Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

381. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 8, 1957¹

Washington, October 8, 1957

SUBJECT

• Egyptian Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
• The Secretary
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Wells Stabler

The Egyptian Ambassador called at his request this afternoon prior to his departure on October 11 for Cairo in connection with his sister’s illness.²

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that although he regretted the circumstances of Dr. Hussein’s return to Cairo, nonetheless he was glad to have the opportunity to talk with him as a person who sincerely believed in better US-Egyptian relations and who had done what he could to contribute to those relations. Dr. Hussein thanked the Secretary for these words and said that indeed he did believe in better US-Egyptian relations.

The Secretary then said that he had been mystified by Egyptian and Syrian reaction to US efforts of late last year and early this year to stop the attack against Egypt and to remove the Israelis from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh. The position and action which we had taken against our NATO allies and with potentially grave risks had represented one of the greater acts of political courage by a President in some time. Notwithstanding our efforts, Egypt and Syria apparently had completely forgotten what we had done and now treated us as if we had been the aggressors. Dr. Hussein intervened to say that he thought US action had been appreciated by everybody in the Near East, but the Secretary demurred, saying that it was hard to find any evidence to that effect at the present time. The Secretary went on that Egypt may have reasons which he could not fathom for such an attitude, but that irrespective of the reasons, he wished to say that the US did not consider that the door to improved relations was closed. Unfortunately judging by Egyptian propaganda and continuing violent attacks on the US, Egypt did not view the matter in quite the same light. Egypt was now somewhat a prisoner of its propaganda. We think, the Secretary said, that Egypt and Syria are underestimating the dangers involved in their dependence on the Soviet Union and in their belief that their independence and freedom are fully immune against Soviet designs. We believe that President Nasser is in error in his judgment on this matter and we believe that our greater experience with the Soviets gives us some competence in understanding the basic Soviet objectives. It may be that the Soviet Union has changed its ways and its relations with the Arab States no longer represent any dangers to the freedom and integrity of those states, but there is absolutely no evidence to support such a belief and Soviet protestations about not interfering in internal affairs of other countries are without foundation. The Secretary cited Soviet intervention in Hungary as an example of how the Soviet Union honored its pledges of non-interference. He said that when confronted with the accusation of interference in the internal affairs of Hungary, the Soviets denied that this constituted internal interference. The Secretary stated that if this was to be the standard of the Soviet Union, neither the US nor many other countries could accept that standard as legitimate in the conduct of international affairs.

The Secretary said that there were certain specific problems between Egypt and the US, and he cited our blocking Egyptian funds in this connection. He indicated that the blocking of these funds, which are being gradually reduced by our licensing of payments for certain Egyptian obligations, had taken place in order to protect American shippers from double jeopardy. We feared that at the time of the nationalization of the Canal, American shippers, who paid approximately $12,000,000 worth of tolls annually, might be involved in suits from the former Canal Company which believed that the tolls should be paid to it. The Egyptian funds were being held to protect American shippers from such double jeopardy. The Secretary indicated that, as Secretary Anderson and Deputy Under Secretary of State Dillon had said to Finance Minister Kaissouni, a settlement between the Egyptian Government and the former Canal Company would remove the reasons for continued blocking of the funds.³ The other problem, said the Secretary, was the matter of Egyptian propaganda which continued its violent attacks on the US. This constituted an obstacle in the improvement of our relations.

The Secretary continued that although he was not entirely sure what President Nasser meant by his policy of “positive neutrality,” he wished to say that the US had no quarrel with neutrality as such. We believed that collective security was the more sensible and more dependable way of protecting the independence of the free world against the Soviet Union, but we recognized that other countries had the right to adopt neutrality as their policy and we maintained friendly relations with many such countries—Finland, for example. However, we believed that the countries concerned should be truly neutral and that they should not permit their neutrality to be used as a vehicle to facilitate penetration of international communism. With regard to nationalism, the Secretary indicated our support for nationalism and said that the vast majority of those nations which had gained independence in recent years had been those having ties with the West. There was no evidence to show that any country which was tied to the Soviet Union was making any progress towards gaining its freedom and independence. He said he was concerned that if Egypt and Syria should continue in their present policies, Arab nationalism would eventually disappear and be swallowed up by the Soviet Union. We regretted that there was not a greater awareness on the part of Egypt to the dangers of the Soviet Union and until there was such an awareness, there was not very much we could do. To maintain a friendly and constructive relationship with a country which did not have this awareness would be tantamount to our agreeing that there was no threat to the independence of that country from the Soviet Union. This in turn would have an adverse effect on those countries of Western Europe which would not understand why there should be a double standard of conduct. The Secretary indicated that we did not insist that Egypt or any other country refuse to have any dealings with the Soviet Union. That was not the point since countries such as Yugoslavia, India and Finland had many dealings with the Soviet Union but always in the awareness of the dangers involved. In the specific case of Yugoslavia, Tito had been through a trial by fire and had realized what such dealings had meant in terms of his country’s freedom and independence. The Secretary stated that if a country should come to us and say that it believed it was dangerous to its freedom and security to be dependent on the Soviet Union and needed assistance, then the US could probably help. However, if a country came and indicated that it was in a good bargaining position and that if we did not give them what they wanted, they could get it from the Soviet Union, we were not interested in that sort of a relationship.

Ambassador Hussein expressed appreciation for the Secretary’s views and said that he regretted the present impasse since it could only be in Egypt’s interests to have good relations with the US. He was certain it was not the intention of President Nasser or President Quwwatli to compromise the independence and freedom of those countries which were greatly treasured by the Egyptian and Syrian people and which were zealously guarded. The Secretary remarked that while he had no doubt it was not the intention of the leaders to place their countries in jeopardy, he could only quote the proverb “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.” The Egyptian Ambassador went on that he believed it was necessary to find some way to clarify the points of difference between the two countries which had been obscured by press and radio treatment in both Egypt and the US. He wondered whether it might be possible to have high level discussions between the two countries aimed at identifying the specific areas of agreement and disagreement and what each country might do to settle the disagreements.

At this point the Secretary intervened to say that he wished the Ambassador to know that President Nasser’s suggestion of a meeting with President Eisenhower had not been ignored, but that visits of chiefs of state were a complicated matter requiring long preparation in advance. The President was already involved in the forthcoming visits of the French and German Presidents and the Sultan of Morocco. Moreover, such visits were largely ceremonial in nature and the President did not concern himself with negotiations, as this was the business of the Secretary of State. There had been one exception to this rule, the Summit Conference, which had not proven to be a particularly constructive exercise. The only thing which had been agreed to was the unification of Germany through free elections but the Soviets had now repudiated even that. The Secretary stressed that the President would not involve himself in specific negotiations of this type. The Ambassador said he wished the Secretary to know he did not agree with President Nasser’s suggestion. The Secretary replied he had raised the matter to let the Ambassador know that we had not ignored President Nasser’s statement.

Ambassador Hussein then inquired whether the Secretary could give him any advice or ideas as to some constructive approach to settling the problem of US-Egyptian relations. The Secretary recalled that Ambassador Hare had had a number of conversations with President Nasser, the last one being some weeks ago, and that he had nothing further to add at this particular point. Mr. Rountree said he was seeing the Ambassador on October 9⁴ and that they would pursue the matter at that time. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for coming in and asked to have his regards conveyed to President Nasser.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/10–857. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler.
2. According to a briefing memorandum, which Rountree forwarded to Dulles on October 8, Hussein had not called at the Department of State since February. (Ibid.)
3. See Document 375.
4. See the memorandum of conversation, infra.