Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

76. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 10, 1957—7 p.m.

Delga 700. For Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re Israeli withdrawal. Following is detailed report of conversation between Lodge and SYG re Israeli withdrawal, main points of which conveyed to Secretary by Lodge on Sunday.²

Lodge gave SYG informal memo containing material telephoned to us Sunday afternoon.³ After reading it aloud, Hammarskjold, Bunche and Cordier all said it was very good. Cordier emphasized last para of memo particularly good.

SYG focused on para 3, section 2. He asked what it meant. Bunche asked “does it imply use of force by US in exercising right of free passage”? Lodge responded he was not aware we contemplated use of force. Cordier said nobody will interfere with US vessels and therefore this was not test case; test would come with respect other vessels.

SYG raised question of Israeli gun boats. He said there are three gun boats in Gulf now. He hoped Israel was wise enough to get them out before withdrawal its forces Sharm el-Sheikh; otherwise, after withdrawal, putting warships through straits would not be innocent passage in territorial waters.

Hammarskjold said if Israel withdraws from both Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt will do nothing in straits; it will not interfere with freedom of passage or exercise rights of belligerence, although it will not say so. (SYG said “prominent Arab”, later identified to be Rifai of Jordan, had told him, when Rifai presented Arabs’ views to SYG last week, that last 2 resolutions made it, as practical matter, impossible for Egypt to exercise right of belligerence in Straits.) If Israel gets out of Sharm el-Sheikh only, then Egypt is likely to assert right of self-defense under Art 51 of Charter and restrict Israeli passage.

Lodge said we felt US approach constituted sufficient assurance for Israelis to withdraw. . . . Hammarskjold had said earlier in conversation he did not believe Israel would withdraw as result of our démarche. He feels that only Ben Gurion’s resignation would permit Israelis to get out since Ben Gurion’s entire political future is dependent upon his strong policy of resistance. Hammarskjold does not believe sanctions will get Israelis out either. Bunche does not share SYG’s views on this point. He believes Israelis can afford to wait “through a vote on sanctions”. If Israelis then decide withdraw after sanctions are voted, they could get out next day without sanctions ever going into effect. He believes, if sanctions voted by GA and US supports them and West Germany withholds reparation payments, Israel will be forced to withdraw.

Hammarskjold said Afro-Asians want plenary meeting on Tuesday⁴ afternoon. He said he would speak to Fawzi today and inform him of US efforts. Hammarskjold made it clear that he did not believe Fawzi or Afro-Asians would agree to further delay in GA consideration since there have been several delays this past week. He briefly showed us report which he intends make to GA⁵ which he described as “brakes on” report and “mildly advising against” sanctions. He read us language which he said provided for Israel sufficient guarantee to warrant their withdrawal. He read to us sentence which states both sides should scrupulously observe Armistice Agreement and that“Egypt has reaffirmed its intention to observe Armistice Agreement on assumption that observance would be reciprocal”. Hammarskjold said if he can get a postponement of GA to Thursday then he might decide to delay making public his report. As of now, if GA meets Tuesday afternoon, he intends to make his report on Monday. In course of conversation, he later said it might be good idea to put out his report on Monday in any event, since it might provide Fawzi with excuse not to press for a meeting on Tuesday on ground that SYG’s report needed careful study. Hammarskjold felt if he was not able to postpone GA until Thursday, it might be possible to have meeting on Tuesday afternoon limited to speeches only. We pointed out that Egypt and India are pressing seven cosponsors to develop common approach and this could help stall initiative from other quarters for resolution on Tuesday.

SYG was seeing Eban, Pearson and Engen separately late Sunday afternoon. . . .

Hammarskjold mentioned two other points not directly relevant to our démarche. He said it is clear Nasser would like to have talks on Canal settlement in Cairo because he personally would like to handle them. Hammarskjold reported Pineau was generally favorable to idea of talks taking place in Cairo. However, SYG cannot undertake this in immediate future in view of present problems confronting him. Directly related to question of talks in Cairo is invitation for Hammarskjold go to Jerusalem. He said Mrs. Meir had invited him in January and Eban had followed up this invitation by spelling it out to press and by pressing him strongly. He intends tell Eban this afternoon that, in view of state of public opinion and mass meetings in Israel, he could not accept such an invitation. . . . He also showed US press ticker from Tel Aviv not covered in press stories we have seen on subject, directly attacking SYG in strong language and calling for his resignation.

SYG also mentioned reasons why he does not feel he could submit Israeli question re freedom of passage Aqaba to Egyptians. Hammarskjold said no government could answer “yes” to this question when another government is in occupation of its territory. Such a response would be made appear as condition and response under duress. . . . SYG has told Israelis they cannot require action under Res II which would negate Res I.⁶SYG believes that situation would be even worse than it is now if he had put question to Egypt as requested by Israel since this would have provoked Egyptians.

Following are concrete changes suggested by Hammarskjold in memorandum:

In Para 2 after word “United Nations” add phrase “not including, however, stationing of UNEF in Gaza strip;” This change was suggested because our para 2 as it stands does not accurately reflect Israeli position as made public by Israeli reps in GA. Israelis have made it clear they do not favor UNEF forces in Gaza strip.

Sec 2, Para 4. It should read that Israel would withdraw and not merely its armed forces. Res I called for withdrawal “of Israel” which would include its civil administration from Gaza. Suggestion was that sentence read: “It is, of course, clear that the enjoyment of a right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with the UN res.”

Same problem arises in Para 1 of Sec 3. In first sentence chanee “Israeli forces” to “Israel”. In second sentence delete word “armed” and add phrase “and occupation” after word “invasion”. In order be consistent we suggest also that word “military” be deleted in last para of memo so that it will read “an occupation in defiance …”.⁷

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–1057. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2. See Document 74.
3. Reference is to the draft U.S. aide-mémoire read over the telephone to Lodge on February 10; see Document 73. The aide-mémoire was handed to Eban on February 11; it is printed as Document 78.
4. February 12.
5. On February 11, Hammarskjöld issued his report in pursuance of Resolution 1125 (XI). (U.N. doc. A/3527) For text of the report, see United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, pp. 283–284.
6. Reference is to the two General Assembly resolutions adopted on February 2; see Document 51.
7. Ellipsis in the source text.