422. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 10, 19571
SUBJECT
- Palestine
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- His Excellency Nuri al-Said, former Iraqi Prime Minister
- Mr. Saleh Mahdi, Iraqi Charge d’Affaires
- William M. Rountree, NEA
- David D. Newsom, NE
The Secretary expressed his pleasure at having had the opportunity to exchange views with Nuri Pasha.2 He said that he personally attached the greatest value to having a person of the stature of Nuri studying the problems in the Middle East.
On Palestine, the Secretary said he was willing to go part way. He pointed out that he had previously said that there should be boundary adjustments. He read to Nuri Pasha the following passage from his speech of August 26, 1955:
“If there is to be a guarantee of borders, it would be normal that there should be prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the third major problem. The existing lines separating Israel and the Arab states were fixed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. They were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect; in part, at least, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.
“The task of drawing permanent boundaries is admittedly one of difficulty. There is no single and sure guide, for each of two conflicting claims may seem to have merit. The difficulty is increased by the fact that even territory which is barren has acquired a sentimental significance. Surely the overall advantages of the measures here outlined would outweigh vastly any net disadvantages of the adjustments needed to convert armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety.”
Nuri replied that what the Secretary had proposed was in his view the second stage. The first stage required the establishment of a basis for negotiations. This, Nuri said, could be done only on the basis of the 1947 Resolutions.
The Secretary commented that the Arab states were entitled to take that position. In his view, however, Israel would never agree to start from that point.
Nuri pointed out that the United States and the United Nations had created Israel and, in the Partition Plan, had given Israel the boundary it had asked for. Now, he said, the Arabs were asking the United States to make the gesture of returning to this position in order to bring the two sides together and to create an atmosphere for peaceful negotiations. If Israel will not accept this adjustment, he said, there will be grave difficulties for the pro-Western Arabs.
The Secretary replied that the United States would make every effort to get Israel to recognize that the Armistice lines were not permanent boundaries. He doubted very much, however, that the United States could exert the pressure that would be required to get Israel to accept the 1947 boundaries.
[Page 849]Nuri Pasha then referred to the Lausanne Protocol of 19493 which had been negotiated under the aegis of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Nuri pointed out that, although the Israeli representative had signed this Protocol, Ben Gurion had rejected it. “Let’s start from that,” said Nuri, “and then let the Palestine Conciliation Commission go on and work out the details.”
The Secretary, recalling that the United States, France and Turkey were members of the PCC, doubted that the Commission would still have any real influence mainly because of the presence of France. He said he did not think that the United States or anyone else could get Israel to start either on a 1947 basis or a 1949 basis. This, he said, was his personal estimate. He believed, however, that it might be possible to get Israel to negotiate on a basis that the Armistice lines were not the permanent boundaries.
Nuri repeated that he believed the Arabs would only negotiate on the basis of the 1947 Resolutions.
The Secretary said that the United States would do all it could to get Israel to make concessions but that this could not be done by requiring that Israel accept the most extreme position before the bargaining started.
Nuri said he believed the United States could get Israel to cooperate if it really wished to do so. He pointed out to the Secretary that when the United States had cut off aid to Israel at the time of the Banat Yacub incident,4 Israel had quickly complied with the United Nations order. To listen only to Ben Gurion, said Nuri, will help only Russia. No Arab state will negotiate with Ben Gurion unless Israel accepts the United Nations Resolutions as a basis. He pointed out that Jordan in particular would be in a most difficult situation trying to negotiate on any other basis.
The Secretary repeated the United States desire to get the Palestine problem settled and to do anything which seemed just and had a reasonable chance of being accepted by both parties. He pointed out that the amount of pressure which the United States could exert on [Page 850] Israel was limited by legal and legislative factors. He repeated his belief, however, that the United States could get Israel to make reasonable concessions.
Nuri then suggested that, leaving Israel aside for a moment, the United States might make a statement that it accepted the 1947 Resolutions as a basis for negotiation. Nuri stressed that any statement by the United States which was not clear and unequivocal would help only the Russians.
Mr. Rountree recalled that the Secretary had introduced a resolution in the General Assembly in 1956 for a committee to examine problems for a possible settlement of the Palestine problem.5 The Arabs at that time had felt that the time had not yet come for the introduction of such a resolution. Mr. Rountree suggested that the concepts of the PCC and of this resolution might be merged.
The Secretary repeated his view that France would not be a helpful member of such a commission at this time. He promised, however, to give full consideration to the Lausanne Protocol and to see whether this might not provide some basis for study. He said that the Embassy in Baghdad would be in touch with Nuri on this matter further after the Department had had an opportunity to study the matter.6Nuri suggested as he departed that a statement by the United States might pave the way for further action by the PCC.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1057. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on December 11.↩
- Nuri al-Said spoke with Dulles on December 5 (see Document 419) and with Rountree on December 9 (memorandum of conversation by Newsom, December 9; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–957). For an account of Nuri’s conversation with President Eisenhower earlier on December 10, see the editorial note, supra.↩
- Reference is to the protocol signed at Lausanne on May 12, 1949, by the Governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The protocol provided that talks with the Palestine Conciliation Commission commence based upon a map showing the 1947 partition lines. For text of the protocol, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. VI, p. 998.↩
- In September 1953, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (General Vagn Bennike) had directed Israel to cease work on a water diversion project at Jisr Banat Ya’qub in the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone. When Israel refused to comply, the matter was brought before the Security Council in October 1953 and the United States subsequently introduced a draft resolution supporting General Bennike’s position. For documentation concerning U.S. interest in the question, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1320 ff.↩
- See vol. XVI, p. 936, footnote 2.↩
- Subsequently, officials in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs reviewed the Lausanne Protocol and determined that it would not serve a useful purpose to attempt to revive the document. (Memorandum from Rountree to Herter, December 26; Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Political Affairs & Relations 1952–1963. POL 22 Incidents, Disputes, Arab-Israel Dispute)↩