Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

324. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 10, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Saudi Concern Over Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba

Discussion:

The King of Saudi Arabia has transmitted to the President a letter (Tab B)² expressing grave concern at alleged movements of Israel war vessels in Saudi territorial waters at the Northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba on May 1–4, 1957.

The Jordanians have also complained to us about the movement of Israel vessels and said they were referring the matter to the Mixed Armistice Commission. It is not clear from a reading of the Jordan–Israel Armistice Agreement that a movement of Israel war vessels into Jordan territorial waters would in fact be a violation of the agreement. The Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement on the other hand clearly forbids war vessels belonging to one party from approaching the shores of the other party closer than three miles.

The Israelis have denied to the press the allegation that there was any maneuvering of Israel war vessels in Saudi territorial waters. The Naval Attaché in Tel Aviv surmises that there may have been some maneuvering in connection with the recent Israel Independence Day celebrations. While he has no knowledge of any movement in Saudi waters, he has pointed out that given the close contiguity of the frontiers at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, where four countries claim territory, it would be very difficult to ascertain the limits of the territorial waters of any one state.

The Saudis have reported to the Security Council their allegation that Israel war vessels violated Saudi territorial waters (Tab C)³ but have not requested Security Council action.

This very complex problem contains a number of issues: 1) the alleged violation of Saudi territorial waters by Israel warships which raises questions of fact as well as law; 2) Saudi Arabian opposition to the use of the Gulf of Aqaba by Israel or Israel-bound merchant vessels through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran; 3) the possibility of an attempt to pass through the Straits by Israel war vessels which would provoke the strongest reaction from Saudi Arabia. Such an attempt, if the war vessels used the channel which lies close to the Egyptian shore, would also be a violation of the Israel–Egypt Armistice Agreement.

While the Saudi Government’s communication to the Security Council raises directly only the question of the movement of Israel warships in Saudi territorial waters, it is obvious that the issues set forth above are closely interrelated and it would doubtless be unfeasible to attempt to separate them for the purposes of discussion with the Saudis or consideration by the United Nations.

We believe there is an advantage to be gained in providing a basis for further direct discussions with Saudi Arabian representatives in the United States (possibly Azzam Pasha) on the implications of UN action and possible alternative courses of action. We are suggesting, therefore, a message which will give the broad outline of the problem and suggest the difficulties involved in taking the matter to the Security Council. We will, at the same time, however, indicate some willingness to consider Security Council action which might lead to an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.

We suggest, also, that, in view of our discussions with the British at Bermuda on the Gulf of Aqaba and subsequent exchanges in Washington, we inform them of the Saudi letter and discuss with them immediately of our contemplated action.

Recommendations:

1. That you transmit to the White House the attached suggested reply for signature by the President. (Tab A)⁴

2. That we inform the British immediately of the letter from King Saud and of our suggested reply and discuss with them further courses of action.

3. That we hand a copy of the message to the King, when approved, to the Saudi Arabian Ambassador here, and suggest discussions with him and with Azzam Pasha in anticipation of further discussions as suggested by the letter.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 980.74/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on May 10. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “Sec has seen”. Tabs A, B, and C are not attached to the source text.
2. Dated May 6; see footnote 2, Document 321.
3. On May 7, the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia, Ahmad Shukairy, addressed such a communication to the U.N. Secretary-General. (U.N. doc. S/3825)

4. A copy of the draft message from Eisenhower to Saud has not been found. On May 14, Rountree forwarded to Dulles a suggested message to King Saud, which had been revised in accordance with a conversation between Rountree and Dulles on May 11. (Memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, May 14; Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/5–1457) The suggested message was transmitted to the White House on May 14, approved by Eisenhower (who initialed the copy in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series), and transmitted to the Embassy in Jidda for delivery in telegram 1032, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1357)

   In the letter, Eisenhower noted that the U.S. position in the Security Council would depend in part on the approach and action taken by Saudi Arabia. The United States therefore believed it desirable to hold further discussions with Saudi Arabian representatives in Washington. In these talks, the United States and Saudi Arabia could review aspects of the problem of raising the question in the Security Council and discuss the status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. (Ibid., 684A.86/5–1357)

5. Subsequent to this memorandum, on May 21, Rountree recommended to Dulles that he call in Eban to discuss Saudi accusations concerning Israeli warships in the Gulf of Aqaba and to urge that Israel keep its war vessels in port temporarily. Dulles approved the recommendation and designated Herter to speak with Eban. (Memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, May 21; ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 59 D 582, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S 1957) On May 25, Eban told Herter that Israeli warships were tied up at Elath and had not violated the territorial waters of Saudi Arabia. (Memorandum of conversation by Wilcox, May 25; ibid., Central Files, 780.00/5–2557)