Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

424. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, December 13, 1957, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington, December 13, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 26 persons present, including Admiral Burke, General White, Lieutenant General Verne J. McCaul (USMC), Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin (USN), Lieutenant General Clyde D. Eddleman (USA) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Murphy, Rountree, and Robertson, among others, for the Department of State. Representatives from JSSC, ISA, CIA, and NSC were also present.]

1. The Middle East Problem

Mr. Murphy made reference to a memorandum from Mr. Quarles to the Secretary submitting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Middle East question.² Mr. Murphy said that he realized that the Chiefs were aware this was not entirely a new problem in the State Department, that he was intrigued by paragraph 2 of the Chiefs’ memorandum (which set forth three basic aspects of the problem which must be resolved), and noted also the statement in paragraph 4 which referred to the fact that the Middle East “problem is so great as to transcend the interests of any minority group”. Mr. Murphy said that the Department was interested to learn of the reasons why the Chiefs had chosen to raise this question at this time and indicated that some background of their thinking would be helpful to the Department.

Admiral Burke explained that the Military Services were frequently being called upon to take some steps in connection with the Middle East and that their hope had been that something might be done to move the problem forward. In response to a series of questions from Mr. Murphy, Admiral Burke explained that the Chiefs had the impression that Saudi Arabia was beginning to weaken, that it might be possible for the United States and its associates to fix boundaries for Israel which, having been agreed upon, the United States and its Allies would be prepared to maintain. This would represent a multilateral effort, outside the UN at first, perhaps being submitted to the United Nations after initial agreement among the parties. In the view of the Joint Chiefs there was evidence that the Arabs, if they were assured that they would be protected against further Israeli expansion, would accept the present armistice lines as final boundaries. Admiral Burke acknowledged that this would be an imposed solution and that there is a direct relationship between the Israeli policy of unlimited immigration and the Arab fear of further Israeli expansion. Mr. Murphy inquired whether by an “imposed solution” Admiral Burke envisaged one imposed by military measures. Admiral Burke replied in the affirmative. He conceded that any effort forcibly to impose limitations on Israeli immigration would involve an unjustifiable degree of intervention in internal Israeli affairs. In the view of the Joint Chiefs a solution along these lines would involve assurances both to the Arabs and to Israel regarding the maintenance of present boundaries.

In response to Mr. Murphy’s question as to what nations might be expected to provide a guarantee of the boundaries along the lines suggested, Admiral Burke replied that he expected principally various NATO nations to provide such guarantee. He suggested that Britain would be willing to participate in providing such a guarantee but recognized that France might well not. Speaking of the refugee problem, he agreed that many of the refugees don’t want to return. He suggested that basically the solution lay in the willingness of Israel to permit some to return and in buying off the remainder through compensation and economic development programs. In his view the United States should act largely in the role of mediator in the negotiation and enforcement of a multilateral arrangement.

Mr. Murphy repeated that these questions are not new ones and that they represent problems with which we have been laboring over a period of years, although with less success than we would have wished. Admiral Burke expressed fear that unless we evolve a plan for solution, the USSR might well preempt us in this field. He invited Mr. Rountree to comment.

Mr. Rountree referred to the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs and expressed his agreement that the three points mentioned in the memorandum were among the principal points which must be resolved in any solution, although there were also others in addition. He pointed out that the United States has tried a variety of approaches including an open economic approach, diplomatic approach, and an approach through the United Nations. The United States is presently reviewing the feasibility of taking new initiatives. However, broadly speaking, this problem has defied solution because the Arab states do not wish a solution, Israel does not wish a solution, and the Soviets do not wish a solution.

Mr. Rountree explained that there is, however, some slight glimmer of hope inasmuch as there is evidence that certain of the Arab states are beginning to recognize that failure to achieve a solution is working against their interest in that under the circumstances it is increasingly difficult to maintain a pro-Western conservative regime. He alluded to efforts which the Secretary made last fall to raise this issue again in the United Nations in the aftermath of the Suez affair. Consultations disclosed nevertheless that the climate in the Arab world was not conducive to a settlement at that time and the effort was abandoned when it became apparent that it would be impossible to get a majority vote in the General Assembly without Arab support.

