Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

315. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 3, 1957—5 p.m.

Secto 14. Secretary will hand Selwyn Lloyd following memorandum today:

“I have now heard from Washington about our conversation of last evening as to another Security Council meeting on Suez.

“Washington shares the view I expressed that there is more danger than advantage in such a further meeting unless of course it can be ascertained in advance that Egypt will then take some forward step.

“We have been acting on the assumption that you did not feel it practical to try to organize a boycott of the Canal and were willing that the Egyptian Declaration, representing the best that Hammarskjold and we could get, would be accepted on a de facto provisional basis. Accordingly, we made our position clear in this respect at the prior Security Council meeting paraphrasing indeed the language of your memorandum requesting that the meeting be held. I understand that most of the SCUA members have taken the same position. These facts, known to Egypt plus the recent political developments in Jordan, make it seem to us less than ever likely that the Egyptians will at a further Security Council meeting make new concessions, and perhaps it is more likely that they will make some sort of an offensive gesture knowing that the Western Powers have little choice but to take their Declaration anyway. Thereby they might seek a ‘success’ to offset the Jordan setback.

“This seems to us at least to create a risk that the Western Powers will be in a worse position after a new meeting.

“There is, I suppose, also a danger to UK–US relations in the appearance of a divergence, and a public impression that the US position at the first meeting—actually taken in accord with you—is something that the UK accepts only after delay and with reluctance, because the US has undermined your position and forced your hand. If matters should develop in this way, and need to be clarified, this again would be awkward.

“It is for such reasons that we continue to think it preferable that there not be a further meeting at this stage. Of course, our reasoning is based to an extent on matters as to which no one can be certain. And the US, as this month’s ‘President’ of the Security Council, will now call a new meeting if you desire.”

Further message will follow after meeting.²

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BO/5–357. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:37 p.m. Repeated to USUN and London.

   During the morning of May 3, Counselor of the British Embassy Bailey informed Shaw that the British Government would be discussing the Suez problem with Hammarskjöld in Geneva that day and would ask him to seek clarifications from Nasser as to whether the Egyptian Government considered itself entitled to withdraw or amend their declaration regarding the Suez Canal. The British decision to call for another Security Council meeting would depend on the Egyptian response. Shaw interpreted this statement to mean that Great Britain would use a favorable response to justify another Security Council meeting. Also on May 3, Bailey told Shaw that monetary discussions with the National Bank of Egypt were scheduled to begin on Sunday morning, May 5, in Basel, and that another meeting of the SCUA Council would be called for May 7 or 8. (Memorandum of conversation by Shaw, May 3; ibid., 974.7301/5–357)

2. Secto 15, May 3, informed the Department of State that while handing the memorandum to Foreign Secretary Lloyd, Dulles expressed concern over the effect which a Security Council meeting might have on U.S.-British relations. In response, Lloyd expressed his government’s fear that if Great Britain unblocked 28 million pounds sterling in the No. 1 Egyptian account, then Egypt would want it all unblocked. Conversely, if Great Britain paid tolls in U.S. dollars, then other Middle Eastern states might request U.S. dollars rather than British sterling. Lloyd expressed a preference for unblocking in British sterling because Egypt would probably remain interested in the whole 28 million. (Ibid.)

   Later on May 3, Secto 17 reported that, after speaking with Macmillan, Lloyd informed U.S. officials that he would wait until May 5 to decide on whether or not to ask for a Security Council meeting. (Ibid.)