Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

408. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 21, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Palestine Refugee Problem

I

We agree with much of Mr. Villard’s paper,² and with most of his recommendations.

1. We agree that the U.S. should continue to support UNRWA as a “holding” operation, recognizing that it will be overwhelmingly a care and maintenance and make-work operation, rather than a real solution. We think the 70% matching limitation on U.S. contributions should be maintained if possible, at an annual cost of about $20 million.

2. We agree that more use of PL 480 surpluses to meet our obligations to UNRWA would be highly desirable, and should be possible.

3. We agree that urgent attention should be given to the possibility of implementing those recommendations of the IO–NEA paper dealing with the assumption by the U.S. on a bilateral basis of certain projects in Jordan and Lebanon which will promote de-facto refugee resettlement, at the same time removing the necessity of contributing for such purposes to UNRWA. We must be prepared to start supporting these activities early in 1958, at which time UNRWA will probably have to slash its operations to the bone for lack of funds. Such bilateral support has the merit of being confined to assisting friendly countries, while funds given through UNRWA must go in part to Syria, even though not needed there.

4. We agree that we should exploit to the fullest the recent apparent and encouraging trend among the refugees to improve their status and actually (if not admittedly) to become “settled”. We agree that this can only be done by carefully avoiding any labels of “refugee-resettlement” on any project which actually accomplishes this objective. We recognize that some of these projects may be in Iraq rather than in Jordan or Lebanon.

5. We agree that the possibilities of third party (i.e. Norwegian; UN Secretary-General) initiative toward the Arab-Israel dispute should be fully explored, and encouraged when promising. We also believe that such an initiative might be usefully directed toward the Refugee problem alone.

6. We agree that the Gaza refugees probably must remain as an international charge so long as they exist. We are dubious but interested at the suggestion of a UN mandate or some variation thereof.

II

We do not agree with certain assumptions.

1. We are not convinced that it would be a mistake to press actively toward a solution of the Palestine refugee problem at this time. We would, of course, agree that much progress would have to be made before we could publicly press for such an objective.

2. We are not convinced that the refugee problem is inseparable from the Arab-Israel problem. By this, we mean that we can see possibilities of working toward a solution of the former which do not totally depend on a solution to the latter, and which could precede (and make more likely) the latter. We recognize fully that the refugee problem is in fact almost totally political, and in this sense inextricable from the overall political problem.

3. We do not think it accurate to state: “To date, there is nothing to indicate that Israel would be willing to accommodate itself to the Arab point of view represented by acceptance of the repatriation principle”. The Israelis have given us indication of considerably more flexibility than this.

III

We feel that certain aspects of our present situation are insufficiently emphasized in Mr. Villard’s paper.

1. The continuance of UNRWA, even if reduced essentially to a care and maintenance operation as herein recommended (by the U.S. taking over bilaterally the promising “rehabilitation” projects) will cost $25–30 million per year. It will become increasingly difficult to secure the other 30% of such sums to permit us to remain at 70%. In any event, care and maintenance without effective movement toward resettlement is the most wasteful method of dealing with the problem. The fact that we think it necessary may not convince the Congress.

The Congressional problem which this wasteful approach presents is, in our opinion, much more serious than indicated in Mr. Villard’s paper. It must be recalled that the U.S. has already put $178 million (exclusive of the current year’s contribution) into the “solution” of this problem, and the problem is now larger and more acute than ever.

Moreover, it must be remembered that for the past several years the U.S. contribution to UNRWA has been relatively painless since it has involved only the yearly re-appropriation of money previously authorized. This year’s contribution to UNRWA effectively uses up the last of this money. Next year we will have to ask for new money. It is unnecessary to point out the different Congressional attitude which this fact will induce. The questions will be searching, and the answers, in our opinion, will have to contain the prospect of real progress—not just indefinite continuance of the status quo.

2. Mr. Villard’s paper seems to us to be optimistic about the cutoff date, 1960. If the refugee situation has not changed markedly by 1960, we feel it unlikely that the UN will allow UNRWA to terminate or will turn the problem back to the host governments. So long as UNRWA continues and is underwritten by the U.S., it is clearly to the political advantage of most states (probably a 2/3 majority of the UN) to continue that arrangement.

3. The increased efforts of the Soviet Union to penetrate the Near East may increasingly diminish our freedom of action in the area. The present, therefore, may not be a good time to act, but it may be a better time than any in the foreseeable future.

IV

We believe the following additional recommendations to those made by Mr. Villard deserve consideration.

1. During Ambassador Engen’s visit next Monday with the Secretary, and in any other such “3rd party” discussions, the refugee problem should be discussed as an issue to which a solution must be found within the near future and not as one that can in time solve itself. While our general views could be explained to Ambassador Engen, detailed discussion of any plan of action we might have in mind, particularly of any contemplated approach to the Israelis, should be avoided lest it inadvertently come to their attention.

2. Renewed consideration should be given to the broad plan of political action embodied in the July 2 IO–NEA memorandum to the Secretary, many elements of which we believe are still valid. We recognize that those parts of the recommendations which would serve to push Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq into a leading role have been temporarily overtaken by events and are not presently valid. Events may also, however, have produced some hope that Egypt and Saudi Arabia might be interested in some aspects of a solution, and this possibility should be pursued. We continue to feel that an initial approach to Israel, seeking its acceptance of the principle of repatriation or compensation, is both feasible and desirable.

3. The financial implications of the recommendations made in the July 2 memorandum should be fully explored.

4. Consideration should be given to the possibilities of some new and dramatic economic development projects in the Near East, possibly utilizing the new U.S. Development Loan Fund or some new national or multilateral agency which we might devise. Any such proposals should have as their actual (although obviously unstated) objective the resettlement of Palestine refugees. It may well be that earlier proposals such as the Johnston Plan, while sound, have become impossible because of the political implications which have attached to them over the years.

5. Consideration should be given to a public statement by the President or the Secretary on what the U.S. is willing to do with respect to the area, demonstrating U.S. concern for conditions in the area and U.S. determination to prevent deterioration. This statement could be anything from an up-dating to an expansion of the Secretary’s statement of August 1955.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/7–257. Secret. Drafted by Hanes and sent through Under Secretary Herter. The memorandum is item No. 16 of “Palestine Refugee Problem, Villard Study, 1957–58”.
2. Supra.