55. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 647. Re Palestine/Israeli withdrawal. Toward end of morning February 2, Menon told Lodge that Fawzi was worried about various parts of US statement as they interpreted how US expected see Resolution II implemented. In particular Fawzi objected to part of statement quoting January 28 statement re stationing UNEF at Sharm el-Sheikh. Also objected to latter part where we stated understanding Resolution II to be voted immediately after Resolution I, thereby giving appearance withdrawal was conditional. Menon said Fawzi’s attitude reflected pressures of other Arabs.
Lodge and Menon then met with Fawzi who said above parts US statement had introduced new element in parliamentary situation. He expressed doubt he should even try to work on Arabs to support Resolution II in these circumstances. Menon and Lodge pointed out importance to Arabs of not putting themselves in wrong. They agreed Fawzi had problem with Arab colleagues which must be faced. They decided meet after lunch.
Lodge met at 2 p.m. with Fawzi and Loutfi (Egypt), Menon and Lall (India). Menon said, as he viewed situation, resolutions before GA had only two purposes: (a) to achieve total withdrawal Israeli forces; (b) to begin now to reinstitute full observance Armistice Agreement. Israel had neither withdrawn nor observed Armistice Agreement. On other hand, Egypt had assured SYG its willingness have no more incursions or Fedayeen activities.
Menon said he would leave aside discussion Gaza since that was more or less agreed.
[Page 85]He then said he would state in GA Resolution II dealt only with measures in SYG’s report, which were governed by paras 5(A), (B) and (C). He would say UNEF could not go anywhere except with Egypt’s consent. He would say also status of Straits of Tiran was separate question from one at issue in light of what SYG had said in his report.
As far as India’s interpretation of resolution, it was that GA was asking placement of UNEF on armistice line. If it went anywhere in Sharm el Sheikh, it could only be on same basis as in Sinai, i.e., “to remove aggressors”. He restated this at our suggestion to say “witness removal of Israelis” or “secure and supervise withdrawal”.
Fawzi said he was faced with dilemma. He was concerned at practical aspects of situation. To state or imply that UNEF would go in only immediately after Israel’s withdrawal and not remain for any length of time could well be encouragement for Israel to remain.
Fawzi saw certain procedural ways out of dilemma. One would be not to press for vote on Resolution II at this time and allow certain interval to pass. Other would be to adjourn debate now and not permit divergence of opinions further to develop until divergencies straightened out.
Fawzi stated Egypt’s position to be that UNEF, according to Resolution II, can be placed only and exclusively on both sides armistice line. No units could be placed anywhere else except with approval of Egypt and Israel according to the case. Then Fawzi said “we must now be prepared put time limit on Israeli withdrawal” and “we are going to have to face question of sanctions”.
Lodge pointed out if things should now go up in smoke, it would remove stigma of guilt on Israel as well as destroy strong moral position of Egypt and supporters of UN action in Egypt.
Fawzi then changed emphasis of discussion by stating that phrase “without delay” requires clarification. He said in view new element introduced into situation, time limits and maybe sanctions might have to be introduced. Lodge pointed out to Fawzi that withdrawal Israeli forces would obviously be phased with arrival UN forces, that he interpreted “without delay” as meaning first soldiers should begin leave immediately. He said whole process should be much faster than that at time of UK-French withdrawal from Canal area in that it now is not necessary to await creation of effectively functioning UNEF.
Lodge then summed up situation as he saw it in following terms: (1) Menon could in his statement spell out meaning of resolution in terms which it was hoped would satisfy Fawzi and his colleagues. US would then seek in some manner to substantiate this interpretation; (2) Lodge was willing publicly to state that “without delay” meant “immediately” or “at once” and that it would be a much quicker process than Anglo-French withdrawal. He might even state that if Israel did not withdraw, he could not predict consequences of such non-compliance. [Page 86] He felt such statement would go quite far and should serve to assure Arabs of US good faith in sponsoring resolution, in calling for their being voted together and in defining functions as was done in US statement.
