69. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 8, 19571
SUBJECT
- Israel Withdrawal from Aqaba and Gaza
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- G—Mr. Robert Murphy
- NE—Mr. Donald C. Bergus
Mr. Eban stated that he had conveyed a reply to the President’s message to Prime Minister Ben Gurion.2 He would appreciate our comments when we had studied it. The key sentences were those stating Israel’s willingness to withdraw from Sharm el Shaikh and to evacuate military forces from Gaza.
[Page 113]Israel appreciated American efforts for constructive discussion in the UN. Mr. Eban had hoped that an opening could be found in the recent resolutions. The Israelis had been deeply moved by what the President and Secretary had said about Israel being a nation with a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind”. He noted that these words had been uttered in the American Declaration of Independence at a time when the United States felt impelled to take forceful measures against an established order, and when France was America’s only ally. Mr. Eban did not wish to criticise but he deplored statements about sanctions. There was, after all, no formal proposal for sanctions before the United Nations. Israel believed that sanctions were neither legally nor morally justified. He hoped that the United States would show a constructive approach. He stated that when proposals came before the United Nations which were offensive to the dignity and honor of the United States, Israel’s representatives did not even bother to consult their Government before opposing them.
Very little time has passed since the passage of the two resolutions on February 2. In that sense the Israelis had approached the Secretary General to ask whether Egypt agreed to mutual and full abstention from belligerent acts by land, air and sea on the withdrawal of Israeli troops. They had also asked the Secretary General to clarify whether immediately on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sharm el Shaikh, units of the UNEF would be stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, in order to act as a restraint against hostile acts and would remain so deployed until another effective means was agreed upon between the parties concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.
A declaration of non-belligerency by Egypt was necessary. The Secretary General’s report had indicated the importance of the non-assertion of belligerent rights. If Israel could assume Egyptian nonbelligerency then its attitude would change. Israel thought the Secretary General had an obligation to try to obtain such a declaration. Mr. Murphy asked if Mr. Eban felt that perhaps the Secretary General might believe that if Israel forces were withdrawn, Egypt would not resist the deployment of the UNEF. Mr. Eban replied that the Secretary General would not tell him this; that the Secretary General had said he would not answer until Israel had indicated whether it would accept the stationing of UN troops at points over 200 miles away from Aqaba. Egypt’s attitude on this question would have a close relationship to the Armistice Agreement. Israel maintained that the Armistice Agreement was inoperative because Egypt had illegally reconciled it with belligerency. If Egypt would now declare non-belligerency a new and broader agreement might be worked out.
[Page 114]Mr. Eban said that Israel had publicly asked the Secretary General if the UNEF would move into the Straits of Tiran area upon Israel withdrawal. The Israelis had told him privately that if he said “yes” to this question, Israel forces would be withdrawn the next day. If the Secretary General thought that Egyptian consent was necessary, he should at least seek such consent. The Israelis had liked the approach of Ambassador Lodge on this matter in his remarks before the General Assembly.
The next step could be the withdrawal of Israel troops from Gaza, leaving the non-military Israel elements in the strip. If the UN would come out and investigate the situation in the strip they would not recommend severing the natural ties which existed and were being developed between Israel and the Gaza Strip.
The Secretary General had insisted that Israel state whether it would accept in principle the stationing of the UNEF on Israel soil. The question was so broad that lengthy constitutional consultation would be required in Israel before it could be answered. He could not acknowledge that a reply to this question was a prerequisite to further action.
Mr. Eban recapitulated the four stages in which this matter should be handled: 1) an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency; 2) withdrawal of Israel forces from Aqaba and their replacement by the UNEF; 3) withdrawal of Israel military elements from Gaza; 4) a UN arrangement for Gaza in which Israel civil elements would operate under UN supervision. He had urged that the Secretary General go to the area and conduct further negotiations on these points in the two interested capitals. The Secretary General had not rejected this suggestion.
Mr. Murphy stated that we had just received Mr. Ben Gurion’s letter to which the Secretary was giving careful study. Our position has been that Israel was in the breach and should withdraw its forces. A feeling was developing here that if Israel withdrew, the United States would want to manifest its intention to do the best it could with respect to the Aqaba issue and free passage. Israel’s position regarding Gaza was more complicated. He did not see how the United States position would work out. He asked which of these two Israel considered more important. Mr. Eban avoided a clear answer on this point, but said that since Aqaba was easier it should be tackled first, and a solution of Aqaba would be helpful in Gaza.
Mr. Murphy indicated that the Secretary might wish to discuss this matter further with the Ambassador. Mr. Eban asked that the Secretary consider the schedule he had set forth.
Mr. Murphy asked what would happen in the Knesset if the Israel Prime Minister announced that Israel would withdraw. Mr. Eban thought that this question was hypothetical. If Israel thought that [Page 115] assurances regarding freedom of navigation would be forthcoming, the Prime Minister could withdraw Israel forces. Otherwise, such an action would be frivolous. Mr. Murphy asked what kind of assurances Israel would require. Mr. Eban replied assurances that the UNEF would remain at Sharm el Shaikh until a more permanent arrangement could be found. Mr. Murphy asked on what basis the UNEF could be kept there. Mr. Shiloah interjected that an assurance from the United States that it would act to prevent blockade of the Straits would be adequate. Such an assurance would not even have to be made public, as Ben Gurion would find ways of conveying his resulting feeling of security to the Israel people without mentioning it. Mr. Eban returned to Mr. Murphy’s question and said that the matter might be solved by obtaining an Egyptian assurance that it would not remount guns at Sharm el Shaikh and provision for some kind of UN observation to see that they did not in fact do so.
Mr. Murphy asked what Israel would like the United States to do at this point. Mr. Eban replied that we should ask the Secretary General to try to negotiate this matter, to keep it from going back to the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Secretary General should also be persuaded to see the wisdom of handling these problems by stages.