Mr. Rountree mentioned that we are again reviewing the possibility of taking some measures with regard to the refugees. The principal obstacle in this regard derives from the fact that the Arab Governments realize that the refugee problem is their principal political weapon against Israel, and for this reason are unwilling to make concessions in this field. Israel, on the other hand, would demand a quid pro quo in return for concessions made to the Arabs with regard to the refugees. We have decided it is time to probe the situation further through the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations and Mr. Engen. In light of the basic division among the Arab states themselves there is little reason for hope of success at this time short of a solution by military force regarding which he would have the strongest reservations. He considered it extremely doubtful that Egypt and Syria would accept a solution which in effect conceded the fact that Israel is here to stay.

In reply to a question from Admiral Burke as to whether Jordan and Saudi Arabia would accept a solution which recognized the permanency of Israel, Mr. Rountree said that he felt Nuri Pasha (the Iraqi leader) might well be willing to reach a settlement along such lines although the position of Saud was more doubtful. In his view, Israel would probably accept the present boundary lines, although politically it was impossible for any Arab state at this time to accept these boundaries. He emphasized that he considered enforcing a solution by military force totally inadvisable.

Admiral Burke commented that in his view it would be a question of imposing the status quo rather than imposing a military solution. Mr. Rountree pointed out that this in effect represented the imposition of a solution against the Arab states who politically could not accept it, and that under these circumstances it would be impossible to obtain a 2/3 vote in the General Assembly. Admiral Burke noted that failure to have Israel’s boundaries fixed and guaranteed constituted a long-term disadvantage for the Arabs themselves. Mr. Rountree agreed with this analysis, but emphasized that the Arabs themselves would not accept this analysis, that many Arabs consider Israel a short-term problem which they will liquidate over a period of time with the military and political support of the Soviet Union.

Admiral Burke expressed the hope that it would be possible to devise a settlement in which Arab acceptance of the present boundaries would be exchanged for a guarantee of no Israeli expansion. Mr. Rountree stated that in his considered judgment there was no prospect of such an agreement at this time. He explained that the Department is willing to consider even the remotest prospects for settlement and that we are continuing to examine all aspects of the problem. He repeated that we have asked Mr. Engen to investigate particularly prospects for some progress regarding the refugee problem, and explained again that Israel must have a quid pro quo for any concessions which she makes regarding refugees. The crux of the refugee problem, viewed in this light, is what can be given to the Israelis in exchange for concessions on this point.

Admiral Burke warned that the problem will increase in degree because of the Soviet intervention and that Israel is the one thing that holds the Arabs together.

Mr. Rountree pointed out that it was unrealistic to think in terms of imposing a solution at this time, that any solution must be such that the Arab Governments could support it. Otherwise, even the regimes friendly to us would be overthrown. He referred particularly to Saudi Arabia and the fact that our relations with Saudi Arabia are considerably strained by controversy over the U.S. position on the Gulf of Aqaba. There is no reason to think that Saudi Arabia would give support to such a plan unless the other Arab governments are also prepared to support it.

In response to further questions from Mr. Murphy regarding the degree to which Admiral Burke considered a solution could be imposed, the Admiral conceded that of course some Arab support would be required and that it would be important to have Saudi Arabia and Jordan among the Arab states in support of such a solution. Mr. Rountree observed that any attempt to impose a military solution on the Arab world would cause the collapse of … regimes … and that the Arab states were not only united on the issue of Israel but also on anti-colonialism.

Admiral Burke remonstrated that if we had to wait for a solution until Israel and Egypt were prepared to accept a formula, the U.S. will find itself in a steadily deteriorating position which will work only to the advantage of the Soviet Union. It is necessary to take the initiative in finding the solution or having the initiative seized by the USSR.

Mr. Rountree agreed that a solution must be found and emphasized that he was not suggesting for a moment that the State Department was not aware of implications of failure to find a solution. Nevertheless the situation is extremely delicate. He said he found the situation serious indeed and that he was willing to be alarmed if alarm would help to make the right decision. He was not alarmed to the point of adopting a solution imposed by military force.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the Joint Chiefs desired additional discussion of this matter in the Security Council. Admiral Burke said this might be helpful. Mr. Murphy agreed that any discussion of this matter was helpful to the extent that it provided a broader understanding of the issues involved. No specific decision was taken as to further action regarding the Security Council.

[Here follows discussion of the possible creation of a Middle East Military Representative (scheduled for publication in volume XII), Indonesia, and Berlin.]

1. Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings; Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense.”
2. Document 417.