request. With Israeli withdrawal from Gaza it would create a situation which was of legitimate concern. In both cases hostilities might result. Consequently, if the U.S. were willing to adopt the Israeli suggestions there would be no hostilities and the final result would also be in the Arab interest. Ambassador Eban continued that Israel was not suggesting usurpation of U.N. interest. Any public statements by the U.S. would be corollary to the U.S. attitude which had already been expressed in its Aide-Mémoire. If the U.N. went along with expanded activities for the UNEF we would avoid conflagration in the area.

Ambassador Eban said that regarding Gaza, Israel acknowledged the priority of Israeli withdrawal. Thereafter the U.N. could have a look at the situation including the proposed solution of the refugee question. The U.S. could give valuable assurances in attaining these objectives. What was unreasonable in these remarks? Israel was merely asking for a statement by the U.S. regarding Aqaba and steps to achieve the objective already indicated by Ambassador Lodge. Israel was agreeable to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and had made suggestions for a settlement of its future.

The Secretary said we seemed to have a situation in which Israel had been called upon repeatedly and unconditionally to withdraw. However, Israel had held back which had caused a disposition in U.N. quarters to take vigorous action to secure Israel’s withdrawal. Against this background we had given Israel a statement of policy which would actuate the U.S. when Israel withdrew. We hoped this would make it possible for Israel to say it would withdraw. We could give no guarantee that the rest of the world would agree with our position. We had thought that the reasons inherent in the situation would have tipped the scale in favor of compliance. However, prior to compliance Israel seemed to want unilateral exploration and agreement regarding Gaza and Aqaba. Why does Israel assume the U.N. and others would accept anything more than the policies already stated? Even if we reached agreement there would be no guarantee that they could be carried out. Probably it would be less likely because there would be bitter and justifiable resentment on the part of other U.N. members, the Secretary General, and the littoral states if we arrogated to ourselves [Page 162] settlement of these questions without consultation with them. The Israeli plan seemed less calculated to achieve the desired result than the knowledge that the U.S. would commit itself as indicated in its Aide Mémoire.

The Secretary admitted that the action which he proposed could not be 100% certain but he suggested that the Israeli procedure was also not 100% certain and was subject to greater risks.

Ambassador Eban said that he was not able to acknowledge any conflict in the Israeli Aide-Mémoire. Israel was willing to withdraw if the UNEF took over and remained until there was a more permanent arrangement for freedom of navigation. He asked if we would ascertain whether the U.N. would endorse what Ambassador Lodge had said. Could we not wait a week to see if those objectives were obtainable? There was a responsibility to avoid the risk of a return to hostilities in the Aqaba area which the Israeli withdrawal might precipitate.

The Secretary referred to that passage in the Israeli Aide-Mémoire which said “The Israel Government is ready to enter into immediate conversations with the United States on specific steps for an early settlement”. The Secretary continued that we had no more basis of entering into a conversation with Israel than with any of the other members of the U.N. To suggest bilateral conversations would be to suggest an improper and unacceptable role.

The Secretary also noted Ambassador Eban had suggested regarding Gaza “that the Governments of the United States and of Israel consult together urgently in an effort to find a suitable arrangement which might be submitted to the United Nations”. The Secretary interpreted this passage to mean that after agreement we would submit the report of the two Governments to the U.N. for ratification. This approach would not only be unacceptable to us but also would be deeply and properly resented by the U.N.

Ambassador Eban said that the emphasis should not be on the formal or procedural aspects but on the policies themselves. The Secretary noted that we had already made a policy statement in the Aide-Mémoire of February 11. We wanted to know if Israel would withdraw. The Israeli Aide-Mémoire was negative in this respect. Ambassador Eban observed that it had made no negative but only affirmative statements. The Secretary said that in any event it was not responsive to the American Aide-Mémoire of February 11.

