Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

386. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 22, 1957¹

Washington, October 22, 1957

SUBJECT

• Joint US-UK Statement on Palestine

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • NEA—William M. Rountree
  • EUR—Burke C. Elbrick
  • EUR—Ambassador Whitney
  • NE—John Dorman
• U.K.
  • Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary
  • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
  • Viscount Samuel Hood, Min., British Embassy
  • Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy
  • Dennis Laskey, Private Secretary/FonSecy
  • Roger Jackling, Head of Chancery

The Secretary said he wished to discuss the draft of the Joint U.S.–U.K. statement on Palestine.² The Secretary indicated that the substance of the statement was very good, although he questioned the advisability of making such a statement at this time. The Secretary said he had just received a visit from the Saudi Ambassador during which, for the first time in a long while, the Saudi representative had made no mention of Palestine or Aqaba.³ It was apparent that the Saudi Ambassador wished to retrieve some of the prestige which he felt King Saud had lost by the refusal of Syria to accept King Saud’s efforts to mediate between Turkey and Syria. This development now gave us a little room to maneuver which would be closed to us should we evoke the Palestine issue through a joint public statement at this time.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd said that although he had not yet read the draft statement carefully, on first sight he was inclined to agree with the Secretary. He would like an opportunity to think the matter over.

The Secretary pointed out that he had made a similar statement in 1955 with no particular effect.⁴ We were still exploring every possible way to bring about a solution to the Palestine problem since; as long as it exists, the Soviets have a trump card in the Middle East. The Secretary recalled that he and Mr. Lloyd, in discussing the paper prepared by the Joint Working Group on Palestine, on October 15, had agreed that they could not go as far as the recommendations contained in the Working Group paper, and that anything less would satisfy neither the Jews nor the Arabs.⁵

Mr. Lloyd felt it would be good to have a statement of this kind as a common doctrine which could be used as an internal exercise in discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom. This would serve as a useful guide-line even though both countries agreed it should not be made public as a joint declaration.

The Secretary pointed out that the Arab world is now gradually becoming more concerned with the threat of Communism in the area than with the Palestine issue. He had told the Saudi Arabian Ambassador that the Syrian rejection to King Saud’s offers of mediation had been instigated in Moscow and not Damascus. Although the Ambassador had not replied to the comment, he was obviously impressed.

Mr. Rountree stated that the substance of the draft statement was a departure from United States policy. The offer to permit all refugees who desired to return and the requirement of a compromise between the frontiers delimited in the 1947 Resolution and the present boundaries was farther than we had ever gone in the past. Never before had we given such a specific framework within which a solution to the Palestine problem must be found.

The Secretary noted that the joint draft statement did not address itself to a very important aspect of the Palestine situation, namely the dangerous policy of increased immigration which the Israeli Government is following. The Secretary suggested that the Working Group might do some more work on this draft statement for possible future guidance. Meanwhile, he concluded, it would be inappropriate at the moment for the United States and United Kingdom to make such a joint statement.

Attachment

Washington, October 21, 1957.

Draft Statement Prepared by the British Embassy⁶

The Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom agree that the unsolved Arab-Israel problem presents a grave obstacle to the peaceful and prosperous development of the peoples of the Middle East, and that tranquillity will never come to the area without a just settlement of that problem.

They have no intention of trying to impose a settlement. Nor do they think it would advance a settlement for them to put forward specific proposals. For there to be a hope of success, these must come from the parties themselves. But they think it timely to reaffirm their views on the principles which should govern such a settlement, and on the contribution which their governments are ready to make.

The two governments are opposed to any attempt to reach a solution by the use of force: it must be found by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The Arab Governments frequently express fears that Israel will seek by violent means to expand at their expense. Similar fears are expressed by the Israelis. The United States and United Kingdom Governments are firmly opposed to any such use of force. They are against aggression from any quarter.

Any settlement must make provision for the three basic elements of refugees, security and boundaries.

A just settlement should accord recognition to the right of repatriation for those Arab refugees who desire it, and should make adequate provision for the compensation and resettlement of those who do not return. A lasting settlement should give security based on acceptance by countries within the area, backed if so desired by guarantees from other countries, of the territorial arrangements embodied in the settlement. Acceptance would appear to require that these territorial arrangements should represent some form of compromise between the present Armistice lines and the boundaries proposed in the United Nations Resolution of 1947.

The two Governments would for their part support any effort, either through United Nations machinery or by other means, to bring about a settlement. They would contribute to a loan to make possible the compensation of refugees who are not repatriated; and they would, if so desired, join in a guarantee of any frontiers embodied in an agreed settlement.

Until such a settlement can be brought about they will continue to support efforts by the United Nations to maintain peace in the area and to reduce tension on the Armistice lines.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784.00/10–2257. Top Secret. Drafted by Dorman on October 23.

2. Earlier on October 22, Rountree sent to Dulles the text of what Rountree described as a “British draft statement on Palestine, prepared by the British Embassy.” In a covering memorandum, Rountree advised that Lloyd would probably raise it at their meeting and that the British Foreign Office envisioned issuing the statement as a joint U.S.-British document on October 25 at the conclusion of Macmillan’s visit to Washington. Rountree recommended against U.S. participation in such a statement, because it would alienate the Israelis without gaining “any real measure of Arab favor”, and it would lead the Arabs to conclude that the statement was made “to gain their favor in the face of the present Soviet political advances in the Middle East”. Rountree also noted: “The Arabs would react strongly against what they would consider US–UK pressure for a solution of the Palestine problem. It is highly doubtful that the British reputation in the area has been sufficiently restored to render it advisable for the United States to identify itself so closely with the United Kingdom with respect to this highly charged issue”.

   Rountree also forwarded to Dulles a memorandum from the Bureau of European Affairs indicating that the substance of the proposed statement was acceptable. (Ibid., 684A.86/10–2257)

   The draft British statement is printed below.

3. Saudi Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Abdullah al-Khayyal discussed the Syrian situation with Dulles earlier that day. The memorandum of conversation by Newsom, October 22, is in Department of State, Central Files, 682.83/10-2257.
4. Reference is to Dulles’ speech of August 26, 1955. See vol. XIV, pp. 378 ff.
5. On October 15, Dulles and Lloyd discussed the “Report of Joint US–UK Working Group on Syria”, dated September 18, which consisted of 17 separate papers on various aspects of the problem. In paper XVIII, “Decisions Required in Connection With a “Containment Plus’ Policy”, the Joint Working Group proposed a substantial redefinition of U.S.–U.K. policy with respect to the Palestine problem which possibly would include: 1) a public reaffirmation of support for the principle that Arab refugees had a right to return to their former homes in Israel if they so desired, and to receive compensation if they chose to settle elsewhere; 2) public opposition to Israeli immigration policies and adjustment of Western policies on economic aid to Israel; 3) exploration of the possibility of devising a formula for a settlement of borders; 4) examination of policy toward the Gulf of Aqaba; and 5) possible formulation and eventual publication of the revised U.S.–U.K. positions on Palestine. The memorandum of conversation and the report are in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123, US/UK Working Group and US–UK Report—Sept. 18, 1957, respectively.
6. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. The source text was attached to the October 22 memorandum from Rountree to Dulles; see footnote 2 above.