Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

269. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (De Palma)¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION IF SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM IS TO BE REFERRED TO UN

I. Basis for Renewed UN Consideration

The Canal question might be referred either to the General Assembly or the Security Council. Although it has not dealt directly with the Canal issue, the General Assembly has a basis for considering the matter pursuant to its resolution of November 2, 1956, which urged that steps be taken to reopen the Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation, and by virtue of its action in arranging for the Canal’s clearance.

On the other hand the Security Council remains seized of the Suez Canal item introduced last fall by France and the UK and its resolution of October 13 (six principles) provides the most advantageous approach to the issue. If Egypt now decrees what purports to be a final settlement for the Canal, the Council is entitled to test it against the standard it laid down in the six principles.

In view of the difficulty of managing a GA debate so as to have it focus clearly on this main issue, it is suggested that the matter should be raised in the SC initially and brought to the GA only if the Council is prevented by a Soviet veto from taking constructive action. The threat of a Soviet veto is no argument against action in the Council since presumably Egypt would refuse to comply with any recommendations which are of such a nature as to provoke such a veto. (The possibility of a UK or French veto is not discussed since a basic assumption underlying action in the SC is basic US-UK-French agreement on a course of action.)

II. Objective of Security Council Action

The objective is not, as the French and possibly also the British might have in mind, to demonstrate that they have exhausted every step in the UN and it is again proven impotent to check Nasser.

The objective should be, as a minimum, to elicit from Egypt interpretative statements which will have the effect of committing it more definitely to carry out the six principles or, failing this, to prepare world opinion for any subsequent peaceful pressures which might be brought to bear on Nasser.

As a maximum, the objective should be to bring about further consultations with Egypt with a view to securing elaborations of the Egyptian declaration along the lines of the US suggestions.

III. Possible SC Resolution

A. Recall the Constantinople Convention of 1888, the Security Council resolution of 1951 concerning Israeli transit through the Canal, and the Security Council resolution of October 13 containing six principles.

B. Take note of the Egyptian declaration.

C. Take note of statements of other Members, and particularly of the Representative of Egypt, which would have the effect of binding Egypt to implement the six principles.

D. Take note of various statements by Members of the Council to the effect that the Egyptian declaration in certain respects does not measure up to the six principles.

E. Establish a Committee of the Council to consult with the Government of Egypt with a view (1) to seeking elaborations in the Egyptian declaration designed to bring it into closer conformity with the six principles, and failing to get such elaborations, (2) to recommend to the Security Council the changes necessary to bring the Egyptian declaration into closer conformity with the six principles.

IV. Suggested Tactics

The matter should be brought to the Council only if preliminary consultations have established that there is adequate support for the above course of action and that the UK and France will cooperate in achieving its objectives. Assuming such cooperation, the US would take the lead in requesting a Security Council meeting and in developing support for such a resolution.

Other friendly Members of the Council should be primed to collaborate in seeking clarification from Egypt on the following points:

A. Is Egypt legally bound by the declaration and, if so, what assurance is there that its terms will not be altered by Egypt without regard for the rights of user nations?

B. Are all states beneficiaries of the terms of the declaration?

C. Does Egypt accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ to settle differences arising under the declaration or the 1888 Convention?

D. Are the provisions for arbitration available at the option of the users and does Egypt bind itself to a definite procedure for arbitration?

E. Whose consent is required for an increase in tolls?

(F. Is Israeli shipping covered by the declaration and if not, why not?)

We should get agreement to hold only 3-4 meetings in order to seek such clarification before bringing to a vote a resolution along the above lines. The discussion should avoid recrimination, should be brief and to the point, with every appearance of a sincere effort to promote an acceptable settlement on the basis of the Egyptian declaration.

The question of Israeli transit should be raised but not pressed in the debate, leaving it to be dealt with by the Committee. The initial resolution should not contain provisions for requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ, but the Committee in its report might suggest the terms in which the issue might be presented to the Court.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–457. Confidential. Attached to an unsigned memorandum for the record, dated April 4, which describes an April 4 meeting between Secretary Dulles and his senior staff concerning the Suez Canal. During the meeting, Dulles authorized Rountree to telephone Ambassador Caccia and inform him that the United States was in general agreement with British views concerning the Security Council, which Caccia had discussed with Dillon on April 3. (See Document 266.) Dulles also stated that he was in general agreement with DePalma’s memorandum concerning a suggested course of action in the Security Council, and he expressed his view that he was not at all sure that the Soviet Union would veto the type of resolution described in the memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–457) A memorandum of Rountree’s subsequent telephone conversation with Caccia is ibid. During the conversation, among other points, Rountree told Caccia that the United States had not come to any firm conclusions as to how or when the matter would be taken to the Security Council.