Ambassador Eban asked if we could use our influence in the U.N. to see whether or not the UNEF functions could be defined. The Secretary replied that we had covered this point by our willingness to make a public declaration. Ambassador Eban continued that because of special international interests in the Gulf of Aqaba it should not be treated as Sinai had been but with greater definition. If this action [Page 163] were taken, we would be closer to a solution. If not, the Egyptian guns would return to the Straits. It was therefore essential that we be prudent and show foresight. Israel was merely asking for precisions.

The Secretary said that, with reference to precisions of language, he wished to make one or two changes in the American Aide-Mémoire of February 11. In the paragraph relating to the Gulf of Aqaba the first sentence should read “The U.S. believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits, giving access thereto.” In other words, “comprehends” would replace “constitutes” and “forcibly” would be dropped from the sentence as now written.

Ambassador Eban again said that greater precision was required regarding the UNEF. The Secretary replied that for whatever his judgment was worth he thought there was not a great likelihood that the Straits of Aqaba would be closed following Israeli withdrawal. He pointed out that Aqaba and Gaza were not unrelated in that American action was contingent upon Israeli withdrawal from both. Ambassador Eban noted that the process in Gaza would be longer than in Aqaba and asked why it would be difficult to obtain a definition of UNEF functions. The Secretary said that other countries in the U.N. must be consulted and that all points of view should be taken into account. In acting without consultation deep resentment would be caused. American-Israeli conversations and a joint mission would not be the right way to proceed.

Ambassador Eban said that it would not be a U.S. mission but a U.N. mission. The Secretary said this formulation would be a different matter. Ambassador Eban added that there was a view now circulating in the U.N. that a mission could go out after Israeli withdrawal.

The Secretary again pointed out that the Israeli Aide-Mémoire stated that “the Governments of the U.S. and of Israel consult together urgently in an effort to find a suitable arrangement which might be submitted to the U.N.” The Secretary added, however, that we could indicate as a member of the U.N. that we would be in favor of a mission or commission regarding the future of the Gaza Strip. If we were now talking about an elaboration of the American policy declaration which would justify Israeli withdrawal, these details could be included but quick action before Monday was desirable; otherwise a storm would break in the U.N.

Ambassador Eban said that an American declaration regarding the UNEF would be helpful after which it might be taken up by the Secretary General. The Secretary thought that the majority of the members of the U.N. would move forward if Israel withdrew.

The Secretary said he wanted to make certain matters clear: we had tried very hard to work out a solution for the present situation. Israel and the U.S. had relationships which were very different from [Page 164] those with other countries and which were very close. Israeli-American relations were unlike American-Egyptian relations. The Secretary said that he would be deeply disturbed if events should push us into antagonism toward Israel. A deep cleavage of opinion would develop within the U.S. It had been his desire, to the best of his ability, to find a reasonable solution. He did not blame the Israeli Government for endeavoring to reduce future risks. He felt that we were very close in the American Aide-Mémoire of February 11, although there might be some modifications. The paragraphs regarding Gaza, for example, did not touch on the question of administration. Question of U.N. study might be considered and perhaps other modifications. He earnestly suggested that the Israeli Ambassador go over the American Aide-Mémoire of February 11 in this light, that it be accepted and that Israel withdraw from Gaza and Aqaba.

Ambassador Eban said he would consult the Israeli Foreign Minister in New York but wished to observe that if Israel withdrew it would have no assurances of an open waterway at the Straits. The Secretary said that the greatest assurance could be found not in what people said, but in what were the elemental forces at work. For example, treaties were not dependable after the conditions in which they were signed ceased to exist. Greater dependability could be placed upon conditions which served vital interests. Such conditions were far better than red ribbon and seals on paper treaties. If Israel withdrew what, in reality, would Israel have in Aqaba? It would have an alternative to the Suez Canal which would be of great interest to all of the maritime powers. The great error of Western Europe was its reliance upon the Suez Canal alone.