Krishna Menon then said to Fawzi he had information that tide had turned against Egypt and Western world was rethinking its position. While it had seemed inconceivable that British and French could have done what they did, he felt clock had turned full circle and we might be facing situation equally as dangerous as one of last fall. Lodge said he had heard similar reports.
Fawzi seemed at real loss to know what to do and suggested it might be helpful for Lodge and Menon to speak to Arab group which would meet with him momentarily.
Few minutes later Lodge and Menon met with Fawzi, Mahgoub (Sudan),2 Rifai (Jordan), Azkoul (Lebanon),3Zeineddine (Syria), Jamali (Iraq),4 Othman (Yemen),5 and Representative of Saudi Arabia.6
Fawzi restated for benefit of group Egypt’s position as he had put it to Lodge and Menon. As far as UNEF concerned, he said, it should be exclusively on both sides of armistice line. It should not be placed or stay anywhere without Egyptian consent. It had no functions but what had already been given to it by GA. UNEF was not there to resolve any question.
Menon stated India’s position was that UNEF was to oversee evacuation of all Egyptian-controlled territory by Israeli forces. Indian troops in UNEF would not go anywhere without Egypt’s consent. He had found to his dismay that not everyone agreed with this proposition and stated his misgivings that UNEF was deemed by some to become a political mission for resolving disputes. India felt it was all governed by para 5(A), (B), and (C) of SYG’s report which called for agreement between SYG and Egypt.
India felt UNEF should be put on both sides of armistice line with “equitable contribution of territory” from both sides. This would constitute a protection against surprise attack from Israel. He would say in GA one should only place UNEF where it can assist in maintenance of Armistice Agreement, i.e., on both sides of line. It would function there as supplement to TSO.
[Page 87]As for Sharm el-Sheikh, Menon said it should be same as for Sinai. This was unfinished job and UNEF could only go there as it had elsewhere—to supervise and secure evacuation.
Menon then spoke of question of mildness of Resolution I. He noted phrase “without delay” could be interpreted by US and India as “forthwith” allowing only enough time to get UNEF in. Lodge pointed out this would be less than for time of evacuation of Port Said.
Menon did not think Israel would withdraw. But, he said, if they did not, US would be put on its honor after passage these resolutions. He felt Arabs would rally greater support to whatever other steps are then possible if they went along. To do otherwise, would play into Israeli hands.
Lodge said he agreed with Fawzi that UNEF should not be used to settle any question, and wherever it went, it was only with consent of Egypt. Parenthetically, he stated, he had stressed Egyptian sovereignty to Europeans who had not been happy at this statement. He had, however, clung to point with that group that GA and its members must respect Egypt’s sovereignty as first criterion. Regarding withdrawal, Lodge said he felt it should start immediately, that it should be phased, and that it would take less time than earlier evacuation. In event failure Israel to withdraw, he could not predict consequences which might result and was willing to state all of above publicly.
Lodge then spoke of practical requirements of situation. If Resolution II “fizzled out” it would be handing great advantage to Israel on silver platter. It would wipe out stigma now attached to Israeli aggression. Israelis had said they would not withdraw, and this was probably their present intention. But UN would be in strong position to do something else only if it had adopted Resolution II. If that were not to happen, we would have lost our position. He hoped group would support Resolution II. They had nothing to lose and much to gain, even if Israel did not at this time withdraw.
Jamali said he felt Resolution II should not have been presented until after Israel’s total withdrawal. Since it had been introduced, it appeared UN was giving in to Israeli demands. He referred to fact Aqaba had been blockaded 8 years and effect of this resolution would be to give up that blockade without any return and as a price for Israel’s aggression. Lodge pointed out nothing could happen in Gulf of Aqaba without Egypt’s consent.
