Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

321. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 9, 1957¹

Washington, May 9, 1957

SUBJECT

• Israeli Naval Actions in Gulf of Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS

• Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Special Representative of Saudi Arabian Government
• NEA—Mr. William M. Rountree
• NE—Mr. Stuart Rockwell
• NE-Mr. Robert Sherwood

Azzam stated that he was calling on Mr. Rountree to inform him how once again the Israelis were causing trouble. He referred to recent incidents involving Israeli warships in the Gulf of Aqaba. According to Azzam, on May 1st an Israeli warship had proceeded down the Gulf in Egyptian territorial waters and had returned to Eilath through Saudi territorial waters. In the course of its passage the warship passed within one kilometer of the Saudi coast, passing at one point close to a Saudi gun emplacement. Azzam added that between the 1st and 4th of May Israeli warships maneuvered in Arab territorial waters in the northern end of the Gulf. Azzam labeled these actions as “extremely provocative.” Azzam likewise mentioned a report which he had heard that the U.S. flag vessel, the Kern Hills, had only three days ago visited Eilath, again, implying a violation of Saudi territorial waters.

Mr. Rountree commented that the Island of Tiran was Saudi Arabian and the Sinai mainland Egyptian, and that the channel in the Strait of Tiran lies nearer Egypt. He inquired if ships transiting the canal had passed through the regular channel or on the Saudi side of it. Azzam replied that he was not sure in which territorial waters they had passed. Azzam noted that in observing the six-mile territorial waters limit, the Gulf of Aqaba is divided into Egyptian and Saudi territorial waters except for a limited portion near the center which he described as “a sort of lake”. Azzam then asked if this issue might be taken to the Security Council.

Mr. Rountree replied that there appeared to be two questions. The first question involved the violation of territorial waters in which there might be no dispute as to the right to be there. The second question involved the transit of waters where there existed a claim to the right of free and innocent passage. Thus, transit of the Strait of Tiran might be an issue quite distinct from that mentioned under the first question. Should the Security Council examine these matters, Mr. Rountree continued, there presumably would arise the question of the legal interpretation of free and innocent passage of the Strait of Tiran, which might in turn give rise to the possibility of reprieve to the International Court. Mr. Rountree asked Azzam if he thought the Saudi Government was prepared to have the court look into this legal situation. Azzam replied that he did not fully know the Saudi Arabian Government’s attitude in this regard, but he thought that the Saudi Government did not wish the International Court of Justice to render a decision on this issue. Azzam, however, distinguished between a decision by the ICJ and an advisory opinion of that body.

Mr. Rountree commented that this government is fully aware of the difficulties in this situation and recognized that there are honest differences of opinion. As was stated in the February 11 Memorandum and on subsequent occasions, the United States Government takes the position that the Straits, although territorial waters, are imbued with an international character which gives to users the right of free and innocent passage. This opinion is based on a principle of international law, as we have honestly and sincerely interpreted it. This government has also stated that its attitude would be affected by an overriding legal opinion such as that of the ICJ. Under our interpretation of the pertinent law, Mr. Rountree stated, this government has no basis for denying U.S. ships from passaging the Strait. He pointed out that the United States was not chartering vessels to test this right. The Kern Hills, he added, was chartered by the Government of Israel for its voyage to Eilath.

Azzam said that Israel had never had the right of free passage in the Gulf because of its state of belligerency with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Government of Israel has decided to exploit the situation created by the presence of UNEF in Sharm elat Sheikh. The Israelis are doing exactly as they please in the Gulf, and deliberately are violating the rights of the littoral powers. The United States Government is, in effect, supporting the Israelis by permitting U.S. vessels carrying war materials to use the Gulf. The Israelis, he concluded, are acting as though the Gulf were their own sea, and not territorial waters where one can pass by tolerance, or under an international treaty such as controls the Bosphorus. The Israelis are thus reaping benefits from their aggression which the Arabs had been told they would not be permitted to do.

Mr. Rountree then pointed out that the United States had done all that it could to assure Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. We made clear that Israel should not benefit from its aggression, nor obtain rights which did not exist before the aggression. We said that Israel should enjoy free passage only when it was no longer in the status of a belligerent. We believe that with Israel’s withdrawal, the situation with respect to Israeli rights should revert to the position before the attack.

Mr. Rountree said that our attitude is affected by two principal factors. First, we earnestly wish to avoid any misunderstandings with the Saudi Arabian Government. Secondly, we believe we must be guided by principle and what we think are the applicable legal factors, and the effect of those factors on the use of the waters of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. It was our belief that quite apart from the Israeli aggression there are certain rights of all nations with respect to the Gulf.

Azzam asked Mr. Rountree if he thought that the passage of the Israeli warships which he had described was legal. Mr. Rountree replied that while he thought that international law and the armistice agreements should apply in this instance, he was not in a position to give a definitive reply. Azzam indicated his doubt that the armistice agreements allowed Israel to send its warships in adjoining territorial waters. He said he felt that the United States had taken, in these doubtful matters, an attitude against the Saudi Arabian Government. By permitting United States vessels to carry war materials to Israel through the Gulf, the United States Government was contributing to the strength of Israel. Azzam said he appreciated the fact that the United States, as a sort of mediator, would receive trouble from all sides. Yet Israel is defeating the main objective of peace by abusing the “limited domination” of the situation which the United States Government presently holds. Continuing, Azzam said that if it is not possible to return to the status quo ante, whereby Israel was not permitted the use of the Strait, Israel should at least be restricted from provoking a deterioration of the situation. Azzam asked that U.S. vessels not be permitted to carry war materials through the Gulf to Israel at least until the whole question might be put to the International Court.

Azzam then pointed out that King Saud was deeply disturbed by the recent events in the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Rountree replied that the King’s latest letter to the President was receiving our most careful attention.² Mr. Rountree said that he could not purport to give a reply to the King’s message but he anticipated that it would be forthcoming in the near future. Azzam called Mr. Rountree’s attention to the reference to the Security Council in the King’s letter, and inquired if our reply would suggest presenting the issue to the International Court of Justice. Mr. Rountree replied that it would be premature for him to comment, but he would be pleased to discuss the reply once it has been made.

Stating that he was merely speculating, Azzam then commented on future courses of action. He said he feared that the majority of the Security Council members were against Egypt and the Arabs. Should an advisory opinion be asked of the ICJ, there might be a long delay in getting an answer. Faced thus, with an adverse prospect in the Security Council and long delays in the Court procedure, Azzam said it might be best if some kind of temporary regime might be established by the United Nations.

Mr. Rountree thanked Azzam for his interesting views and said that he was not in a position to judge the situation in the Security Council. Before departing, Azzam once again pleaded that the United States Government prevent U.S. vessels from carrying oil and other war materials to Israel through the Gulf.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 980.74/5–957. Confidential. Drafted by Sherwood. Azzam Pasha also discussed the Gulf of Aqaba situation with Herter on May 9. The memorandum of conversation by Rockwell is ibid.
2. In a letter dated May 6, King Saud protested alleged recent movements of Israeli air and naval craft in the waters and air space of the Gulf of Aqaba. He also reiterated the Saudi view that Israeli exercise of a right of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba would constitute a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s historic and legal rights in the waters of the Gulf, which was a “closed Arab Gulf”, and would endanger the security of the sacred Moslem places to which the waters led. (An official English translation is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.)