Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

403. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 16, 1957—8 p.m.

1226. Ambassador Hussein today gave me account of two-hour conversation he had with Nasser last night following their previous talk as reported Embassy telegrams 1099 and 1125.² In this conversation, as in preceding one, Hussein says he pulled no punches but that Nasser, although frequently arguing back, took it well.

Hussein opened by citing various examples of recent actions by USG culminating in its endorsement of Black Mission which indicated our position not obdurate and also covered pertinent portions of messages which had been passed to him from Washington. He expressed opinion opportunity for improvement relations exists and, renewing recommendation for “truce”, stressed need for quiet. When Nasser observed unusual seek “cease-fire” while truce terms being discussed, Hussein replied that might be good military dogma but existing situation requires immediate quieting without splitting hairs on terms. Furthermore, even in military operation it would hardly be expected that new front would be opened up while truce under discussion and he cited press and radio attacks on Jordan as new factor which making bad situation worse.

Mention of Jordan revealed this was sore spot. Nasser said not Egyptian but Jordanian radio which had begun attack. In fact, he had maintained restraint for sometime but had finally decided forebearance no longer a virtue and had ordered Voice of Arabs to pay Hussein in his own coin. Hussein said he was somewhat at a loss to know how to reply to this since he had heard nothing re prior Jordanian attacks but had nevertheless argued that, regardless of who had begun present slugging match, it was undignified and disgraceful and was blackening Egypt’s face in world. Discussion went on for sometime during which Nasser also mentioned clandestine stations, especially Voice of Truth and Free Egypt, which were vilely slandering him every day and which he had intelligence reports to prove were tools of Counter-Subversion Committee of Baghdad Pact to which US belongs. He also gave impression of suspecting that Radio Jordan would not dare be so aggressive without American encouragement. However, Hussein stuck to his guns and said he was left with impression that attacks will in fact be relaxed not only against Jordan but US and he noted in that connection that several of today’s papers had stopped featuring Jordan issue.

(Note 1. Nasser’s confident statement that it was Jordan and not Egypt which had started exchange of insults raised our eyebrows as well as those of Hussein since we had always assumed that campaign in Egyptian press and radio was coldly calculated move. However, upon reviewing available FBIS reports we find that Amman radio began extreme and provocative campaign against Egypt as far back as October 18 but that Cairo radio failed to respond until November 3. Nasser, therefore, may have point as far facts re current campaign go but to be noted that sporadic attacks on Jordan have been taking place for sometime past.)

(Note 2. … informed today Nasser did in fact indicate intention relax attacks on Jordan after talk with Hussein last night and as first step ordered Middle East News Agency cease fabricating reports of alleged unrest in Jordan. However, intended reduce pressure gradually as to avoid arousing suspicion.)

Discussion next turned to Syria with Hussein saying Bizri known to be Communist and steps should be taken oust him possibly by Diplomatic appointment. He also emphasized danger of general move to left in country. Without bothering to repeat usual protestation that Syria nationalist and not leftist, Nasser said couldn’t see who could move against Syria [Bizri?]. Hussein suggested Sarraj but Nasser expressed doubt he would take on such task in such way that Hussein given impression Nasser sees Bizri as real power in Syria. Hussein also mentioned recent Alsop article³ purporting show that large amount of Soviet tonnage going through Turkish Straits gave rise to suspicion that military materials going to Syria must be far beyond its absorptive capacity and must, therefore, be regarded as for Soviet stockpile purposes. Nasser questioned this but it seemed to set him thinking, as also did Hussein’s warning that Egypt’s close ties with Syria could become source great danger if Bizri decided do Kadar act⁴ and go over to Russians.

Last part of talk was focused on Soviet Union and Communism. Re former Hussein pointed to danger of increasingly close contacts and said rumors going around already that Soviet Ambassador Kissilev was becoming new Lord Cromer.⁵ Here Nasser professed to have no fears, saying Russians behaving circumspectly but that he was watching and would act promptly and firmly if there were signs they were going too far. Nasser also seemed similarly sure of himself when Hussein brought up matter of local Communism which was not only making inroads but being directed at times against Nasser himself. In fact, Hussein went so far as to suggest that Russians might well be grooming someone replace Nasser when opportune moment arrived. Hussein also deplored fact that press impregnated with Communists and that Communists and neo-Communists given responsible government positions, mentioning specifically Ahmed Fuad, Magdi Hassanein, Achid Barawy and Abu Nosseir as following in that category and being crooks in the bargain. Nasser said such accusations had been made before but charges did not bear up under investigation. Hussein maintained that confident thorough investigation would substantiate his statements.

Hussein’s conclusions from foregoing were as follows:

(1) Nasser feels the idea of a truce has possibilities and told Hussein to continue his efforts in that direction. Question is what to do next.

(2) Attacks on Jordan are largely result of sense of personal injury felt by Nasser under bite of Amman radio attacks coming on top of propaganda of clandestine radio stations with which he now associates USG, in fact this has become obsession.

(3) Although he will not actually admit it, Nasser is worried about Syria and has doubts re strength his protégé Sarraj vis-à-vis Bizri.

(4) Nasser is dangerously over-confident of his ability to match wits with Russians and to crack down on local Communists at will.

(5) Despite fact that Hussein bore down to extent of actually rubbing it in, Nasser not only did not take offense but seemed appreciate being approached so frankly.

Comment follows.⁶

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/11–1657. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:07 p.m.
2. See Document 394.
3. See The Washington Post and Times Herald, November 4, 1957, p. A17.
4. Reference is to the Hungarian Communist leader Janos Kadar, who had cast his lot with the Soviet Union when the Nagy government repudiated the Warsaw Pact on November 1, 1956. With the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt, Kadar emerged as Prime Minister of Hungary.
5. As the British Consul General in Egypt between 1883 and 1907, Lord Cromer (Sir Evelyn Baring) used his control over Egyptian finances to exercise significant influence over the country as a whole.
6. Infra.