Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

397. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 13, 1957¹

Washington, November 13, 1957

SUBJECT

• Israel’s Security Position; Suggestions for Strengthening the Position of the West in the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Ya’acov Herzog, Minister of Israel
• The Under Secretary
• NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
• NE—Donald C. Bergus

The Israel Ambassador handed the Under Secretary a letter dated November 13, 1957 to the Secretary containing a message from the Prime Minister and copies of a memorandum entitled “The Middle East: Crisis and Remedy.”² The letter noted that the Prime Minister had indicated special interest and satisfaction with Paragraph 5 of the Declaration of Common Purpose published by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan.³ Israel wished to participate in the proposed pooling of knowledge and planning in order to strengthen its own security within the framework of the security of the entire Free World. Mr. Eban expressed the hope that joint consideration of these questions could proceed even prior to the opening of the December meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Mr. Eban summarized the memorandum by stating it set forth the somber view which Israel took of the Soviet effort in the area. The memorandum suggested the following remedies to strengthen the Western position in the Middle East: 1) Precision should be given to Western commitments to defend the independence and integrity of Middle Eastern states; 2) New thinking as to the economic problems of the area was required; and 3) Efforts in the field of propaganda and counter-subversion should be stepped up. Mr. Eban added that with regard to the latter point he was awaiting more specific material with respect to Jordan. The Under Secretary and the Ambassador discussed briefly the problem of internal subversive activity in the area and the fact that in so many cases in the Middle East individual leaders played a very large role, and that the interests of the West were perforce bound up to a large extent with specific personalities.

Mr. Rockwell pointed out that the basic concept behind the close defense association among the Western Powers was defense against international Communism and the USSR. Some nations of the Middle East did not think that the USSR represented the greatest threat to them. Therefore, they were not so interested in the Middle East Doctrine and other collective security arrangements as they might be. He wondered how this could be overcome. Mr. Eban referred to the other commitments the U.S. had with respect to aggression in the Middle East. He alleged that most countries preferred a guarantee against aggression from any quarter. Mr. Eban felt that Soviet behavior in the area made the distinction between intra-regional conflicts and the threat of Communism less valid.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/11–1357. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on November 14.
2. Neither printed. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 6, Document 391. Point five of the Declaration concerned the need to develop a greater sense of community security through collective defense arrangements and affirmed that the United States and the United Kingdom considered their possession of nuclear weapons as a trust for the defense of the free world.