294. Note From the British Embassy to the Department of State1
1. Objectives
H.M.G.’s present thinking is that our objectives should be as follows;—
- (a)
- To get from the Egyptians a unilateral declaration as satisfactory as possible from a Western point of view;
- (b)
- To avoid entering into an agreement with Egypt just yet, because on any calculation of its probable contents it will not comply with the six requirements;
- (c)
- To use the Egyptian declaration as something to which we are prepared to give a trial as a de facto arrangement without prejudice to existing rights or the terms of the final settlement for which we still aim. Whether or not we talk about payment of dues under protest will depend upon the nature of the Egyptian declaration.
2. Tactics
With regard to tactics, we deferred to the U.S. view about asking last Wednesday for a Security Council meeting on Thursday because the U.S. Government thought it best to play the hand that way. Our present thinking is that we will almost certainly need to hold the U.S. Government to their offer to ask for a meeting of the Security Council this week, e.g. on Tuesday for a meeting to take place on Wednesday.2 The reasons for this need are that it does not look possible to prevent a considerable movement of shipping through the Canal much longer [Page 562] and that there are grave dangers to Anglo-American relations and otherwise, if it appears that Nasser is winning his game of so spinning out the negotiations that we have been put at a disadvantage.
3. Security Council Meeting
At such a meeting it is essential in H.M.G.’s present thinking that we should get beyond purely procedural matters, such, for instance, as an invitation to Egypt to attend. Indeed, H.M.G. trust that the U.S. Representative would state the Egyptian advances on their original memorandum, whether those advances have been withdrawn or not. In our view, there should be constructive criticism and suggestions from as many members of the Security Council as possible and the view should be expressed as generally as possible that a trial should be given to the system containing the advances proposed by Egypt as a de facto arrangement. We, and perhaps others, could then say either that we proposed to act in that way, or that we would recommend such action to our associates in SCUA or simply that we would discuss the matter with our associates in SCUA.
4. General
H.M.G. recognise that decisions cannot be taken before Monday when the Egyptian communication is expected. But speed has now become so essential that they consider that the U.S. Government should have this early indication of the way in which their minds are working. For this reason, they would be grateful if they can be informed of the nature of the Egyptian communication as soon as it has been received, so that their study of it can take place as the U.S. Government is considering its attitude.