313. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
3412. Bonn for USDel. Presented Senator Humphrey2 night April 30 to Nasser who for well on 3 hours outlined development regime and its relations with USG. Although personally friendly, trend his remarks was one of advanced exasperation with American press and despair with USG.
[Page 588]Talk began with domestic scene on which, under Humphrey’s questioning, Nasser dwelt at greater length than usual, speaking both philosophically (“people have to be economically free to be politically free”) and in specific programs such as cooperatives and community centers. He admitted however programs greatly slowed down owing heavy cost.
Humphrey expressed interest against background his own experience and suggested this type story in which Americans would be interested if properly presented through press, including local American correspondents. At mention press Nasser’s eyes clouded and from thereon conversation veered to the political and contentious, and also to more routine line.
Beginning with reference unique initial friendship between revolutionary regime and USG, Nasser traced deterioration of relations through usual 3 “turning points” of Baghdad Pact, arms deal and cancellation Aswan aid. Re first, he said not only question of Iraq’s inclusion and consequent break in collective Arab approach but also of proselytizing aspect on other Arab states in full knowledge Egypt’s inability and policy not join any pact having Great Power participation.
Re arms, he covered unsuccessful negotiations with USG, British and French. He had weathered these frustrations till 1955, despite strong criticism of his officers, on grounds that Israel would not attack Egypt but Gaza raid proved him wrong and he had personally taken initiative in requesting arms from Soviet ambassador.
Re Aswan Dam, Nasser traced protracted negotiations with IBRD and USG and their “insulting” termination. (Humphrey defended Secretary strongly on this point but to little apparent avail since Nasser indicated his worst fears confirmed by his having read Beal’s book). As result GOE had decided within 4 days to nationalize Canal in order show that a small nation “can do horrible things” when mistreated by a large power.
As result this and subsequent developments, including economic pressures and press attacks, Nasser said now appears that USG is in about same position as British were first last year when they were engaged in program of undermining Egypt and making false charges preparatory to moving actively against Nasser regime. Only difference is that USG seems intend reaching same objective by peaceful means. He had repeatedly tried clarify situation but USG persisted in believing him responsible for various subversive activities in area. Fact is he has neither funds nor organization to carry on activities attributed to him and this included charges re Egyptian implication in Jordan affairs. However, no doubt about campaign being waged by West against him as exemplified by fact radio channels (presumably he meant clandestine) operating against him had been increased from 8 to [Page 589] 27. He also pointed to recent articles in Time, Newsweek and magazine section of New York Times clearly indicating American policy of weakening and isolating Egypt.
At this point Humphrey warned against danger of psychological and political fixations and noted degree to which controlled Egyptian press had contributed to this situation, especially in its kid-glove treatment Soviet Bloc while consistently blackguarding West. Didn’t Nasser feel he was really going much too far toward Soviet bloc for safety? Why couldn’t he himself take initiative in changing current by speaking understanding word regarding some favorable development such as reasonable attitude taken by U.S. Government regarding Canal Declaration?
Nasser admitted increasingly close identification with Soviet bloc but said not his fault but that of West which had driven him there. Regarding suggestion he make some sympathetic statement on U.S., he did not feel he was in position do so as long as present pressures being exerted. If he did, it would be interpreted as indication of weakness.
Final subject discussed was Palestine where Humphrey sought Nasser’s thoughts on settlement. Nasser noted there had been little trouble between Israel and Egypt from beginning of revolution in 1952 to ‘55 and he surprised see David Ben-Gurion in troubles since then which reached climax in Israeli attack last fall. Now things are much more difficult but possible that some machinery for conciliation could be helpful in due course. Meanwhile should not single out issues which would involve Arab concessions while Israelis remained adamant on such other issues as refugees and frontiers.
At this point and in conclusion Humphrey made strong endorsement of President Eisenhower as man of great understanding and integrity in whom confidence could be placed in working out these difficult problems. Nasser said regretted didn’t know President personally but had read about him and had great respect for him.
Believe interview was useful not only to give Humphrey opportunity evaluate Nasser at firsthand but also to afford occasion for Nasser to hear some straight talk from a responsible legislative, as distinct from executive, source. Humphrey did this very well and, although repeatedly referring to his opposition role in domestic and, to lesser extent, in foreign affairs, he adhered strongly to general policy line on subjects discussed. I hope some of his arguments may have sunk in and will produce results. However, my own impression is that Nasser is becoming increasingly impervious to our counsels as he sees himself being brought to bay by our pressures. More and more his attitude seems to be “I have explained my position till I am getting tired of doing so but you don’t heed me or believe me. All right; have it your own way; but it’s your decision, not mine, and the consequences will [Page 590] be your responsibility”. Naturally I don’t condone this view but do believe it represents Nasser’s present mood fairly accurately. This would also suggest that, while in this mood, Nasser’s actions are more apt to be in form of stubborn resistance or intemperate reaction rather than compromise.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–HU/5–257. Secret. Received at 1:51 a.m., May 3. Repeated to Bonn, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Benghazi, and Tunis.↩
- Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D.–Minn.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s subcommittee on the Middle East, paid an extensive visit to the region in April and May 1957.↩