Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

39. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 25, 1957—8 p.m.

Delga 590. Verbatim text. Re SYG Report on Israeli Withdrawals. Lodge and staff discussed US resolution (Gadel 119)² with SYG and Pearson. Since Canadians had also drafted resolution, and both US and Canadian drafts had been shown to SYG and found generally acceptable to him, it was decided to combine certain provisions from both resolutions. Draft also takes into account suggestions made by SYG.

Following draft resolution worked out by Canadian and US staff as basis for consultations between Lodge and Pearson about noon Saturday.³ Would appreciate any comments Department may have soonest.

“The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions of November 2, 4, 5, 7, 24, 1956 and January 19, 1957,

Having received the report of the Secretary General of January 24, 1957 (A/3512),

1. Deplores the non-compliance of Israel with the resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the withdrawal of its forces behind the armistice demarcation lines and demands that Israel complete that withdrawal without further delay;

2. Notes with satisfaction the Secretary General’s report and approves the recommendations and measures proposed by the Secretary General therein, which are to be carried out upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces;

3. Recognizes that withdrawal of forces must be followed by action which would represent real progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions in the region;

4. Urges the Governments of Israel and Egypt to reaffirm their undertakings under the General Armistice Agreement between them of February 24, 1949, and to take all necessary measures to return to full implementation of that Agreement;

5. Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement;

6. Instructs the Secretary General to make arrangements after consultations with the parties concerned for the deployment of the UNEF on both sides of the Armistice demarcation line, and in the Gaza Strip, so that it may be in a position to assume the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervision Organization in all the areas where the organization now functions under the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel; to prevent incursions and raids across the Armistice demarcation line; and to maintain quiet and peaceful conditions along the line;

7. Requests the Israeli and Egyptian Governments to remove military forces from these areas of deployment;

8. Authorizes the Secretary General, through a civil and military mission to be selected by him, to assist in and supervise the replacement of the present civil administration of Gaza, and to take steps to ensure that the Gaza Strip shall not be used as a base for incursions in and raids against Israel;

9. Recommends that determination of the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran should be sought from the International Court of Justice, which should be accepted by the countries concerned, and pending this determination calls upon the parties to the Armistice Agreement to give assurances that they will not assert or exercise any belligerent rights in these waters, or interfere in any way with the right of innocent passage therein;

10. Authorizes the Secretary General to arrange for air and ground units of UNEF, on the withdrawal of Israel forces from the Gulf of Aqaba area, and through arrangements with and in cooperation with the Egyptian authorities, to assist in the establishment and maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area, based on mutual restraint and non-interference, and in the prevention of acts in contravention of the preceding paragraph;

11. Urges all members to observe and respect these recommendations and measures and to extend their full cooperation in giving them effect;

12. Requests the Secretary General to report as appropriate to the General Assembly.”⁴

With respect to operative paragraph 8, Dept will note that there is no specific reference to Egyptian administration of Gaza even though this is what Canadians and SYG both envisage. When we raised question as to whether specific reference should be made to Egyptian administration to make resolution more acceptable to latter, Canadians said this formulation (without specific reference to Egyptian administration) might be more acceptable to Israelis in that it would make it easier for them to retreat from the position they have taken in their Aide-Mémoire with respect to Gaza.

Assuming US-Canadian agreement on satisfactory draft at Saturday meeting, we plan tentatively seek co-sponsors of following:

Norway, Colombia, Peru, India, Burma and Yugoslavia. Lodge called Fawzi tonight and informed him we were formulating some ideas as to possible action in the GA and that before we moved ahead we would wish to consult with him. Lodge intends give Fawzi general lines of resolution Saturday if we have achieved agreed text.

Earlier in the day when SYG had been informed our view favoring early initiative in General Assembly, he informed us that Fawzi had expressed preferences for debate on Monday without any resolution on the table. SYG had in mind debate could then be delayed for couple of days in order give him opportunity to discuss situation further with Egyptians and Israelis. GADel officer reminded SYG that others were working on more extreme proposals, and in light of this, our view was that early initiative was desirable. This evening when Lodge discussed US resolution with Hammarskjold and emphasized desirability initiative in order to avoid extreme proposals, SYG did not disagree and said that there would be many grateful for such an initiative. SYG was pleased that we intended seek other co-sponsors and urged US to work with Indians who, in his view, have been and can be most helpful. Lall (India) earlier had expressed strong interest in Indian participation and stressed importance of no resolution being tabled without fullest consultation so as to assure two-thirds vote. He said this was most crucial period for UN and that it was of utmost importance that Assembly work as team.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–2557. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:52 p.m.
2. Supra.
3. January 26.
4. The Department of State transmitted to USUN several proposed changes to this draft resolution in Gadels 123 and 125, January 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–2757)