Ambassador Eban observed that Nasser might close both the Straits of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. The Secretary observed that he would be acting contrary to world public opinion, in which event Israel would not stand alone. Under such circumstances if Egypt took steps which could not be justified, then a case could be made. Israel’s best assurance would lie in this basic fact. Israel would take a great risk if it centered upon a U.N. recommendation by which Egypt might not be bound.

The Secretary said that he was going down to Georgia to discuss these and other matters with the President. He believed that he had made the American position clear. He planned to return in the early afternoon of February 16 and hoped that Ambassador Eban meanwhile would be able to make progress along the lines of the American Aide-Mémoire of February 11. We were considering making our Aide-Mémoire public tomorrow afternoon. Israel might also wish to publish its Aide-Mémoire of February 15. We would then see what would develop thereafter.

[Page 165]

Ambassador Eban said that he would set down some words which might be helpful. He thought there was no wide area of division to justify a parting of the ways. Minister Shiloah observed that the Israeli procedural suggestions contained in its Aide-Mémoire had not correctly described the substance of the Israeli case.

Ambassador Eban, in response to the Secretary’s query as to what remarks Ambassador Eban would make to the press on leaving, said he planned to say that the Israel Government’s proposals had been submitted to the Secretary for study, that Ambassador Eban had made some oral observations and that he presumed that the various matters were being considered.



The Government of Israel deeply appreciates the sympathetic interest of the President and the Secretary of State in its problems, and their willingness to devote earnest study to the quest for solutions. It regards this constructive interest as a further expression of American friendship for Israel and of American concern for peace in the Middle East.

Israel has noted with satisfaction the affirmative approach of the United States to the question of free navigation in the Gulf of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran.

The Government of Israel expresses its agreement in principle with the approach to this question defined by the Secretary of State in his Aide-Mémoire of February 11 and in his conversation with the Ambassador of Israel on that date.

In particular, Israel is appreciative of the following elements in the United States’ position:

the affirmation that the Gulf constitutes international waters, and that all nations, including Israel, have the right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto;
the invocation in the Aide-Mémoire of the assurances conveyed by Egypt to the United States on January 28, 1950;
the statement of the readiness of the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, to exercise the right of free and innocent passage, and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.
the suggestion that as a precautionary measure the UNEF move into the area of the Straits as the Israeli forces are withdrawn.

[Page 166]

The Government of Israel is impressed by the statement of the Secretary of State to the Ambassador expressing awareness of the responsibility which would rest upon the United States if Israel were to withdraw and the Egyptian restrictions were to be resumed.

While giving full weight to these policies and attitudes, the Israel Government is conscious of the danger which would arise to the freedom of Israeli shipping in the Gulf and to peace in the area if Egypt were to resume occupation of the Straits of Tiran before the attainment of a settlement. For many years Egypt has maintained restrictions in the Suez Canal contrary to the Convention of 1888 and to decisions of the Security Council which, under Article 25 of the Charter, have binding effect on all members of the United Nations. These policies, together with corresponding restrictions in the Gulf of Akaba, have cut Israel off from her freedom of commerce with large parts of the world; have inflicted enormous losses and burdens upon Israel’s economy, and have constituted a danger to peace and security in the Middle East.

Despite the disapproval of the United Nations and of the maritime community, including the United States, no effective steps were taken to ensure the termination of these practices.

Recent expressions of Egyptian policy give ample grounds for the belief that, if no preventive measures are taken, the Egyptian restrictions in the Gulf of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran will be resumed, with consequent peril both to Israel’s national interests and to peace in the area.

In order to meet this danger, the Government of Israel supports the suggestion that units of the UNEF move into the Straits as Israel troops withdraw. But it holds that these units should be stationed along the western coast of the Gulf of Akaba until a peace settlement is achieved, or until an agreed and permanent arrangement for freedom of navigation is otherwise secured. In this connection Israel has noted the proposal made on behalf of the United States by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the United Nations on January 28 and February 2, 1957.