Rifai saw no justification for discussing anything other than withdrawal. GA should not yield to Israel’s demands or deal with them in any way. He wondered what would be gained. He thought no resolution was needed for withdrawal, saying “we can take action whenever we want to”. He then asked why UNEF should go to Sharm el-Sheikh when it was not on armistice line and not within context of formal discussion in GA. Lodge pointed out reason was simply that, just as [Page 88] elsewhere, where there were Israeli troops, UNEF could go upon their withdrawal. Rifai then said there were no people in Sharm el-Sheikh, it was far removed from armistice line area, and to send UNEF there would be to go beyond functions of Force. He said they felt UNEF would act to obtain free passage in Gulf which was beyond its function and entered into realm of controversy. Lodge said he could understand Rifai’s points and wished to say in all candor that US would like to see an end to shooting in Straits of Tiran but, nevertheless, recognized that Egypt’s consent was of paramount importance.
Zeineddine raised question of putting time limit on withdrawal since phased withdrawal could not be completed immediately. Lodge said he could state for our part desirability of specific time limit, but preferred not to amend resolution in that sense.
Zeineddine also said, while Resolution II might enhance moral stand of Arabs, all states realized reason Israel had not withdrawn was not its defiance of UN but because of support Israel got from many countries, a support which was not new but had continued in face of many resolutions in past. He felt US had more persuasive arguments to use with Israel than so far had apparently been used. He wondered whether US could take further action.
Mahgoub expressed concern that resolution as interpreted by Lodge was retrogression from principle of unconditional withdrawal. Lodge denied there was any condition put on Israel’s withdrawal. Menon said one more resolution withdrawal would not make much difference. What was important was that chances of possible action upon Israelis failure to withdraw would be enhanced by present operation. There was no question of tying two resolutions as cause and effect.
Mahgoub stated Resolution II introduced new elements on which Israel’s withdrawal had never before depended. He tried to make something out of fact only one measure had been singled out of SYG’s report. He questioned whether SYG had blanket authority under phrase “other measures, etc.”. He and Menon exchanged few sharp words on this subject, Menon denying SYG would have blanket authority and Mahgoub affirming he would.
Mahgoub then compared SYG’s language on Straits of Tiran with Lodge’s quote today from his January speech. Lodge again replied that nothing could be done under Resolution II until withdrawal and repeated that UNEF cannot stay at Sharm el-Sheikh or elsewhere without Egypt’s consent.
Jamali, on question of withdrawal resolution, urged an additional para for SYG to report in three days about Israel’s withdrawal. Lodge said he liked this idea on its merits and would see what could be done about it. If, however, it were only amendment offered, he felt it might not be possible to accept amendments.
[Page 89]In response to Rifai, Menon pointed out his concern that US and West be brought along. No government, he said, of stature of US could sit back if Israel again refused withdrawal after adoption both resolutions. Rifai argued public opinion in Arab states could not accept UN’s moderate attitude in face Israel’s failure withdraw.
Mahgoub again raised question of future intent in event Israel continued refuse comply. He pointed out it had been understood during negotiations prior to last resolution that Arabs had dropped strong language deploring Israel’s non-compliance and asking sanctions on understanding that resolution would be followed by a stronger one if necessary to obtain compliance. Now they were offered another resolution on withdrawal weaker than earlier one. How could Arabs, he asked, [insure?] that, if they agreed now and Israel continued to refuse, something stronger would be adopted?
Azkoul pointed out that in regard to question of Egypt’s consent to deployment of UNEF, if Egypt withheld its consent, this could give rise to an appearance that Egypt had defied UN just as Israel now stands in position of defiance. Lodge said Egypt’s consent was not only necessary to stationing UNEF, Egypt had right to withhold its consent and would not be in defiance if it did. Status of Israeli and Egyptian compliance with GA resolutions was entirely different. Lodge reiterated that Resolution II would be gain for Arabs although it obviously was not everything they wished to have. Lodge then thanked Arabs for courtesy of hearing US views and withdrew from meeting.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–357. Confidential. Received at 4:45 p.m.↩
- Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.↩
- Permanent Secretary-General of the Lebanese Delegation at the United Nations.↩
- Chairman of the Iraqi Delegation to the General Assembly and Representative to the United Nations.↩
- Yemeni Alternate Representative to the General Assembly.↩
- Ambassador al-Khayyal.↩