Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, April 17, 1957—7:02 p.m.

803. Re Suez. Ambassador Caccia² today left with Department memorandum on SC meeting on Suez matter of which following is summary:

1. UK agrees SC meeting should not be asked for today in view US opinion it not wise go to Council on Thursday.³

2. Combined aim should now be to get Egypt publish as soon as possible memorandum containing advances already made and any further progress such as on matters of cooperation with users and independence of development fund.

3. UK would hope declaration with essential modifications and clarification of certain provisions relating to arbitration, jurisdiction of ICJ, “independence” of development fund and organized user cooperation could then be regarded as providing de facto basis for resumed use of Canal. SYG has pointed out to Dixon (UK) that, as six of seven countries to which Egypt had shown draft had “accepted” it, use could be made of this fact, without specifying countries, to establish international character of declaration when registered with UN. SYG thought this better than throwing declaration open for accession which would raise problem of Israel and open door for Egyptian argument that only those who accede could benefit from arrangements proposed in declaration, i.e. arbitration. Under SYG interpretation Egypt would in practice be obliged carry out certain obligations toward international community as a whole. UK for instance would thus be able to profit by provisions of declaration without in any way committing themselves to it. Egypt could no more tear up declaration than tear up a negotiated document.

4. Question is how to get Egypt to publish declaration. Possibly threat SC proceedings might influence publication. But there cannot be much delay. Reasonable hope exists that shipping position can be held over Easter weekend but doubtful how much longer it will be before trickle of ships becomes substantial movement through Canal. UK hopes US will continue use strongest pressures upon US shipping companies to hold off for time being.

5. Consequently UK hopes US will agree if UK requests to issue call on Tuesday for Wednesday SC meeting next week. UK recognizes may not be tactically wise to do so when Tuesday comes. But UK would like to feel it can still count on US Government to act on Tuesday if in light of circumstances then prevailing UK should request it do so.

6. If declaration published, purpose of meeting would be to report on state of negotiations. Tone of report would depend on whether Egypt had withdrawn advances made over original draft. If not, tone need not be unfriendly. If Egypt goes back to original draft, whether or not published, UK would hope US would report facts bluntly.

7. If Egypt publishes declaration in “best form”, from Western point of view, UK would have open mind as to timing and nature of any SC proceedings. In that case, might not even be necessary call meeting, provided Egypt transmits document to SYG. But UK would wish for time to reconsider matter, including complicated issues of arbitration.

8. UK leaves to US decision how hand should be played in Cairo, including introduction into discussions of element of threat regarding SC meeting next week. Could US not say that matter cannot drag on interminably, that US regards itself as having responsibilities to users in general, and that from US point of view it must make early report to SC and to members of UN on situation? This would not in itself be hostile act toward Egypt.

9. If leak occurs and it is alleged US has given in to Egyptian pressure to postpone SC operation, UK would hope it would be said that Easter weekend rather than Egyptian pressure was cause of delay.

(For USUN and AmEmbassy Paris: Above not for communication to French Government.)

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1757. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gamon and approved for by Ware who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London, Cairo, and Paris.
2. Caccia met with Dillon, De Palma, and Shaw early in the morning of April 17. A memorandum of conversation by Shaw, with the attached memorandum summarized in telegram 803, is ibid.
3. April 18.