Failing such an arrangement for the stationing of UNEF, the Government of Israel suggests that a precise guarantee be afforded for the specific protection of Israel-bound shipping exercising its right of passage in the Straits and the Gulf.

Israel believes that the Aide-Mémoire and the oral observations by the Secretary of State in his conversation with the Ambassador on February 11 signify the sincere intention of the Government of the United States to provide an effective guarantee against interference with free navigation in these international waters. Accordingly, the Israel Government is ready to enter into immediate conversations with the United States on specific steps for an early settlement. It is desirable [Page 167] to co-ordinate the sequence to be adopted in such matters as a public declaration of United States policy embodying the guarantee of free navigation; concurring declarations by other maritime powers; the evacuation of the Sharm-el-Shaikh area by Israel forces; and the entry of UNEF into the evacuated area and the definition of its functions.

A preliminary list of other specific points suggested for discussion is submitted as an Annex to this Aide-Mémoire.

The Government of Israel has studied the observations in the Aide-Mémoire of February 11 on the Gaza Strip. It has, in particular, noted the following elements:

the recognition that this area, until recently under Egyptian occupation, “has been a source of armed infiltration and reprisais” and of “great potential danger because of the presence there of so large a number or Arab refugees”;
The observation of the Secretary of State that the United States has not crystallized a final view on the future of the Gaza Strip but that this future “should be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations.”

The Government of Israel wishes to add the following comments:

The Gaza Strip, occupied during the invasion of 1948, was never Egyptian territory. The Armistice Agreement under which Egypt occupied the Strip was continuously broken by Egypt. In violation of the United Nations Charter and of the decision of the Security Council against belligerent acts, Egypt conducted hostile acts against Israel. These actions were based on a doctrine of “a state of war” with Israel, which Egypt still declines to relinquish, despite the fact that this doctrine, and any actions arising therefrom, were repudiated by the Security Council in 1951. In these circumstances there is no basis for the restoration of the status quo ante in Gaza by the return of Egypt to an area which she used exclusively for the purpose of establishing an aggressive base against Israel.

Israel’s stand on the Gaza question is influenced by three problems:

The security of Israel, and especially that of its villages and settlements in the South and the Negev;
The welfare and economic situation of the local population;
The problem of the refugees.

Israel is prepared to make a supreme effort to raise the standard of the residents of the area from the fearful poverty which grew increasingly disastrous during the Egyptian occupation.

The Government of Israel is ready to make its contribution to a United Nations program for settling the refugee population of the Gaza Strip. Israel’s contribution, within this framework, will consist both in the payment of compensation and in the settlement of a part of [Page 168] the refugee population of Gaza. Israel is confident that the United States will understand the significant effect of this step for the solution of basic problems which have been deadlocked for several years.

In view of the vital importance of the Gaza problem and of the contribution envisaged by Israel towards its solution, it is suggested that the Governments of the United States and of Israel consult together urgently in an effort to find a suitable arrangement which might be submitted to the United Nations.

This examination, which should include an investigation of the position in the area by a suitable mission, should not take a long time. The steps immediately envisaged are the withdrawal of Israel forces and the discussion of a suitable relationship between the U.N. and the local and Israel Administrative services.

Israel believes that it is necessary to prevent a recurrence of the turbulent conditions out of which the recent hostilities arose. There should be a new era in the relations between Egypt and Israel. By constantly violating the Armistice, through the invocation of belligerent rights and the conduct of blockades and hostilities, Egypt distorted the fundamental character of the Armistice Agreement as a transition to peace, and emptied it of its central purpose. At a time when the Agreement had full legal force, Egypt regarded it as an expression of “a state of war”. In these circumstances, Israel cannot legitimately be requested to return to the status quo ante, and to resume adherence to an agreement which Egypt has nullified throughout a period of eight years by claiming and exercising a policy of belligerency inconsistent with its terms.

At the same time, the Government of Israel declares that it does not seek or claim any belligerent rights against Egypt, and that it undertakes to abstain, on the basis of reciprocity, from any hostile act whatever against Egypt.

The Aide-Mémoire of February 11 deals with the questions of Gaza and the Gulf of Akaba, since problems exist in both areas in connection with the withdrawal of forces. While no context of withdrawal arises in the case of the Suez Canal, the Government of Israel emphasizes its hope for United States support in securing the implementation of Israel’s rights under the 1888 Convention. On many occasions, the most recent of which was President Eisenhower’s public statement on February 6,6 the United States has noted the violation by Egypt of its obligations under the 1888 Convention in respect of Israel-bound shipping.

[Page 169]

The United Nations has devoted great effort to secure the clearance of the Suez Canal for navigation. If the Suez Canal is to be reopened physically and then to be operated with discrimination, the United Nations will have inadvertently become responsible for expediting the renewed violation of international law.

It is inconceivable that the Suez Canal can be opened by the United Nations and remain closed to any of its member-States. It is essential, in the interest of peace and security, to ensure that Egypt refrains from interference with Israeli and Israel-bound shipping exercising the right of free and innocent passage in this international waterway. The Government of Israel would welcome a clarification of United States policy on this point.

The constructive and affirmative approach expressed by the Secretary of State in the conversation and Aide-Mémoire of February 11 confirms the belief that the United States and Israel have a common aspiration to strengthen peace in the Middle East. In view of the great measure of proximity between the viewpoints of the two Governments on the questions under discussion, the Government of Israel desires to hold urgent conversations with the United States Government in order to clarify the issues and to promote an early solution.

Israel hopes that the United States will help to create such international conditions in the immediate future as will allow swift progress to be made in such discussions, designed to bring about a settlement of problems which, until the Secretary’s initiative on February 11, were in a position of acute deadlock.



It is Israel’s understanding that the term “free passage” as generally accepted in international law means passage of ships irrespective of flag or destination of cargo, without previous authorization of the littoral state or states, and without the right of the littoral state to suspend such passage: furthermore that “innocent passage” means passage of a ship whose conduct is not essentially injurious to the safety and welfare of the littoral state. (Hyde, International Law 1945, p. 517)7 It is suggested that these two definitions be explicitly stated in any declaration to be made by the United States, setting out the policies envisaged in the Aide-Mémoire.
Reference is made to the statement in the Aide-Mémoire “that no nation has the right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage etc.” It is suggested that in any formal declaration of purpose these [Page 170] words be amended to read “forcibly or otherwise”. The object is to preclude interference by the enactment of obstructive regulations, the penalisation of ships exercising innocent passage, or by such methods as the blocking of the waterway by placing obstacles in the navigable channel. Such interference by regulation, intimidation and physical obstruction have been followed by Egypt in the Suez Canal. It is consequently submitted that Governments prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage should specifically decline to recognize the validity of regulations imposed by any of the littoral states with the effect of frustrating the basic aim of free and innocent passage.
The Government of Israel would welcome information on the steps proposed by the United States in order to exercise its rights of passage in the Gulf and the Straits at an early date. Israel would also welcome a discussion of methods whereby the United States might “join with others to secure general recognition of this right”. It is presumed that this involves cooperative effort with other maritime nations who have an interest in developing navigation in the Gulf and the Straits.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–1557. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins. The time of the conversation is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) A summary of this conversation was transmitted to the Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 796, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2-1557)
  2. Document 78.
  3. For texts of Lodge’s statements to the General Assembly on January 28 and February 2, see Department of State Bulletin, February 18, 1957, pp. 270–271, and February 25, 1957, pp. 325–326, respectively.
  4. A copy of the Israeli Aide-Mémoire is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.
  5. A transcript of Eisenhower’s press conference of February 6 is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 122-135.
  6. See footnote 2, Document 143.